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Editors’ Introduction:
Gender and Nation in Hungary since 1919
The articles of the present volume investigate the intersections of gender
and nation in Hungary since the end of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.
They reflect on the political, social, and cultural developments of the last
hundred years in Hungary that resulted in a wide range of definitions and
discourses concerning the content and boundaries of the nation. The seven
contributions occupy a broad range of disciplines, from political, cultural,
and gender history to literary studies and political science. They explore
the ways in which gender has been used — and abused — in the construc-
tion of the nation under the various regimes that governed Hungary since
1919. Through an intersectional analysis that takes into account the inter-
play of gender, class, and ethnicity, the articles address the following ques-
tions: How were notions and specific definitions of femininity and mascu-
linity mobilized through various political ideologies in Hungarian history?
Who was included in the nation and who, when and why was left out or
excluded from it?
Few terms have generated more studies and debates in the last few
decades in the humanities than nation/nationalism and gender. This intro-
duction is not the place to provide even a cursory overview of the vast
scholarship prompted by the renewed interest in nationalism during the last
couple of decades, especially pertinent in post-Communist East-Central
Europe that has seen a shocking revival of ethnic nationalisms. Similarly,
we cannot possibly do justice to gender studies and women’s history as
they relate to Hungarian studies. Here we can merely point to some of the
main influences and lacunae that inspired the editors and authors of this
volume in their own work.
Benedict Anderson’s analysis of the nation as “an imagined
political community” has transformed the study of nationalism.1 It cast a
critical eye on the nation-building process of modern nations, and on the
discourses that determine the place of individuals and groups within the
nation as well as the roles attributed to them along the lines of gender,
class, ethnicity, race, and sexuality. Anderson and others’ emphasis on the
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role of cultural developments, in particular the intellectual movements of
the Enlightenment and Romanticism as well as print culture, in the nation-
building process offered a highly fruitful vantage point in the East-Central
European context, whose nationalisms, in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries, were grounded in these cultural and intellectual
movements. The connection Ernest Gellner made between emerging nati-
onalisms and modernization has been equally important, and helped to
draw out the common threads in the region’s contested national narratives,
traditionally pitted — and articulated — against one another.2 This trans-
national perspective offered the frameworks of the Enlightenment and
Romanticism for the study of emerging nationalisms of the late 18th and
early 19th centuries, and those of modernization and anti-modernity for an
interpretation of the radical nationalisms of the early twentieth century and
the interwar period, respectively. The influence of these foundational
works can be clearly detected in the, to date, perhaps most important
contribution to East-Central European nationalism studies, the four-
volume reader aptly titled Discourses of Collective Identity in Central and
Southeast Europe (1770-1945).3
Coinciding with the rise of new scholarship on nationalism, in the
last two decades women’s and gender history have gained prominence and
uncovered “the relationships between gender and nationalism. Studies of
women’s participation in national movements and of women’s history
writing have considerably enriched our knowledge of the role of women in
national pasts.”4 Hungarian scholars were largely cut off from women’s
and gender history and studies until the late 1980s but have made great
strides since 1989. As a result, we can now refer to a sizeable body of
scholarship, mapping out the history of the Hungarian women’s move-
ments and women’s increasing participation in higher education and the
professions, rediscovering female artists, and re-evaluating the literary
canon by including “forgotten” woman writers. We can also rely on a
small number of studies exploring sexualities and masculinities in the last
two hundred years of Hungarian history and culture.5 Women’s and gender
studies, however, have failed to breach the walls of mainstream Hungarian
scholarship and academia and, not unlike in other parts of the region,
remained “quarantined.” Likewise, such well-studied topics, pertinent to
the history of Hungarian national consciousness and nationalism, as the
history of Hungarian nationalist and racial ideologies and movements, the
Jewish question, and the right-wing and racist movements and ideologies
of the interwar period, have rarely been studied from a gender perspective.
This is a phenomenon not unique to Hungary: as a Czech historian of gen-
Gender and Nation in Hungary since 1919 7
der and nationalism remarks, “women/gender history throughout Europe
largely has been developing parallel to mainstream national history, rather
than as its integral part.”6 Not even the rise of nationalism in Eastern
Europe after 1989 resulted in the incorporation of women in mainstream
national histories.7
Such pessimistic assessment is not universally accepted: no lesser
authority than Benedict Anderson questions it while pointing to signs of
progress. In his introduction to a 1995 collection of essays surveying the
field of nationalities studies, Anderson states that while “[u]p until recently
theoretical writing on nationalism ignored, overlooked, or marginalized the
issue of gender (…) this ‘silence’ has been irreversibly ended by a vast
corpus of feminist scholarship and theorizing.”8 He adds that most of this
scholarship has focused on Western/European societies and the ambiguous
role women played in various nationalist projects, the way increasing
access to the suffrage and citizenship has transformed (undermined but
also strengthened in new ways) patriarchal gender relations, including the
nation state’s control or attempted control over women’s fertility.9
Writing in the same volume, Sylvia Walby reiterates that “most
texts on nationalism do not take gender as a significant issue”10 yet she
cites the highly influential volume of NiraYuval-Davis and Floya Anthias
as an exception.11 Since its publication in 1989 the volume has inspired
countless studies in a wide range of geographical and historical contexts,
exploring the ways in which gender and gender relations influence
national/ethnic practices and projects.
Examples pertinent to the East-Central European context include
the edited volumes and studies by Maria Bucur, Nancy Wingfield, Karen
Hagemann, Pieter Judson, Marsha Rozenblit, and Melissa Feinberg,
among others.12 A recent volume edited by Agatha Schwartz connects
modernity, one of the key concepts shown to spur on the emergence of the
nation state, to notions and definitions of gender roles.13 A handful of
recent studies explore aspects of Hungarian history and culture under the
lens of gender and nation — and come from scholars working outside of
Hungary, highlighting the reluctance of Hungarian scholars to engage with
gender and theory in general.14
By setting the chronological limits of this volume, we intended to
highlight the break between the liberal prewar period and the anti-liberal
post-1919 period in Hungarian history. The liberal achievements of the
1848-49 revolution and War of Independence and the 1867 Compromise
had brought Hungary into the European mainstream and guaranteed
Jewish emancipation as well as linguistic and cultural rights for the ethnic
Editors’ Introduction8
minorities. By the end of the 19th century women’s education rights were
enshrined in legislation. But these developments were also contested: in
the last decades of the 19th century growing intolerance against the cultural
and political rights of the nationalities and emerging anti-liberal political
parties brought the principles — and practice — of liberal citizenship into
question. By the first decade of the twentieth century the limitations of
citizenship/electoral rights were vehemently contested by the Social
Democratic Party and its trade unions, a strong women’s rights movement,
and the political movements of the nationalities; and at the end of the
WWI the last of these brought down the Monarchy.
In the aftermath of the revolutions and the Trianon Treaty, the
conservative regime of the interwar period articulated a new definition of
citizenship and indeed the Hungarian nation by rejecting the liberal
principles of the prewar period. The dominant Christian-nationalist ide-
ology of the interwar era, especially in its radical representatives, came to
rely on an openly racist and exclusionary rhetoric and political practices.
Universal suffrage, including women, was granted in 1918 and practiced
for the first time in 1920 but would be gradually limited during the inter-
war period. The dominant conservative discourse also reversed the liberal
model of women’s emancipation and reinforced women’s traditional roles
of women in both public and private life. A series of anti-Semitic legis-
lation, from the 1920 numerus clausus law to the so-called Jewish laws
between 1938 and 1941, gradually limited the educational, civil, professi-
onal and economic rights of Hungarian Jews, and eventually stripped
Hungarian Jews of their citizenship on racial grounds.
After 1945 racial and gender discrimination was outlawed and
women finally achieved full citizenship — however, during the Stalinist
period, citizenship would be restricted on social grounds, and members of
the old elite excluded from the nation. Although during the state socialist
period — commonly known as the Kádár regime — these restrictions
would cease to apply, the lack of political democracy and the limits placed
on civil society made a mockery of citizenship rights. The governing
ideology declared discrimination against women and ethnic and racial
minorities (in and outside Hungary) solved, and any form of nationalism
obsolete and superseded by a fictitious, homogenous “socialist nation.”
One of the unexpected and most disappointing developments of
the post-Communist period in Hungary has been the downward turn in
gender equality; the token political representation of women during the
state socialist era was replaced not by genuine political participation but,
quite the opposite, women’s unprecedented under-representation in poli-
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tical life. Despite the commitments for gender parity, undertaken by recent
Hungarian governments and underwritten by the European Union, Hun-
gary lags far behind not only Western European but other post-Communist
countries when it comes to women representatives and leadership positions
in political and economic life. In addition, patriarchal gender discourses
with a decidedly anti-feminist bent have become an accepted part of public
life, including the media. Expressions of racism, sexism, and homophobia,
often by officials of parties represented in parliament, have become
tolerated elements of public discourse. In official celebrations and rhetoric,
highly conservative and Christian gender hierarchies are promoted as the
carriers of traditional Hungarian values, reviving a definition of national
identity reminiscent of the dominant discourses of the interwar period.
It is particularly fitting then that the interwar years are the setting
for four contributions in this volume. In “Nationality, Sexuality, and
Gender in Literary Representations of Ilona Zrínyi” Tímea Jablonczay
explores the interplay between gender and nation-building in Hungary of
the 1920s based on the figure of Ilona Zrínyi. Jablonczay demonstrates
how this 17th-century historical female figure became a captive of the web
of nationalist narratives of the Horthy-era and its homogenizing discourses
about gender identities for the sake of the “imagined community” of the
Hungarian nation, discourses that reinforced patriarchal constructions of
femininity and masculinity.
Fiona Stewart in “‘The Parting of Ways:’ The Shifting Relation-
ship between Anna Lesznai and Emma Ritoók, and the Restructuring of
Hungarian Cultural and Political Life in the Early 1920s,” narrates the
friendship between the two Hungarian women writers. She describes the
breakdown of their personal relationship caused by Emma Ritoók’s
engagement with a racially grounded anti-Semitism. Through this case
study, Stewart offers a picture of the political and cultural atmosphere of
post-Trianon Hungary, an atmosphere increasingly characterized by a
narrow definition of who belonged to the Hungarian nation and who was
to be excluded from it.
In his analysis of the recent Karády renaissance, in “Mata Hari or
the Body of the Nation? Interpretations of Katalin Karády” David S. Frey
dissects the multitude of symbolic meanings that were cast upon the popu-
lar screen star of interwar Hungary. Frey is particularly interested in how
the interwar discourses of gender and nation played out in the numerous
images that Karády embodied in the eyes of many of her contemporaries
and how these images have been re-evaluated and re-contextualized in
post-communist Hungary.
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Róbert Kerepeszki in “Nationalist Masculinity and Right-Wing
Radical Student Movements in Interwar Hungary: The Case of the Turul
Association” describes the development of the leading radical right-wing
student association in interwar Hungary, paying special attention to its
gender aspects. Kerepeszki analyzes the mixture of anti-modernism, anti-
feminism, anti-Semitism, nationalism, and militarism that shaped Turul’s
ideology. Although mentioned only in passing, it is significant that Katalin
Karády and the femininity she represented (the independent, sensual
“femme fatale,” the exact opposite of Turul’s  domestic, motherly and
subordinate feminine ideal) was seen by Turul as a threat to Hungarian
youth and her films were boycotted by Turul’s leadership.
Andrea Pető in “Gendered Exclusions and Inclusions in Hungary’s
Right-Radical Arrow Cross Party (1939-1945): A Case Study of Three
Female Party Members” uses material from the so-called People’s
Tribunals that took place in the immediate post-WWII period. She
analyzes the perspective of three women who found a space for political
agency either through membership in and work for the Arrow Cross Party
or via association with high-ranking Arrow Cross officials. She demon-
strates that, despite the party’s overall anti-modernist gender rhetoric,
some women aligned themselves with its right-wing, anti-Semitic ideology
and embraced an anti-modernist emancipation model so as to give their
“feminine” contribution to what they had considered as the healing of the
dismembered post-Trianon national body.
Katalin Fábián and Tanya Watson both address the gender politics
of the contemporary period. In “Naming Rights: Nation, Family, and
Women’s Rights in the Debates on Domestic Violence in Contemporary
Hungary,” Fábián describes the reluctance to tackle the issue of domestic
violence that pervades Hungarian politics to this day, thus making
Hungary one of the last countries in the European Union without legis-
lation against domestic violence. Through an intersectional analysis, she
presents the various activists of the debate surrounding domestic violence
and, more broadly, violence against women in Hungary against the back-
ground of the new wave of conservative nationalist rhetoric.
In “Hungarian Motherhood and Nők Lapja Café” Tanya Watson
examines the representations of women and motherhood in contemporary
Hungary based on the most popular, mainstream online women’s maga-
zine. In her analysis of a selection of articles, she detects an emphasis on
definitions of motherhood embedded in a strictly heterosexual model of
motherhood, along with a rejection of “foreign” models of motherhood
and parenting in favour of the “true” Hungarian ways of mothering.
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With this special volume we intend to provide a forum for young
and established researchers, from both Hungary and North America, to
present their research and thus establish links of communication between
scholars working within and outside Hungary. While the fields and themes
covered in the volume are by no means exhaustive, we are hopeful that this
forum will encourage young scholars to engage with or continue their
work on these pertinent topics and that the studies published here will
inspire further discussion.
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Nation, Sexuality and Gender in Literary
Representations of Ilona Zrínyi
Tímea Jablonczay
An interest in women writers is not entirely new to contemporary Hunga-
rian literary criticism. However, interpretations related to issues of gender,
sexuality and nation have been largely left out of literary scholarship. In
my paper I will examine literary representations of Ilona Zrínyi (Jelena
Zrinska). Rather than focusing on the biography of this historical per-
sonality, the subject of my analysis will be her representations in selected
narratives that feature her as the main protagonist, with an emphasis on
Mária Szentmihályi Szabó’s novel Zrínyi Ilona.1
Ilona Zrínyi is one of the few women in Hungarian collective
memory that have not been “forgotten” and neither was her inclusion in
Hungarian history ever banned or suppressed by changing regimes. Her
figure has been constantly evoked and re-imagined in historical literary
narratives and visual representations and as such, she is deeply embedded
in national cultural memory. Nevertheless, one question immediately
arises: which collective memory casts her story into a particular narrative?
In the 19th century, her figure became mythical, her portrait woven into a
nation-building ideology. Historians, literary scholars, and writers tended
to depict her figure as a symbol of national freedom and her story often
became an allegory of nationalistic ideas. I will examine how Ilona
Zrínyi’s historical figure was appropriated by nationalist discourse parti-
cularly between the two World Wars. In discussing this particular example
of Hungarian nationalism, I will pay particular attention to the role of
gender in nation-building discursive practices. I will be asking the follow-
ing two questions: which line of rhetoric identifies Irona Zrínyi with the
role of the mother of the nation; and what historical, cultural and political
context was able to cast her in that role? My arguments are based on works
in social history of the 17th century and the period of 1920-1945.
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Two sets of national narratives about Ilona Zrínyi seem to have
emerged. In one concept of the nation, the one in which gender is homo-
genized and totalised by rhetorical strategies, she repeatedly became the
symbol of national coherence: the warrior woman, the wife of Ferenc
Rákóczi I, the mother of national hero Ferenc Rákóczi II, the loving wife
of Imre Thököly, the niece of the famous Hungarian poet and commander
Miklós Zrínyi, the daughter of Péter Zrínyi, Ban of Croatia. We can see
from this list that she appears as belonging to men, her personality takes up
meaning and significance mostly in relation to them. The historian of the
period, Ágnes R. Várkonyi, who attempted to understand the role of this
historical figure in its cultural and historical context, constructs another
narrative about her. In it, Ilona Zrínyi is a modern landowner, the pleni-
potentiary mistress of the Rákóczi estate, the “lord lieutenant” of the
county of Sáros; she makes history during the siege of Munkács2 but not
so much as a revolutionary as an outstanding diplomat and politician.3 I
will investigate how social consciousness has shaped narratives about
Ilona Zrínyi’s life, deeds and personality — especially during the interwar
period — and attempted to present her according to the dominant images
of femininity and women’s social roles. Ilona Zrínyi as a national heroine
is a metaphorical figure in national ideology and as such it offers an
example to follow. It is also inextricably linked to the image of the “dowa-
ger,” which has a particular significance in Hungarian social history.4
I will be using the example of Mária Szentmihályi-Szabó’s novel
titled Ilona Zrínyi5 in order to demonstrate how to work female national
identity as a discursive strategy within a national narrative. For my analy-
sis of the historical context, I will be relying on Jürgen Habermas’s theory
of the public sphere.6 I will argue that the historical figure Ilona Zrínyi was
appropriated under the Horthy-era for ideological purposes. It was a
contradictory appropriation as her image of the “mother of the nation” was
based on both feminine and masculine aspects, but because of her
secondary position in relation to her male counterparts, sexual and national
identity completely merged in this representation.
Gender, sexuality and nation
There are numerous examples in theories about nationalistic discourse that
are related to female identity patterns, roles and figures.7 I wish to explore
some junctions that are pertinent to critical discourse analysis. If we look
at nationalist discourse in relation to female identities, we will be able to
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understand, on the one hand, the social and cognitive processes that al-
lowed one social group privileged access to and control over other groups
and, on the other, the relationship between nationalism and gender, parti-
cularly in the historical periods under scrutiny.
Recently, feminist scholars have drawn attention to the fact that
“all nations depend on powerful constructions of gender.”8 Masculine and
feminine roles in nation-building have been subject to both historical and
rhetorical analysis. Historically, the concept of the nation has been tied to
the construction of gender identities.9 The nation as an “imagined commu-
nity”10 not only constructs identities but also defines gender roles
designated for its citizens. Femininity and masculinity and the construction
of normative sexuality have evolved in various forms of nationalism; in
turn, the nation is linked to gender by these very same discursive practices.
Nationalism and gender as linked to hierarchical relations run through all
systems of cultural representation. In the constitution and control of
national cultural representation leadership is a privilege of men. Men and
women do not share the same right of access to national resources since
the preferred gender identity in relation to the nation is masculine.11 In this
discourse women are ascribed a symbolic and metaphorical role. The role
of women and the family is, first and foremost, tied to national symbols.
Women’s role in nationalist discourse can be considered as one of submis-
sion because, as symbolic carriers of the nation, they represent a meta-
phorical liminality without being given any space as agents of the nation in
the public sphere. That is to say, the national discourse offers a mute
position for women; women cannot have their own identity since they
have no national identity (“the nation remains the property of men”). Thus
women’s identity lacks both a collective and a subjective dimension.12
According to Nira Yuval Davis and Floya Anthias, the participation of
women in the national project does not seem to be a passive one because
their symbolic status is connected to their reproductive role: in the nation-
alist rhetoric they can produce the “pure” nation which is both a biological
and an ideological reproduction (culturally and symbolically defending the
borders of the nation, therefore the nation is reproduced through their role
as a symbolic border guard).13
Women’s participation in nation-building and the development of
the modern bourgeois public sphere reveals complicated intersections and
crossings between the private and the public spheres. At the end of the 19th
century, social and economical changes in Hungary had shifted the
structure of both the private sphere and that of the traditional family.
Women’s access to higher education and their increased professional and
Tímea Jablonczay16
employment opportunities along with their organizing in various associ-
ations encouraged women to take on a more public role. After 1919, pre-
World War I feminism that had dared to openly challenge patriarchy
encountered a conservative and right-wing discourse within the women’s
movement itself, along with an anti-feminist backlash in the public arena.
Christian political (including women’s) organisations with a conservative
agenda began to negate women’s emancipation using essentialist argu-
ments.
During the interwar period, the horizontal private-public polariza-
tion was masked by nationalist strategies attempting to demonstrate that
women were equal subjects in the public sphere. Both women and men
had been given the right to vote, but behind this apparent equality, women
continued to be controlled both in the public and the private spheres.
National consciousness (as dictated by the conservative Horthy-regime)
with regard to political reform — along with a Christian nationalist ide-
ology — tried to preserve traditional female roles and family models. This
was supported by the existing social systems (educational, political, legal,
family, media, cultural, etc). However, parallel to attempts to revert to a
conservative family model and gender roles, the fact that the modern way
of life gradually gained more and more ground (through the media and
improved educational opportunities) could neither be halted nor ignored.14
Political and regional revisionism — the period’s dominant
agenda, aiming to restore the “historical,” pre-war territories taken away
from Hungary in the Trianon Treaty — offered women a symbolic place in
the program of nation-building through the rhetoric of cultural national-
ism.15 Women’s traditional roles in the family were expanded into the role
of the mother of the nation. The trope for the family as nation and for the
nation as family works in a discursive way in the stabilization of the nation
state.16 The agenda of political revision of Hungary’s borders had tied
women to the frame of motherhood and the frame of nationhood. Thus it is
understandable why feminism was a thorn in the eye of nationalist rheto-
ric. Feminism was often — wrongly — perceived as an attack on mother-
hood and — rightly — as challenging traditional gender values; therefore,
because of the metaphorical identification of the nation with motherhood,
women’s emancipation was seen as dangerous for the nation. Thus liberal
feminism, along with all other activism or organization not in agreement
with the national framework, had to be stifled.
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“What can Ilona Zrínyi teach us today?”17
Nationalism has to operate political myths such as the “invention of
tradition” in order to sustain the idea of the powerful, substantial nation.18
The invented traditions are based on either symbolic or ritualistic rules,
revising certain behaviour patterns and stressing the continuity of the past
so as to maintain the constructed coherence of the nation. Invented tradi-
tions have significant social and political functions and none of these
traditions would come into existence nor establish themselves if they were
not able to acquire these functions.19 Many woman writers from the
interwar period, among them Mária Szentmihályi-Szabó, took on impor-
tant roles in this process through their historical and biographical novels.
Significant historical events and heroines or transformed orders of histori-
cal events and turning points are at the centre of these narratives. These
texts also work in the collective memory by producing continuity between
the past and the present; that way collective cohesion, an “us”-conscious-
ness is reinforced and the process of exclusion established.  Szentmihályi-
Szabó’s novel about Ilona Zrínyi not only portrays a female historical
figure’s life but it also serves as a good example of collective identity
formation and of how collective memory operates.
Other, male authors, such as Sándor Takáts in his study Régi
magyar nagyasszonyok (Hungarian dowagers of the past) attempted to
reinvent the role of the dowager as a socially constructed concept.20 Takáts
only depicts Kata Zrínyi and Dorica Zrínyi while Ilona Zrínyi is left out
both in this book and a later one, Magyar nagyasszonyok (Hungarian
dowagers) published in 1926. Although he does include Ilona Zrínyi in
some other texts, she is represented as a woman whose political judgment
becomes emphasized once she is forced into the role of the dowager.
Takáts emphasizes her “masculine spirit” with a didactical message, but
her representation (or rather lack of it) is produced through her political
relation with the Habsburgs (and/or with the Germans).21 Takáts’s texts
extol women’s symbolic role as guardians of the nation. Thus in Magyar
nagyasszonyok women can surpass men by selflessly living for the nation
and by being capable of dying for their ideals. In the author’s words,
women “are the most faithful guardians of national traditions, customs and
of the national language;” “they are the biggest enemies of foreign fashion
and morals,” and they learned what it means “to blaze for national glory,
to yearn for national goals; “they cannot be persuaded to leave their
homeland” and they lure their husbands back home from Vienna when
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“the Viennese wind blows the memory of their Hungarian homes out of
their [the husbands’] heads.”22
The anti-Habsburg resistance is a constitutive element in the con-
struction of Ilona Zrínyi’s role as a dowager in the works of Miklós Aszta-
los and József Vértes. They emphasize her marriage to Rákóczi and her
role as a mother while Thököly, her second husband, is marginalised. In
these representations, Ilona’s marriage to Rákóczi gains significance not
for its romantic dimension but for its decisive impact on the national
cause. What matters is the strategic element contained in the maintenance
of property, the building of family connections, and the Wesselényi
conspiracy: “glory was waving at Rákóczi and the road to St. Steven’s
crown was free.”23 These are just some examples of the numerous Ilona
Zrínyi representations in the first half of the 20th century. Her 1906
reburial — along with Thököly and Rákóczi — provoked a renewed
literary interest in her figure. Regarding her cult, 1943 became a really
important year as this was the 300th anniversary of her birth. During this
period, it was particularly important to reinvent historical personalities and
events and to celebrate them as a vital part of collective memory.
It is highly significant that Ilona Zrínyi appears as the central
figure in Ágnes R. Várkonyi’s recent research.24 Here Ilona Zrínyi has
become recontextualized and revalued as she is interpreted as a sovereign
personality, a politician and diplomat without the attributes of the dowa-
ger. In Várkonyi’s interpretation, Zrinyi’s marriage to Rákóczi made her
the richest woman in Hungary. Widowed at thirty-three, she had the
decision-making power of an autonomous leader. Thanks to her out-
standing diplomatic skills, she negotiated that her son (Ferenc Rákóczi II)
not be put under the guardianship of Emperor Leopold. She became the
lord lieutenant of Sáros county and managed her domains. She supported
her people, listened to their complaints and helped them regardless of their
religious affiliation. Her subject status, her autonomy and decision-making
power cannot, however, solely be regarded as a Zrínyi inheritance. On the
one hand, in 17th-century Hungary, women were more equal to men than
they were 100 years later; on the other hand, Ilona Zrínyi was probably
also driven by the pressure of circumstances. Várkonyi emphasizes that
she did not have many relatives and that she led a very secluded life.
According to Várkonyi, Munkács became the centre of the modern
estates Ilona Zrínyi headed. In Munkács, she introduced trading activities
and established diplomatic relations. She corresponded with Poland and
Transylvania and kept the international political publics informed as much
as she kept herself informed. Várkonyi calls her a “diplomatic bridgehead”
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with the main function to manage foreign politics and to keep Europe’s
interest in Hungarian matters alive in times of the Ottoman invasion so as
to ensure the country’s political self-determination, religious freedom and
economic growth.25 According to historical research and in reference to
Habermas’s theory, the public sphere began to form as early as the 17th
century through the expression of a public opinion on foreign and
domestic policy.26 Information in newsletters, leaflets and weeklies
reached the public pointing to the existence of an information network.
The Ottoman invasion was followed with great interest all over Western
Europe. In this respect, Munkács was a strategic centre. Ilona Zrínyi was
featured in “headlines” in Italian, German, English, French, and Dutch
newspapers and leaflets. People worried about her, admired her, protested
on her behalf and she was considered the most courageous woman in
Europe. One French magazine depicted her covered in armour from head
to toe in front of burning bastions. In a Spanish drama, she was featured in
the collapsing great hall of her castle surrounded by clouds of gunpowder
smoke.”27 It was unprecedented in 17th century Europe “that a woman
would be compared to the ruler of the Habsburg Empire, Leopold I., King
of Germany and Hungary and Roman Emperor.”28
As Várkonyi has pointed out, for centuries the evaluation of Ilona
Zrínyi’s historical figure was constructed through a romantic-national
ideology. Her character had been endowed with stereotypes that fit the
ideology of a given period. In the interwar period, Ilona Zrínyi became a
nationalist symbol through the role of the dowager constructed by nati-
onalist ideology. The figures of the representative public sphere (not
interpreted by history) are able to lend themselves to national symboli-
zation because they do not resist the work of symbols; they embody the
possibility of identification and identity as in the representative public
sphere the lord, the crown coincides with the total state (nation). Aspects
of gender have to be taken into consideration as well since female figures
from the 16-17th centuries appeared as agents in certain historical situ-
ations: they participated actively in political life and thus shaped historical
events. Nationalist ideology from the romantic to the interwar periods
exploited these illusory identities centred in the representative public
sphere where its gender aspects transgressed the binary opposition of
hierarchic feudalism.
In the interwar years, with a weakening of patriarchy’s privileged
positions discussed above, the structures of power and submission were
yet again reinforced. The hierarchy had to be strengthened and mascu-
linity and femininity redefined according to their traditional attributes.
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Ilona Zrínyi thus becomes the defender of national culture, a mythical
figure. She is passive, subverted (too feminine) because she is a sup-
porting actor to her son, her father, her uncle and her two husbands. Thus
her heterosexual female identity becomes constructed by and through
men. The national–gender–sexual identity becomes linked to the role of
the dowager and socially accepted as a representation that reflects the
values and interests of the community and contributes to the constitution
of social consciousness.
The genre of Mária Szentmihályi-Szabó’s novel
This novel fits into the Hungarian historical and biographical narratives of
the 1920s and 1930s. We could define it with the term “historical-
biographical novel”29 because of its focus on biographical events and the
private life of the main protagonist. This “historical-biographical novel”
based on a historical narrative around a female protagonist adds a gender
aspect to the national discourse. A national allegory operates with a
totalizing homogenisation in the surface structure by concealing the dis-
continuities in the text.30 However, the splits and fractures are fixed in the
unconscious of the text. Thus the figure of Ilona Zrínyi becomes trans-
formed into a national symbol, but the ambivalence of the signification
system as symbolism and the operation of the ideological discourse are
revealed by her very representations as a national symbol.
In the 1930s Hungarian literature tended to search for topics in the
past that could serve as an analogy for the present while also projecting the
future. A representation of the historically authentic — the factual — was
therefore given preference. The actual series of events were written as a
pattern using a romantic template to make it look like an illusion of reality.
The narrative of the “imagined community,” however, cannot conceal the
tension that arises from the instability of the pursuit of an idealised uni-
formity. The presence of arbitrary symbols is used to create the narrative
of the nation; in other words, the narrative is a cultural construct attempt-
ing to set up meanings regarding the origins of the nation. The nation
appears as the signified in this allegory, but the process of representation
produces a slippage and repetition of the metonymic signification.31 The
homogeneous time of national stability prefers to be presented as
simultaneity by abolishing diversity so that the temporal shift in historical
time can be manifested. The metonymic slippage happens through the gen-
der aspects of discursive practices. In Szentmihályi-Szabó’s novel, wo-
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men’s subjectivity is part of a national narrative, built on the pattern of an
assumed past and the construction of a 17th-century gender role that, is,
again, considered socially acceptable in the public mind of the 1920s and
1930s.
This constructed role must be read as the product of a retrograde
history that dominates the thought of the official national discourse under
the Horthy-era with its claim of a linear historical narrative and a fixed
horizontal nation-space. Inasmuch as the past was regarded as meaningful
for the present, the selection of a past relevant to the construction of the
present became limited, including alternative roles for women; thus the
story of Ilona Zrínyi’s life did not allow the casting of a different kind of
female figure. Such reading of the past and of accepted roles for women
were deeply entrenched in the collective memory of Szentmihályiné’s
times and its institutional norms and practices. Although a patriarchal
construct, the “dowager” gender construction became transmitted by both
male and female writers to female readers through such historical-
biographical narratives.
In this respect, it is important to consider the process of this
novel’s reception and its use of genre. On the one hand, the novel demon-
strates the process of constructing the nation as an eternal albeit imaginary
form. On the other hand, the historical novel was a popular genre and thus
shaped readers’ attitudes by catering to large audiences and simultaneously
exerting an integrative function; the readers could understand themselves
as members of one nation rather than isolated individuals. National-
historical narratives thus contributed in an important way to the construc-
tion of a national identity in the 1930s. According to historians, ethnicity
did not actually play an integral part in the construction of collective
identity in feudal societies. Regional aspects, religious and possibly pro-
fessional status could be constitutive in the construction of collective
identities.32 The official view of history in the 1930s, which is represented
in the novel, however, held the common language and common origin to
be the main forces of cohesion. The novel is built on such “fictional ethni-
city” as it emphasizes national identity in Ilona Zrínyi’s self-definition.
Every feature of her character is submitted to national principles; thus
information about her Croatian background is withheld and so to speak
bracketed from the readers. The following quote shows how a common
Hungarian origin is created through the use of rhetoric: “The mother,
Katalin Frankopan, also came from a family that was proud of its past.
Although Croatians in origin, the Frankopans were Hungarian through and
through and stood out with their power and prowess as far back as the
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reign of the Árpád dynasty.”33 The protagonist Mózes Gaál knows that he
cannot lie about the discrepancy in the family’s background; therefore he
recurs to a rhetorical strategy to justify the attachment of Hungarianness to
the house of Árpád.
If we regard this novel through the lens of a Bildungsroman, we
can examine how a national narrative about a woman can establish the
heroine’s subject position. Such a narrative illustrates how the ideology of
male domination operates: the subordinates are influenced into accepting
their subordination without questioning it and they themselves create a
female representation based on homogenizing essentialism. The biogra-
phical genre is interesting for the ways in which this particular novel
embeds a woman’s life story in a traditionally patriarchal narrative genre
as a narrative of development (Bildungsroman). The heroine is void of
contradictions; her character and habits do not change. Instead of a self-
reflecting subjectivity accompanying a fragmented career path — which
would have been allowed in the historical context — her identity, from the
first moment on, seems to be coherent and embedded in a pre-narrative
frame. The plot of the narrative follows a pre-modern literary pattern as it
is motivated by predestination. The destiny of the female protagonist is
indicated from the beginning of her life story and the relationships
between the protagonists can be regarded as framed by a predetermined
national destiny. Being a subject of history as a female Bildungsroman
protagonist is interesting given that traditionally this genre was reserved
for the subject development of a male protagonist. The main ambivalence
of the narrative form in this case lies in the fact that the heroine does not
need to enter the social sphere because she is already placed there from
birth, but she does have to take on an identity only accessible to men in
patriarchal discourse. For the narrative the identity of the heroine is
accounted for as given and coherent, her subject position in the socio-
symbolic order is identified with a position of power. In this sense the
conventional linear narrative form frames the metaphorical identification
of the family story (the woman’s life story) and the national (pre-modern)
history: Ilona Zrínyi’s life story and identity become the (hi)story of the
nation’s own identity. The heroine acquires a subject position through the
pre-given metaphor of the mother of the nation.
She does not only identify with a position offered by the nation,
but her sexual identity is also determined by the national principle. The
designated role of women in the family, motherhood as the sole female
function and value is elaborated along with the ideology of the biological
function and nature. When the family becomes the trope of the nation, the
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analogy of the story of the family and the history of the country (the
nation) appear in the narratives. Besides the designated women’s stories
and the marriages in favour of the stabilization of the nation, the inter-
locked feminine and masculine roles come to light, but instead of the
possibility of self-representation for men, Ilona does not become the sub-
ject of her own story because that was possible for men only.
Properties of the text
What specific devices does this narrative use in order to construct and
interchange causal relationships in a manipulative way? As outlined
above, Zrínyi Ilona has to take a fixed position regarding her gender roles,
her sexual identity is swallowed up by the nation, and every aspect of her
identity (ethnic, class, gender) becomes dissolved in the national identity.
The national ideology extends itself into the subject’s body. How does
Ilona Zrínyi become a national symbol, how does a national ideology
monopolize the body of the female subject?
Controlling sexuality and reproduction is important to nation-
building and to maintaining national identity. The expression of sexual
desire and practice is also defined by the development of coherent gender
norms in the regulatory practices of power. The fictional Ilona Zrínyi
becomes controlled by power in that her sexual desire is determined by
the active or passive roles men play in nation-building. The narrative
about her private life becomes intertwined with the public sphere of the
nation, the public takes over the private. The woman’s social and sexual
identity is subordinated to the national identity. Her desire grows with her
readiness to be of service to her homeland. Ferenc Rákóczi II is repre-
sented as subordinate to his mother and as unable to separate from her,
thus she is represented only in her role as mother, nurse, and shelter. She
can desire Thököly only because he positions himself as a leader, his life
being determined by his fight against the Emperor and for his country.
Ilona Zrínyi is aware of why she needs him: their encounter is defined by
a sense of belonging and the physical experience of love. Thököly, the
leader, smites the armies of the Emperor and recaptures castles; he thus
perfectly embodies the man she needs, he almost acts out her intentions.
However, her desire makes her the servant of the man (the nation): she
follows and serves him by wanting nothing else. The discursive practice
puts the biological sex in the service of a national gender construction and
does not allow the woman to be the subject of a different desire. At this
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point the desires are not only oriented by the patriarchal discourse, but the
structure of institutionalization extends to a combination of national tenets
and sexual desires. When the anti-Turkish Zrínyis’ daughter becomes
aware of Thököly’s pro-Turkish feelings, her desire for him abates.34 This
rhetorical practice is by no means limited to Szentmihályi-Szabó’s novel;
we can also find it in Vértes’s representation of Ilona Zrínyi: “Amidst
love’s pleasures, in passionate embraces, during sweet, intoxicating teas-
ing, Ilona never failed to mention the great idea of Hungarian freedom.”35
The body becomes monopolized by the national ideal in that a
causal relation is established between sexual identity and national identity:
the carrier of sexual desire becomes nationalized. In the interchange of
cause and effect sexual desire is subordinated not only to the masculine but
both become engulfed by the national and thus made normative.36 The
identification of sexual identity with national ideology is a performative
act: both femininity and masculinity are tied to the biological sex. The
metaphorical protection of national borders is imposed upon the body; thus
the control of the personal physical aspect also becomes essential to
national security. Guarding the borders becomes synonymous with keep-
ing to acceptable sexual boundaries, and through this “border guarding”
the techniques of power can reinforce and homogenize the national com-
munity.
Such examples might seem to point to the national appropriation
of sex, but what is of equal interest is the historical construction created by
discursive practice. Here we might recall, as per Habermas’s account that
the public and the private are not separated in the representative public
sphere, that the reigning prince/princess represents his/her status and also
him-/herself. To choose Ilona Zrínyi as a reigning princess (fejedelem-
asszony) within the feudal representative public sphere is problematic and
also provocative because already as a historical figure she resists this
cliché. In Várkonyi’s portrait, on the other hand — which could offer an
alternative representation as a basis for a different kind of collective
memory — she is a politician who actively shapes her own image, a sub-
ject who resists the roles imposed upon her and challenges the meanings of
the prescribed national narrative. It is obvious, though, how in the Hun-
garian context of the Horthy-era the national public and private spheres
become interlocked: the reproductive practices of sexual desires come
under state control and they wrap around the given figure (here Ilona
Zrínyi) the construct of a public representation that the power structures
can identify with.
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National framework — maternal framework
Given that Ilona Zrínyi resists the strategies of patriarchal power, she
becomes an ambivalent patriarchal symbol at the intersection of mirroring
representations and of a historical narrative. The realization of national
totality through language can be caught in the arbitrarily created symbol of
maternity. As seen above, social separation of gender roles is important
within nationalist ideology. Through national discourse, biological and
gender roles overlap with metaphorical identification. The protection of
national territory becomes gendered: the military has masculine connota-
tions — courage, force, heroism — whereas the feminine equals weakness
and submission. As such it is linked to peace and must be protected.
In order to consider the protection of the nation (of women) as
men’s undertaking, at the level of discourse, weakness must be demons-
trated as a biological given. If borders were to be violated, it would imme-
diately have to be proclaimed as an anomaly. Therefore the heroines
represented as national and patriarchal symbols must be dethroned and
domesticated. Motherhood as an institutional practice falls into the hands
of the power of the state. Maternal characteristics of feminity have to be
emphasized and subordinated to the service of the nation. Ilona Zrínyi
hardly fits the ideal of a conservative man — the pure, virtuous, passive
woman — as, being an active politician and decision-maker, she does not
need his protection. In order to maintain the feminine ideal, the national
pantheon had to prove that she defended the nation through her maternal
abilities — otherwise she would become a threat to the symbol of the
nation. The patriarchal and national representations of motherhood turn her
into a mythical ideal of maternity and the apparent contradictions are
resolved through her subordinaton. Her place is fixed in traditional roles,
she becomes a guardian of tradition who already as a young woman
demonstrates maternal feelings toward her younger sister.37 She is con-
structed as a mother that her son will be able to identify with. In Munkács,
she only protects the rights of her children; rather than being “a swag-
gering woman who dresses in an armour and puts herself on display, she
was a princely-proud woman, a heroine through her maternal love and
spousal fidelity.”38 In her young son Ferenc Rákóczi, she reinforces the
value of fighting for and belonging to the nation through imaginary
mediation by singing him songs and telling him fables about valiant heroes
who fight the Turkish invader. Despite her ambiguities, her only merit to
Hungarians becomes having given birth to and nurtured Ferenc Rákóczi II.
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The level of specificity and the degree of completeness: an ideological
point of view
Like Szentmihályi-Szabó’s biographical novel, other national narratives
about women were also written for a wide though predominantly female
audience. We can track the propaganda, the intention to influence public
opinion through various narrative devices such as in what kind of logical
order the events appear, what parts of the events are withheld, what kind of
“facts” are overemphasized, and how the ideological viewpoint and the
characters’ use of language are activated. The hidden discursive processes
not only convey to the readers group values and norms but they also
inform about the creation of social consciousness and public opinion so
that the reader makes his/her own conclusions as per the implied power
interest.
Szentmihályi-Szabó’s novel about Ilona Zrínyi is a rhetorical
construct that puts into representational practice women’s fixation within
the space and homogenous time of the nation thus legitimizing it. We have
seen that this narrative constitutes Ilona Zrínyi as a national symbol, her
figure is identified with the nation both at the synecdochical and
metaphorical levels. The synechdoche stands for the part of the whole,
while this part also becomes identical with the whole as in a metaphor: the
private and public, the family and the nation all merge into one. The nation
monopolizes the female subject through its biological and sexual identity,
it directs her desires so as to submit it to the idea of the national com-
munity. How does the ideology expressed in the narrative viewpoint serve
this discursive practice?
The narrator’s speech from a privileged, omniscient position does
not only describe the characters’ inner lives. The thoughts, emotions and
memories of the protagonist are told through narrative descriptions, but it
is worth examining the ideological position of the narration and how the
represented world is ideologicaly mediated. Although the novel is first and
foremost written according to the principles of realism, the relationship
between the story and the narration is characterized by multiple perspec-
tives and a frequent shift in points of view. True, the narrator relates the
events in close succession, but the division of the narrative is not achieved
by breaking it up into chapters but rather through a change in space, time
and point of view. However, despite this multiplicity in perspectives, there
are no different worldviews; instead, one dominant ideological point of
view transpires and the events and characters are evaluated according to a
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single value system. The other points of view are subordinate to the domi-
nant point of view and the characters are also subjected to this ideological
viewpoint.
There is an emphasis in the narrative on everybody presenting
themselves, and this self-presentation usually goes against how others
view them. The character of Ferenc I Rákóczi, for example, is represented
from Ilona Zrínyi’s perspective and value system. Ferenc is thus seen as
weak and unprotected, as someone who needs protection. He has only a
few chances to speak, but the psycho-narrative insertion makes it obvious
that he is aware of Ilona’s desire not being directed at him. In the follow-
ing course of the narration, the multiple perspectives become subordinated
to the national ideological point of view: the national identity goubles up
every other identity of the subject. When young Ilona feels that Rákóczi is
able to reconcile the Protestants and to wield power, she looks at him
“with the gentle bashfulness of nascent love” and sees him as “superior to
others”. Ferenc’s reaction is conveyed through an internal narrative per-
spective: “As if his woman’s desire called out for him, Ferenc made a
move.”39 But when his mother’s servant enters, Ilona’s desire subsides,
and we can see from Ferenc’s perspective that he feels he has been caught
in a net. He had signed a contract, and if he does not obey, Peter Zrínyi
will take Ilona away from him.40 Ferenc might appear as a national hero
from his own perspective, but the interspersed narrative voices and the
image transpiring through Ilona Zrínyi’s perspective create an image of
him as that of a cowardly anti-hero who leaves the battlefield and seeks
refuge at his mother’s so as to escape execution. When the Wesselényi
conspiracy is unveiled, Ilona begins to see Rákóczi’s cowardice and his
weakness: “conscious of her helplessness, she would have liked to shout
out into the world how disappointed she was by all living men! She only
ever found strength, endurance, and pride amongst women!”41 Other ele-
ments of this ideological point of view can be found in other terms,
phrases, and symbols, which directly belong to the authorial voice. The
worldviews of the characters are thus constructed and linked with their dis-
course.
Conclusion
Representations of Ilona Zrínyi as a symbolic Hungarian border guard are
geared toward ideologically maintaining the Hungarian national com-
munity in separation from others. The cultural codes of masculinity and
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femininity — in customs, religion, literature, art production, language,
clothing, behaviour — are inscribed in the operation of a national dis-
course as a power tenet. The intersectionality of nation–gender–sex within
the national sphere evolves as the national discourse and/or the discourses
of gender and sexuality are changing in a given society. That is to say that
these structures and discourses are in an interdependent relation. These
are not fixed categories but rather cultural and historical constructions and
competing political and symbolic areas where groups struggle with each
other for control over their meanings.42 When a society’s institutional
cultural discourses form the surface of a nation’s  space and time through
its symbols’ totalizing representations, gender is dichotomized through
discourse into social production (male identity) and reproduction (female
identity) thus tying masculinity and femininity to biological gender roles.
We cannot understand the concept of nation and nationalism
without analyzing the integration of gender and sexuality in the concept of
nation. The analysis of the discursive practices of power, control and
hegemony in the representations of Ilona Zrínyi can be understood if we
examine the relationship between gender, sexuality and nation. Her
historical figure became easily appropriated by a representational practice
rooted in a romantic historiographic tradition, which incorporated a mid-
19th century national model of femininity into its own image without any
reflection and through the exclusion of a critical historical consciousness,
and made it into its national symbol based on the idea of sameness. Such
1920s’ and 1903s’ representations of the 17th century not only meant a
strengthening of patriarchal roles, but they also attached fixed gender
identities to a homogenizing and totalizing nation-construct and thus
reinforced governing power structures.
Meanwhile, another narrative about Ilona Zrínyi could also be
told. Its heterogeneities would disturb the homogenizing processes and its
third space would deconstruct the essentialism of the imagined com-
munity.43 Its subject would resist the nationalist calling and it would
evoke the trope of an alternative national allegory. But such a narrative
would create a very different past and also a very different present.
NOTES
1 Countess Ilona Zrínyi (Jelena Zrinska), 1643-1703, was born in the
famous Croatian Zrinski family in Osalj, Croatia. Her mother was Katarina
Frankopan. Her father, Petar Zrinski (Peter Zrínyi), Ban of Croatia was executed
Literary Representations of Ilona Zrínyi 29
by the Habsburgs for high treason. Her first husband was Ferenc (Francis)
Rákóczi I, the elector prince of Transylvania whom she married in 1666. Their son
was Ferenc Rákóczi II, the leader of the Hungarian uprising against the
Habsburgs. As a widow, she inherited and controlled the vast Rákóczi estates and
married Imre Thököly, the leader of the so-called Kuruc rebellion against the
Habsburgs in the 1680s. Ilona defended the family castle in Munkács, Ruthenia -
Mukachevo in present-day Ukraine — against the Habsburgs for 3 years. Finally
overpowered, she was taken to Vienna. Her children were taken from her and
educated under the auspices of Leopold I. Eventually Ilona Zrínyi and Thököly
went into exile in the Ottoman Empire and later died in Nikomedia (Izmit).
2 Today Mukachevo in Ukraine.
3 Ágnes R.Várkonyi’s historical research serves as inspiration for my
interpretation based on critical discourse analysis. Ágnes R. Várkonyi, Zrínyi
Ilona, „Európa legbátrabb asszonya” [Ilona Zrínyi, Europe's most courageous
woman] (Budapest: Magyar-Török Baráti Társaság, 2008).
4 On the “dowager role” see more in László Kürti’s article in Hungarian
„A nemek képei” [Images of gender], in Andrea Pető, ed. Társadalmi nemek képe
és emlékezete Magyarországon a 19-20. században. [Image and memory of
gender in 19-20th-century Hungary] (Budapest: Nők a Valódi Esélyegyenlőségért
Alapítvány, 2004), 113-131. In English see László Kürti, “Eroticism, Sexuality
and Gender Reversal in Hungarian Culture,” in Sabrina Petra Ramet, ed., Gender
Reversals and Gender Cultures: Antropological and Historical Perspectives
(Routledge, London, New York, 1996), 148-163.
5 The first edition of the novel was published in 1939. I will be quoting
from the following edition: Szentmihályiné-Szabó Mária, Zrínyi Ilona. (Bukarest:
Kriterion, 1992).
6 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere:
An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. by Thomas Burger and
Frederick Lawrence (Boston: MIT Press, 1989).
7 See George Mosse, Nationalism and Sexuality: Middle-Class Morality
and Sexual Norms in Modern Europe (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
1988); Nira Yuval-Davis, Gender and Nation (London: Sage, 1997); Sidonie
Smith and Gisela Brinker-Gabler, Writing New Identities. Gender, Nation and Im-
migration in Contemporary Europe (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1996); Tamar Mayer, “Gender Ironies of Nationalism: Setting the Stage” in
Gender Ironies of Nationalism: Sexing the Nation (London and New York:
Routledge, 2000), 1-24.
8 Anne McClintock, “Family Feuds: Gender, Nationalism and the
Family,” in Feminist Review 44 (Summer 1993): 61.
9 Rada Ivekovic and Julie Mostov, “Introduction,” in From Gender to
Nation (Ravenna: Longo, 2002), 9-27.
10 A term coined by Benedict Anderson.
11 McClintock, “Family Feuds: Gender, Nationalism and the Family,” 61.
Tímea Jablonczay30
12 Ivekovic and Mostov: “For women cannot claim identity with(in) the
nation, or when they do so, they risk disloyalty to the higher gender/national
principle which proscribes roles and hierarchies.” From Gender to Nation, 12.
13 Yuval-Davis, Gender and Nation, 60-61.
14 At this time woman’s sexuality had already been thematized in
literature. Renée Erdős’s poems and narratives were  significant in this respect. On
Erdős, see Agatha Schwartz, Shifting Voices. Feminist Thought and Women’s
Writing in Fin-de-siécle Austria and Hungary (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-
Queen’s University Press. 2008), 173-182.
15 Andrea Pető, Napasszonyok és holdkisasszonyok : a mai magyar
konzervatív női politizálás alaktana [Women of Sun and girls of Moon: A mor-
phology of contemporary conservative Hungarian women doing politics] (Buda-
pest: Balassi, 2003).
16 Ida Blom, Karen Hagemann and Catherine Hall, eds., Gendered
Nations. Nationalisms and Gender Order in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford:
Berg, 2000).
17 Szentmihályi-Szabó wrote an essay entitled “Mire tanít ma bennünket
Zrínyi Ilona?” [What can Ilona Zrínyi teach us today?] (Budapest, Athenaeum,
1943), in order to illustrate and comment on her novel. Here and further,
translations from the Hungarian original are by the author.
18 Eric Hobsbawm, “Mass-production Traditions: Europe, 1870-1914,” in
Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 263-307.
19 Hobsbawm, ”Introduction,” in Hobsbawm and Ranger, The Invention
of Tradition, 1-14.
20 Sándor Takáts, Régi magyar nagyasszonyok [Hungarian dowagers of
the past] (Budapest: Élet, 1914).
21 Gyula Szekfű’s Száműzött Rákóczi [The exiled Rákóczi] (Budapest,
1913) provoked a substantial debate. Takáts wanted to be loyal to Szekfű.
However, Takáts ignored Ilona Zrínyi in his later significant book about the Hun-
garian dowagers, Magyar Nagyasszonyok I [Hungarian dowagers I] (Budapest,
1926). Narrative images between the two World Wars were largely based on the
tenets established by Takáts. Magda Kállay produced a summary of the literary
representations of Ilona Zrínyi from Kálmán Thaly to Ferenc Herczeg (Zrínyi
Ilona a magyar szépirodalomban [Ilona Zrinyi in Hungarian literature],  (Buda-
pest: Városi nyomda, 1942), in her introduction heavily relying on Takáts’s work.
She stressed that all of Ilona Zrínyi’s acts and thoughts were a manifestation of the
specific Hungarian national soul; she seems to have been a patriotic devotee of
nationalist politics.
22 Takáts, “Nagyasszonyainkról,” in Magyar Nagyasszonyok I, 10 and 40.
23 József Vértes, Zrínyi Ilona ura, I. Rákóczy Ferenc. Történeti regény.
[Ilona Zrínyi’s husband, Ferenc Rákóczi I;  A historical novel] (Budapest: Lég-
rády, 1922), 71.
Literary Representations of Ilona Zrínyi 31
24 Várkonyi,, Zrínyi Ilona, 182-184.
25 Ibid.
26 Nóra G. Etényi, “A 17. századi közvéleményformálás és propaganda
Érsekújvár 1663-as ostromának tükrében, 1663” [Shaping public opinion and
propaganda in the 17th century in relation to the siege of Érsekújvár in 1663]
Aetas, 1995/1: 97.
27 Várkonyi, Zrínyi Ilona, 184.
28 Ibid.
29 This literary terminology was based on the concept of the “French
novel” created by Zsigmond Kemény in the mid-19th century. See Zsigmond
Kemény, Élet és irodalom [Life and literature], ed. Gyula Tóth (Budapest:
Szépirodalmi, 1971).
30 Homi K. Bhabha, “DissemiNations: Time, Narrative and Margins of
the Modern Nation,” in ed. Homi K. Bhabha, Nation and Narration (London and
New York: Routledge, 1990). 291-322.
31 Ibid., 292-294.
32 György Csepeli, „Versenyben az identitásért” [Competing for iden-
tity], Valóság 1991, no. 12: 18.
33 Mózes Gaál, I. Rákóczy Ferencné, Zrínyi Ilona (Budapest: Franklin,
1899), 8.
34 Szentmihályi-Szabó, Zrínyi Ilona, 214.
35 Vértes, Zrínyi Ilona ura, 69.
36 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble. Feminism and the Subversion of
Identity (New York: Routledge, 1990), 25-34.
37 Szentmihályi-Szabó, Zrínyi Ilona, 6.
38 Gaál, I. Rákóczi Ferencné, 62.
39 Szentmihályi-Szabó, Zrínyi Ilona, 94.
40 Ibid.. 95-96.
41 Ibid., 103.
42 Tamar Mayer, “Gender Ironies of Nationalism,” 1-2.
43 Bhabha, ”DissemiNations”, 305.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bhabha, Homi K. “DissemiNations: Time, Narrative and Margins of the Modern
Nation.” In Nation and Narration. Ed. Homi K. Bhabha. London and New
York: Routledge, 1990. 291-322.
Blom, Ida, Hagemann, Karen and Hall, Catherine Ed. Gendered Nations, Natio-
nalisms and Gender Order in the Nineteenth Century. Oxford: Berg, 2000.
Butler, Judith. Gender Trouble. Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New
York: Routledge, 1990.
Tímea Jablonczay32
Csepeli, György. Versenyben az identitásért.” [Competing for identity ], Valóság
1991, no. 12: 17-25.
Gaál, Mózes. I. Rákóczy Ferencné, Zrínyi Ilona. [Mrs. Ferenc Rákóczy I, Ilona
Zrínyi], Budapest: Franklin, 1899.
G. Etényi, Nóra. A 17. századi közvéleményformálás és propaganda Érsekújvár
1663-as ostromának tükrében, 1663.” [Shaping public opinion and propaganda
in the 17th century in relation to the siege of Érsekújvár in 1663], Aetas 1995.
no. 1-2: 95-139.
Habermas, Jürgen. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An
Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. Trans. by Thomas Burger and
Frederick Lawrence. Boston: MIT Press, 1989.
Hobsbawm, Eric. “Mass-production Traditions: Europe, 1870-1914.” In The
Invention of Tradition. Ed. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1983. 263-307.
Ivekovic, Rada and Mostov, Julie. “Introduction.” In From Gender to Nation. Ed.
Rada Ivekovic and Julie Mostov. Ravenna: Longo, 2002. 9-27.
Kállay, Magda. Zrínyi Ilona a magyar szépirodalomban. [Ilona Zrínyi in
Hungarian literature]. Budapest: Városi nyomda. 1942.
Kemény, Zsigmond. Élet és irodalom. [Life and literature], Budapest: Szép-
irodalmi, 1971.
Kürti, László. “A nemek képei.” [Images of gender]. In Társadalmi nemek képe és
emlékezete Magyarországon a 19-20. században.[Image and memory of
gender in Hungary in the 19-20th-centuries], ed. Andrea Pető. Budapest: A
Nők a Valódi Esélyegyenlőségért Alapítvány, 2004. 113-131.
_______. “Eroticism, Sexuality and Gender Reversal in Hungarian Culture.” In
Gender Reversals and Gender Cultures: Anthropological and Historical
Perspectives. Ed. Sabrina Petra Ramet. London, New York: Routledge, 1996.
148-163.
Mayer, Tamar. “Gender Ironies of Nationalism: Setting the Stage.” In Gender
Ironies of Nationalism: Sexing the Nation. Ed. Tamar Mayer. London and
New York: Routledge, 2000. 1-24.
McClintock, Anne. Family Feuds: Gender, Nationalism and the Family.” Femi-
nist Review 1993. no. 44: 61-80.
Mosse, George. Nationalism and Sexuality: Middle-Class Morality and Sexual
Norms in Modern Europe. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988.
Pető, Andrea. Napasszonyok és holdkisasszonyok: a mai magyar konzervatív női
politizálás alaktana. [Women of Sun and girls of Moon: A morphology of con-
temporary conservative Hungarian women doing politics]. Budapest: Balassi,
2003.
Schwartz, Agatha. Shifting Voices. Feminist Thought and Women’s Writing in
Fin-de-Siècle Austria and Hungary. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 2008.
Literary Representations of Ilona Zrínyi 33
Smith, Sidonie and Brinker-Gabler, Gisela. Writing New Identities. Gender,
Nation and Immigration in Contemporary Europe. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1996.
Szentmihályiné-Szabó, Mária. “Mire tanít ma bennünket Zrínyi Ilona?” [What can
Ilona Zrínyi teach us today?]. Budapest: Athenaeum, 1943.
______. Zrínyi Ilona. Bukarest: Kriterion, 1992.
Takáts, Sándor. Régi magyar nagyasszonyok. [Dowagers of the Hungarian past].
Budapest: Élet, 1914.
_____. Magyar Nagyasszonyok I [Hungarian dowagers I]. Budapest, 1926.
Várkonyi, Ágnes R. Zrínyi Ilona, “Európa legbátrabb asszonya.” [Ilona Zrínyi,
“Europe’s most courageous woman”]. Budapest: Magyar-Török Baráti Tár-
saság, 2008.
Vértes, József. Zrínyi Ilona ura, I. Rákóczy Ferenc. Történeti regény. [Ilona
Zrínyi’s husband, Ferenc Rákóczi I: A historical novel]. Budapest: Légrády,
1922.
Yuval-Davis, Nira. Gender and Nation. London: Sage, 1997.
Tímea Jablonczay34
Hungarian Studies Review, Vol. XLI, Nos. 1-2 (2014)
“The Parting of Ways:” The Shifting
Relationship between Anna Lesznai and Emma
Ritoók, and the Restructuring of Hungarian
Cultural and Political Life in the Early 1920s
Fiona Stewart
In the early 1920s, the failure of the bourgeois and communist revolutions
of 1918-19, coupled with the traumatic territorial losses imposed by the
Trianon peace agreement, left the Hungarian nation reeling and searching
for new ideological directions and symbolic definitions. The decimation of
the political left by the counter-revolutionary backlash of the new regime
under Miklós Horthy1 gave more clout to conservative parties, among
them the Independent Smallholder Party and the Christian National Unity
Party,2 who consolidated their power and influence by appealing to a
population desperate to protect the nation from further trauma and loss.
Crucially, the disproportionately high representation of Jews amongst the
left-leaning, radical intelligentsia, whose willing participation in revoluti-
onary action had (in the eyes of the counter-revolutionaries) steered the
nation to the brink of total destruction, instigated the re-definition of the
nation along ethno-religious lines and authorized the resurgence of virulent
strands of anti-Semitism in the social and political arena. Powerful rhetoric
of ‘us’ and ‘them’ shaped public opinion, and laid the groundwork for the
dangerous political trajectories that would gain strength throughout sub-
sequent decades.
The anti-Semitic rhetoric that emerged in Hungary in the 1920s
was not new, but rather the recapitulation of debates that had gripped the
social and political life of the nation for decades, now augmented by grief,
blame and fear. Despite the Jewish population’s patriotic assimilation and
active participation in national culture and politics throughout the 19th and
early 20th century, anti-Semitic sentiment continued to bubble under the
surface, overflowing during times of national crisis.3 By the 1920s, how-
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ever, the liberal spirit that had tempered the debates over the so-called
‘Jewish question’ throughout previous decades had largely been eroded by
the turmoil of war and revolution. From their exile, many of the artists and
intellectuals, who had been involved in liberal, leftist and radical move-
ments, could no longer exert an influence on Hungarian social, cultural
and political life. This gaping void left a conservative, right-wing majority
to determine who and what constituted the Hungarian nation.
The intellectual life of the nation was also forced to adapt to this
new social and political climate, stripped of its primary actors. Priorities
shifted and new patterns of affiliation and exchange were established,
leaving former peers standing on opposite sides of an irreconcilable divide
determined by tenuous bloodlines, and perpetuated by popular stereotypes
and reactionary politics. Among those whose relationship was irrevocably
affected by these shifts were Anna Lesznai4 and Emma Ritoók, two of the
most prominent female participants in Hungarian cultural and intellectual
life at that time. This paper will examine the nature of the division between
the two women and the extent to which it is indicative of the reactionary
patriotism and accompanying anti-Semitic rhetoric restructuring Hunga-
rian cultural and political life in the early 1920s, the repercussions of
which are still being felt today.
Both Lesznai and Ritoók were accomplished writers whose work
earned the respect of their (mostly male) peers. In 1905, Ritoók’s first
novel, Egyenes úton, egyedül (On the Straight Path Alone) won the annual
literary prize of the conservative literary weekly, Új idők (New Times).
From 1908 onwards, Lesznai regularly published her poetry in the liberal
literary journal, Nyugat (West). Lesznai was also active in many other
aspects of Hungarian cultural life, designing book covers and exhibiting
her embroidery with a prominent group of avant-garde painters, Nyolcak
(The Eight). Ritoók focused on her intellectual career, writing scholarly
articles and translating literature from French and Norwegian. While their
academic backgrounds differed dramatically (Lesznai was home-schooled,
while Ritoók had earned a doctorate in Hungarian literature), they both
gravitated towards the intellectual circle developing around the philoso-
pher György Lukács. Like Lukács, Ritoók studied with the German soci-
ologists Ernst Bloch, Georg Simmel and Max Weber, while Lesznai, too,
grappled with their core philosophical concepts throughout her diaries.5
Alongside Lukács, Béla Balázs, Arnold Hauser, Károly Mannheim and
Lajos Fülep, Ritoók and Lesznai became core members of the so-called
‘Sunday Circle’, an informal gathering of intellectuals that began meeting
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every Sunday in 1915, in order to discuss the pressing philosophical and
political issues of the day.
As prominent female members of a male-dominated intellectual
milieu, Ritoók and Lesznai shared many common experiences that should
have formed the basis for greater solidarity between the two women. But
in the aftermath of the war, Ritoók could no longer overlook Lesznai’s
Jewish roots and, on those grounds, severed all ties between them. This
rejection was not sudden or unexpected. For years, Ritoók had made it
clear that her Christian upbringing and conservative political leanings
distanced her from the rest of the Sunday Circle.6 Indeed, with the notable
exceptions of Lajos Fülep and Béla Zalai, the core members were largely
the offspring of (often wealthy and/or ennobled) liberal, assimilated Jewish
parents. Lesznai, herself, came from the prosperous Hatvany family on one
side, and the influential Moscovitz family on the other.7 In a diary entry
from 1920, Ritoók acknowledges that Lesznai and her family had indeed
made a sincere attempt at assimilation: “Amazingly [Lesznai] was also
able to adopt Hungarianness within her spirit; their whole house resembled
that of the rich, Magyar gentry… In her verses, she poured Körtvélyes8
into her rhymes… the love of the earth. Even after her appearance, I still
wouldn’t have believed her to be Jewish.”9 But for Ritoók, such an attempt
at assimilation could only be successful on a superficial level. Under the
surface, the plain fact remained. By the end of the war, she had conflated
that Jewishness with an inherent radicalism and hostility towards the
nation, eliciting a more hard-line, essentialist stance.
The foundations of the conceptual rift between Lesznai and Ritoók
can already be seen in 1917 in their individual contributions to a special
double issue of the sociological journal Huszadik Század (Twentieth
Century) that sought to explore the subject of the ‘Jewish question’ from
multiple perspectives. Throughout subsequent years, the questions raised
and conclusions drawn in those brief articles are re-articulated in their
diaries and personal correspondence, as well as in each of their respective
roman-á clef ― Ritoók’s, A szellem kalandorai [Spiritual adventurers],
1921 and Lesznai’s, Kezdetben volt a kert [In the Beginning Was the
Garden], 1966 ― characterizing the social and political climate of this
period. An examination of these writings reveals that Lesznai betrays an
ambivalent attitude towards how her identity is shaped by her Jewish roots,
combined with a sense of disillusionment over the increasingly powerful
social forces defining her as ‘other’. Ritoók’s initial critique and eventual
total rejection on the basis of Lesznai’s Jewishness was a painful indicator
of the impotence of political idealism in the face of historically rooted and
Fiona Stewart38
emotionally fuelled social divisions. Ritoók, on the other hand, sees the
‘rootlessness’ and ‘foreignness’ of her Jewish peers as a danger to the
cultural and political life of the nation, as a concrete obstacle to recon-
ciliation and regeneration. Instead, she establishes new personal and pro
fessional bonds, consolidating new patterns of affiliation along ethno-
religious lines.
While politically, socially and economically the status of Jews in
Hungary followed the general historical trajectory of the region,10 the
initial flowering and subsequent transformations of Magyar nationalism
had a decisive ideological impact on the ways in which Jewish identities
developed throughout the 19th century. The commitment of the ‘first
reform generation’11 to liberal political and economic reform, and the
establishment of a modern nation, encouraged the initial move towards
Jewish emancipation. Though Jews did not achieve full political rights and
equality before the law until the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867,
Law 29 of the 1840 Diet removed some restrictions on native-born and
naturalized Jews. Significantly, they were granted the right to settle in any
of the cities in the land (excluding mining towns).12 While the upper house
of the Diet did not grant all of the proposals of the liberal reformers, at the
very least this concession represented a symbolic step forward, allowing
Jews greater social and economic mobility. As a result, many Jews were
drawn into the revolutionary spirit of reform, pledging allegiance to a
vision of nationhood in which they could hope to be included and pro-
tected. The nation came to be the primary touchstone of identity for
emancipated Jews, and their new-found freedom to participate in the
building of that nation fuelled a patriotic impulse towards magyarization13
and assimilation.
Like for many members of her generation, it was extremely dif-
ficult for Lesznai to identify with her Jewishness, having been raised in an
assimilated Jewish household where the Hungarian nation was the primary
source of identification and commitment, yet growing up in an
environment that was increasingly hostile towards the participation of
Jews in the cultural and political life of that very nation. This tension was a
source of anxiety for Lesznai and her peers, eliciting a variety of
responses. Lesznai’s situation was further complicated by the fact that as a
child she was christened as a Calvinist. The details of this conversion are
vague and given very little voice by Lesznai, herself. As Petra Török
explains, following a childhood illness, she was christened, but it is not
clear whether this was her mother’s decision or at the urging of the local
minister.14 In 1923, Lesznai emphasizes that she is a “converted Calvinist
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with no religious affiliation.”15 Whatever the circumstances, prior to World
War I, neither religious identification seems to have had a significant
impact on her outlook beyond a theoretical interest in Jewish mysticism
occasioned by Lukács. The reality was, however, that in spite of her own
ambivalence in respect to her Jewish roots and her early conversion to
Christianity, external forces continued to define her as Jewish amidst a
growing tide of anti-Semitism.
Where Lesznai remained relatively silent on the subject of this
growing tension, her close friend, the writer Béla Balázs, acutely felt the
fundamental incompatibility between his fervent Magyar patriotism and
his Jewish/German heritage. Like Lesznai’s conversion to Calvinism, his
choice of Catholic conversion did little to ensure his inclusion in the
national community. Around the same time that Lukács began exploring
the philosophical possibilities of Jewish mysticism,16 Balázs confesses in
his diary, “I am Jewish and I can’t find peace within myself, I can’t see my
ultimate purpose”.17 Just over a year later, in 1912, his sense of alienation
appears to be even more intense, as he conveys a hostility towards the
circumstances of his birth:
But what will become of me? I hate the contemporary Jewish literature
more than them, I feel more distanced from it than they do ― but neither
do I find any community with them. They do not accept me. My name is
German, my blood is Jewish and my writings will never reflect the special
character of the Magyar race.18
In light of this problematic position, Balázs made the choice that he felt
might resolve some of these tensions. In 1913, around the time of his
marriage to Edit Hajós,19 Balázs converted to Catholicism and officially
changed his name from Herbert Bauer to Béla Balázs. While Balázs hoped
that his choice of values would allow him to be fully accepted as Magyar,
he grossly underestimated the growing resentment against those ‘rootless’
Magyars who attempted to find ‘roots’ in the Magyar nation. It was within
this context that Lesznai began to re-assess her relationship to her
Jewishness, not as a matter of religious practice or abstract philosophy, but
as a matter of identification and affiliation.
In her novel, Kezdetben volt a kert, Lesznai reflects the shifting
moods and attitudes amongst the Jewish and non-Jewish populations
throughout the late 19th-early 20th century. The protagonist Lizó’s (Lesz-
nai’s) father is a quintessential representative of the upwardly mobile,
assimilating Jews of Lesznai’s parents’ generation. He fervently believes
that his identity can become coherent through a total identification with the
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nation, effectively negating his ‘otherness’. Pledging allegiance to the
‘spirit of ‘48’, reciting the poetry of Petőfi, entering into public life,
adopting the lifestyle of the Magyar nobility, trusting in the legislative
fruits of liberalism, István Berkovics (Geyza Moscovitz) was able to
identify himself as Magyar first and foremost. As he emphatically asserts,
“István Berkovics is neither Jewish, nor Catholic, but a Magyar gentleman,
period.”20 Meanwhile, it is Lizó’s older brother, János (Iván), who first
begins to recognize the tenuousness of this Jewish-Magyar amalgam and
the fundamental incompatibility between this patriotic commitment and
the persistent ways in which their ‘otherness’ was continually reinforced
by reactionary forces in their homeland. As he expresses, “There is too
much of a flagellating duality within me, like this, my unlucky half-
Jewish, half-gentry condition. János Berkovics Rozgonyi. I don’t trust in
this amalgam. My father did, but today it is difficult to do the same, and
tomorrow it will be impossible.”21
Unfortunately, János was right. Yet, Lizó must come to terms with
this reality for herself. There are several points throughout the novel where
she is confronted with the fact that she is Jewish, shattering the illusion of
her assimilation. Each time, her ‘difference’ is exposed to her by someone
she is close to, highlighting the growing divisions between members of the
cultural and intellectual avant-garde over the ‘Jewish question’. While, in
the real world, such divisions crystallized in the rift between herself and
Ritoók, in the novel, this plight is effectively illustrated in a conversation
with one of her brother’s friends, whom she had assumed to be a peer in
both a social and intellectual capacity. In discussing whether or not her
brother will be elected to the National Casino22 like her father before him,
the cracks begin to show between their positions. The conversation is
worth quoting in its entirety for it outlines the dominant arguments being
wielded on both sides:
[Hudák]: “When your grandfather was selected [to the Casino] a
liberal current flowed through Hungary, István was still able to follow in
its footsteps at that time. Since then, the world has become more con-
servative. It’s understandable too, they have to protect against the emer-
gence of strengthening left-wing factions. And another thing… There is
still the fact that even those inclined towards moderate liberal ideas are
today leaning in an anti-Semitic direction. And not without good reason…”
Lizó pulled her hand away from Hudák’s grasp. She couldn’t
believe her ears that János’s best friend, and her former suitor, was trying
to reason that it is the domineering nature of Jewish spirit that meets its
‘rightful opposition’.
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“The Jews are running everything,” Hudák became more heated in
his arguments, “in the banks, in industry, in the press. The large estates,
too, are slowly coming into their hands.”
“And in medical science,” broke in Lizó, “but that is so they can
help; and in literature and social sciences! Everywhere where they are
struggling for regeneration, we are there and taking our places!”
[Hudák]: “Ady and Móricz23, your own demi-gods, they aren’t
Jewish.”
[Lizó]: “But the Új szó [Nyugat] editors, who paved their road
and a bunch of the wonderful writers around them, and their public who
buy their journal and their books, those are also Jewish! Don’t you think
we are serving the Hungarian nation in this?”
[Hudák]: “I don’t think so, Lizó. Every people wants to draw their
own intellectual leaders from their own blood. If they are presented with
fanatics, like Ákos Faludi [Jászi], whom you unfortunately greatly esteem
and love, who want to ravage the foundations of the old Magyar world,
then naturally…”
Lizó interrupted with indignation, “Ákos wants to help the
Magyar peasants!”
“Yes, but meanwhile he is bringing the nationalities down on us
with his extreme principles. There is no way he could understand our
roots.”24
Here, Hudák’s main argument is two-fold, revolving around the
disproportionate involvement of Jews in the professions and cultural life,25
and their perceived penchance for radicalism, foreign to the ideals of both
the conservative and liberal factions of the Magyar gentry. Hudák’s
arguments were by no means exceptional at the time. Ritoók, herself,
wields very similar arguments throughout her writings. Indeed, one of the
defining characteristics of the ‘Jewish question’ throughout the first two
decades of the 20th century was an anxiety over the growing influence of
Jews in the professional and cultural life of the nation. This anxiety forced
the ‘Jewish question’ into a position of prominence alongside the
‘nationalities question’ as one of the most pressing domestic issues facing
the integrity of the nation. But, what exactly was this ‘Jewish question’?
Where the ‘nationalities question’ could be centered on linguistic and
cultural difference, and enacted through debates over political rights and/or
independence, the ‘Jewish question’ was far more vague and complex. The
patriotic commitment to the nation by assimilated Jews, and the existence
of legislative and legal equality, suggested that there should be no ‘ques-
tion’ about the status of Jews in Hungary. At the same time, the persist-
ence of anti-Semitism, the emergence of a more prominent non-assimilated
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Jewish community26 and the ‘anti-Magyar’ radicalism of the ‘second
reform generation’ suggested that there were pressing questions about the
ideological divisions being drawn along religious lines and forcing people
into increasingly polarized positions.
In 1917 Oszkár Jászi27 decided to launch an investigation into the
complexity of this ‘question’. He recognized that the intensifying climate
of anti-Semitism, compounded by the failure to come to any agreement
about the nature and scope of the problem, was destructive and anti-
productive, and hindered the establishment of the modern nation. Jászi felt
that only through thoughtful debate and discussion could the nation come
to any sort of agreement as to what this ‘question’ actually was and
generate concrete solutions to this divisive and alienating issue. In order to
accomplish this, Jászi sent three questions to a cross-section of professors,
writers, politicians, editors, lawyers and other professionals who were
invited to add their voice to the debate. He then compiled the responses
into a special double issue of Huszadik Század. While certainly this ‘cross-
section’ was largely restricted to middle-class, urban, male intellectuals
and professionals, effectively silencing many of the most virulent strands
of anti-Semitism emerging in rural areas and in the women’s movement,
Jászi did attempt to survey the political and religious spectrum, “in the
hopes that, in inviting opposing opinions, we should be able to reflect the
existent, certainly disparate, opinions and moods regarding the issue of
Jewishness”.28
Of the sixty respondents, only two were women: Anna Lesznai
and Emma Ritoók. These responses represent the first real attempt by both
women to concisely and comprehensively express their views on the
subject. Up until that point, neither woman had stated her position so
plainly. For Lesznai, her silence had been partly due to her philosophical
outlook that did not allow her to forge an identity based on ‘difference’,
and partly due to the fact that, like her father, she believed a patriotic
commitment made such questions irrelevant. Ritoók, on the other hand,
had genuinely wanted to participate in a community founded on intel-
lectual principles, regardless of religious affiliation. But, when those intel-
lectual principles began diverging from her own in the form of concrete
political action, Ritoók was forced to re-evaluate her priorities. In
Huszadik Század, she struck the first blow, irrevocably cleaving her from
her former peers. Interestingly, the two women’s responses bear some
similarities in how they seek to approach the subject both from a personal
and seemingly ‘objective’ perspective. Both women attempt to identify
certain ‘special’ characteristics that position Jews as outsiders within the
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Hungarian nation. The big difference is that where Lesznai judges these
distinguishing features to be positive attributes capable of contributing to
the continual regeneration of the nation, Ritoók concludes that the Jew’s
‘difference’ is fundamentally hostile to the nation.
Each contributor was asked the same three questions:
1. Is there a ‘Jewish question’ in Hungary, and if so, what do you
see to be its essence?
2. What are the causes for the Hungarian ‘Jewish question’? Is it
symptomatic of Hungarian society; the societal relations, institutions,
characteristics, customs of Hungarian Jewish, as well as non-Jewish popu-
lations, that play a role in bringing about this question?
3. Wherein lies the solution to the ‘Jewish question’ in Hungary,
and what social or legislative reforms do you feel are necessary?29
The sixty responses were then divided into two categories: those who did
not think there was a ‘Jewish question’ and those who thought there was.
Notably, many of those included in the first category were assimilated
Jews who felt that if the ‘question’ was about political or legal rights, then
the achievements of the 19th century meant that there was no ‘question’. If
the ‘question’, however, was about the position of the Jews within the
daily life of the nation, then the patriotic commitment of the assimilated
Jews also suggested that there was no ‘question’. Like Geyza Moscovitz,
the belief in the compatibility between their commitment to the nation and
their Jewishness essentially negated the ‘question’. Through this lens, the
‘Jewish question’ appeared to be a one-sided question, as expressed by
Lajos Szabolcsi, the editor of the journal Egyenlőség (Equality).30 In his
response, he argues:
This is only a question for those who cannot resign themselves to
the fact that we, Hungarian Jews, believe this land to be our home as much
as Hungarians of other faiths. It is only a question for those who believe
that our presence, our existence, our merits, our resilience, our progress are
not facts, not positives, but domestic unrest and unsettling irresolution, in a
word: questions.31
Others, however, suggested that the existence of these questions
challenged the very basis of their identity and therefore an analysis of the
reasons for those questions was necessary, in order to come to any sort of
resolution on both a national and personal/psychological level. From this
perspective, the professor Bernát Alexander and many of the cultural/
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intellectual avant-garde, including Lesznai, believed that there was a
‘Jewish question’. While Alexander agreed with Szabolcsi’s assessment
that a large part of the ‘Jewish question’ had to do with external judgments
beyond the control of the Jewish population, the existence of those who
considered it “a very serious problem what they should do with the Jews”32
added a more complex dimension to the problem. In effect, the questioning
of the very basis of assimilation as a valid identity was the source of
another deep ‘question’ for the Jewish-Hungarian population. As Iván
Moscovitz acknowledges in Kezdetben volt a kert, the emergence of a
‘Jewish question’ served to erode their feeling of belonging within their
home and create an alienating duality within the ‘self’. Thus, a big part of
this ‘Jewish question’ was how to negotiate the resultant identity-crisis and
discover a productive basis for new identities.
Following Bernát Alexander, Lesznai reinforces the internal
dimension of the ‘Jewish question’. “The Jewish question does exist,” she
argues, “even if the Jew is sitting alone in his/her room behind closed
doors.”33 With this as her starting point, she attempts to discover how her
Jewishness has shaped her identity despite her assimilation. Was there a
discernible ‘difference’ defining her as a Jew? She reflects on the experi-
ence of growing up in a noble, Magyar household. Through the privileging
of national and class affiliations, Lesznai’s father had effectively dissolved
any traces of their Jewish heritage. At the same time, she had spent a lot of
time with her grandparents in Pest who maintained the religious and
cultural practices of their faith. Meanwhile, she was drawn to the sights
and sounds of the Catholic rituals of the village peasants, yet she, herself,
felt the ‘foreignness’ of the orthodox Jewish merchants. Pulled between
these poles, she began to sense her own ‘difference’, giving rise to the
‘Jewish question’ within herself.
For her, this ‘difference’ was determined by a lack ― the lack of a
true home and more human community within which she would no longer
feel alienated. As she reflects: “Sometimes I joyfully believed ‘I am
home’, when I surrounded myself with those Jews and those Christians
with whom I felt a special community according to my memories and my
inclinations. But never, in no circle, have I seen that synthesis of remem-
brance, culture and temperament in which I can fully be immersed.”34 She
concludes that it is this feeling of ‘homelessness’ that is particularly
characteristic of the Jew, rooted in the historical experience of ghetto life.
Characteristically, however, Lesznai wants to ascertain how this ‘lack’,
this sense of alienation, might be translated into a positive, constructive
attribute. She suggests that, “The Jew’s feeling of belonging nowhere
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gives rise to an impatient, restless desire for belonging somewhere.”35 It is
this characteristic restless impulse that had authorized a variety of diver-
gent responses across time and place. In this way, Lesznai is able to forge
crucial ideological links between the patriotic desire of her parents’
generation towards assimilation, the emphasis of the non-assimilated com-
munity on the preservation of language and tradition, and the utopian
vision of Theodor Herzl’s Zion.
In light of this analysis, the problem of ‘homelessness’ and
alienation at the root of the internal ‘Jewish question’ could only be solved
through a complete transformation of the social, political, economic and
cultural conditions defining that ‘difference’ as ‘otherness’. It was this
desire for transformation that inclined Lesznai and her peers towards
revolutionary action, despite widespread skepticism over the methodo-
logies and aims of Communism. Yet, in the absence of such trans-
formation, temporary strategies of community-building could help foster
understanding. Lesznai proposes more inter-marriage as one possible
strategy.36 This suggestion, however, exposes the flaw in her analysis―her
underestimation of the ‘external’ ‘Jewish question’ and the conscious
effort by people like Ritoók to determine and maintain the ‘otherness’ of
the Jew.
In her response, Ritoók articulates arguments similar to Hudák’s in
Kezdetben volt a kert, expressing concerns over the prominence of Jews in
influential positions. She argues that the resentment towards Jews is
‘justifiable’ because their sudden success in finance and culture meant that
young Magyars at the beginning of their careers had to take low-ranking
positions with little possibility of upward mobility. More worrying is
Ritoók’s evaluation of the ‘culturelessness’ (kulturálatlanság) of Jews.
She argues that, in abandoning their roots and traditions, they had severed
their ties to the past. With no responsibility to the past, they had no
responsibility for the future and were thus only concerned with the present.
This disconnected way of being allowed for the overvaluation of money
and financial gain. Additionally, their lack of tradition led them to grasp
towards the ‘new’, giving rise to the ‘bastardized’ Magyar language of the
urban, assimilated Jew and the ‘unprincipled’ art of the new avant-garde.
Ironically, Ritoók’s judgments on modern art, as expressed in her 1916
work A rút a művészetben (The Ugly in Art), are very similar to those of
Lukács, whose 1910 article Az utak elváltak (The Parting of Ways) praises
monumentality and Classicism in art.
Thus, Ritoók’s comments in Huszadik Század do not necessarily
reflect the reality of her adopted intellectual milieu, but rather rest on
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common, divisive stereotypes about the ‘nature’ of the Hungarian Jew. As
such, they expose the deep ideological divides amongst the avant-garde
and the persistent weight of dominant ideologies framing the scope of
thought and action. Like Lizó facing Hudák, the Jewish members of the
Sunday Circle were deeply pained to hear Ritoók reiterate the growing
anti-Semitism of their social and political environment, re-casting their
genuine goals of regeneration as the desperate, unprincipled strivings of
‘uncultured’, detached individuals. In the face of this hostility, the theoreti-
cal interest in Judaism as a redemptive philosophy (Lukács), or the
decisive attempt to erase that ‘difference’ (Balázs), could not counteract
the very real anti-Semitism that thrived on ‘difference’ and sought to make
that ‘difference’ the basis of a new politics.
By the following year, the conceptual rift that was revealed in
Huszadik Század culminated in Ritoók’s total rejection of her former
peers. Instead, as previously mentioned, she sought out like-minded indivi-
duals and forged new alliances. Unlike in the Sunday Circle, where com-
mon intellectual and philosophical principles formed the basis of discus-
sion and exchange, in the years following World War I, Ritoók privileged
ethno-religious affiliation above else as the basis of new patterns of
interaction and solidarity. Active in both literary circles and the right-wing
women’s movement, Ritoók fought to re-define the ideological basis and
aims of those programs. Primarily, she wanted to distance Hungarian
cultural and political life from ‘foreign’ Jewish influence, and was able to
cast this as a positive, productive approach serving the best interests of the
nation. The new direction of Hungarian culture and political life had to be
Magyar, and for Ritoók that meant, in no uncertain terms, that it needed to
be rid of Jewish participation.
It is a great tragedy that a large proportion of the (for the most
part) assimilated Jewish intelligentsia who participated in the production
and reception of a new Magyar culture in the first two decades of the 20th
century also participated in, or at least supported, the revolutions of 1918-
19. Thus, following the collapse of the short-lived Communist Republic,
the aesthetic and intellectual endeavours of the Hungarian avant-garde
came to be seen (albeit mistakenly) as a critical cause for the Trianon
peace treaty. The reality of the situation was that no governing body would
have been able to alter or reverse the outcome of Trianon, but the knee-
jerk reaction was to find a scapegoat on which to pin the losses. And a
conservative public could not help but judge the socially and politically
active Jewish-Magyar culture as ‘foreign’ (a word that Ritoók repeats
often) and hostile to the ‘true’ interests of the Magyar nation. Tragically,
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forced into exile by the counter-revolutionary backlash, many of those
artists and intellectuals had indeed become ‘foreigners’ in a real, physical
sense.
Meanwhile, the consolidation of a reactionary, xenophobic patri-
otism concretized their positions as ‘outsiders’ in a symbolic sense. The
old, reactionary rhetoric touting the dangers of Jewish dominance in the
professions and in cultural life regained currency. Ritoók, herself, com-
plains vehemently about the dominance of Jews in cultural and intellectual
circles, pointing to the relative success of Nyugat and the influence of the
Sunday Circle in intellectual and political circles as living proof of the
dangers of collaboration and co-operation. As she expresses: “If I were to
begin a cultural society with Jews then a year later 90% would be Jewish,
just as it was everywhere before the war; suddenly we saw that whatever
we started ended up in the hands of Jews, and was turned into something
completely different than what we wanted.”37
With this in mind, Ritoók looked to build her own cultural/literary
society free of Jewish influence. She turned to her friend, the writer Cécile
Tormay to establish the conservative Magyar Asszonyok Nemzeti Szövet-
sége (MANSz; The National Association of Hungarian Women). Ritoók
also contributed to Tormay’s new literary journal, Napkelet (Orient).38
Despite personal issues between the two women,39 from Tormay’s diaries
and other writings it is clear that she and Ritoók shared the same con-
victions about Hungarian cultural and political life and its aims. Both
women naturally supported the introduction of the numerus clausus of
1920 that capped the percentage of Jews able to enroll in universities. The
widespread support of the numerus clausus was a clear sign of the extent
to which reactionary and xenophobic ideals of nationalism had triumphed
in the public sphere. As Tormay argued: “We demand the enforcing of the
numerus clausus law not in order to oppress the alien race but in order to
promote our own race, because we think it would be insane and suicidal on
the part of the nation not to want to recruit its intelligentsia from among its
own, native race.”40
Needless to say, membership in MANSz was not open to Jewish
women. Furthermore, Ritoók and Tormay consciously sought to distance
their organization from the pre-World War I feminist movement that had
owed much of its success to the work of radical Jewish women.41 Thus, the
emergence of MANSz as an influential force in the women’s movement,
as well as in national politics, was indicative of the broader shifts taking
place in cultural and political life, as networks of affiliation were re-
structured along ethno-religious lines.
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In a letter written to her friends Kálmán Rozsnyai and his wife42
on June 17, 1924, Ritoók outlines the conceptual arguments directing the
restructuring of Hungarian cultural life along these lines. The tone and
content of the letter reveals a far more frank expression of her anti-Semi-
tism than her response in Huszadik Század, perhaps owing both to the
personal nature of the letter and the experience of the intervening years
that had served to strengthen her convictions. Crucially, Ritoók does not
consider her attitude to be anti-Semitic. She attempts to distance herself
from anti-Semitic attitudes based on hatred by justifying her stance as
being motivated by patriotism, and aimed at the protection and regenera-
tion of the nation. “I want [a new cultural society] to be Magyar,” she
states, “Or I won’t do it. Just so there is no misunderstanding: not anti-
Semitic, but Magyar.”43 The fact that Ritoók could even make such a
conceptual distinction speaks volumes about the nature of the social and
political climate in the early 1920s. The revanchist attitude unleashed by
Trianon allowed the public to promote anti-Semitic rhetoric in the guise of
patriotism, as something both positive and necessary to the survival of the
nation. It is on the basis of this kind of protective stance that Ritoók must
reject her former peers as those who would endanger the nation with their
intellectual and political ambitions.
Re-iterating the sentiments expressed in Huszadik Század, she
discovers the root of this divide in cultural and psychological, rather than
religious, differences. “It is not about the fact that we pray at different
churches, but about the fact that our whole spirit and their whole mentality
are different.”44 Emphasizing this difference in ‘mentality’, Ritoók
believes that it was the ‘foreignness’ and ‘rootlessness’ of her former
friends and colleagues that made it easier for them to choose a revoluti-
onary path that would put the very survival of the nation at risk. As she
expresses elsewhere:
Only a degenerate race could search for renewal through destruction.
Furthermore, if they want to create anew a world severed from its past, it is
not enough to eliminate the last statue, the last book, the last violin, but
they would also have to destroy the last person who remembers… At this
point we are not talking about philosophy, but about my Hungarianness.
And it is this that separates me from them.45
Ritoók judges the behaviour of Lesznai and Balázs to be a direct product
of their Jewishness and their ultimate lack of commitment to the future of
the nation. And it is this perceived betrayal that she cannot forgive.
It is bitterly ironic that the patriotic fervour and deep conviction
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with which Ritoók explains the need for new patterns of affiliation and
networks of participation mirrors the cries of her Jewish peers decades
earlier as they yearned for the development of a Magyar culture that could
rival the best intellectual and aesthetic products of Europe. As Balázs
writes in his diary in 1905:
I was speaking with him [Zoltán Kodály]46 about my secret, most sacred
dreams, which I have never put into words, neither in conversation nor in
writing ― about a great Hungarian culture, which we need to make, which
shall leap into European development, such that we should lead, just as
each one of them has led ― English, French, German ― just as now, the
little Norwegian, who before now no one knew anything about, has leapt in
― why not the Hungarian?47
Given the patriotic commitment of Lesznai, Balázs, Jászi and most of their
peers, Ritoók’s claims about their ‘rootlessness’ and flagrant irrespon-
sibility sound hollow. Furthermore, while Lesznai supported the com-
munist revolution in principle, she did not approve of the trajectories taken
by the revolution in practice. She was active in the Writer’s Directorate,
producing and disseminating fairytales to the general population, but she
did not follow Lukács blindly into battle. Lesznai was also skeptical of the
destructive and authoritarian nature of Béla Kun’s administration as a
viable path towards the establishment of new social and political struc-
tures, and a stronger foundation for democracy.
In the years following the collapse of the revolutionary govern-
ment and her subsequent flight to Vienna, Lesznai fills pages of her diary
reflecting upon the mistakes of the revolution, the ethics of political action
and the very possibility of putting the ideal of democracy into practice.
She believes that the institutionalization of the revolution ultimately mired
it in authoritarian structures of power and control and that stagnation was
antithetical to the goals of regeneration through dynamic forms of com-
munity and politics. She maintains, however, that despite its practical
flaws, the concept of revolution, itself, should not be abandoned. She
argues that, “The revolution becomes a crime as it becomes instituti-
onalized, but the revolutionary attitude of the spirit, the destruction of
formulae in the interest of the establishment of more dynamic structures
must be a constant factor of ethical behaviour.”48
Given the social and political rhetoric of counter-revolutionaries
like Ritoók, Lesznai recognizes the impossibility of establishing a dyna-
mic, inclusive democracy within a context where people yearn for the
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certainty of essentialisms. Such a context could only usher in totalitarian
forms of government. As she laments:
The weakness of democracy is that it is rational. There are no either-or
codes, it is free of superstition and it is dynamic. The spirits of most
people, however, do not know faith without superstition. This is why mass
democracy is unbelievable and impotent. Most people want a dogmatic and
static image of the world. The ever-perfecting god was an esoteric concept,
and those who live in that faith are few.49
Nevertheless, Lesznai feels that one cannot abandon the road towards
democracy in its ideal form, despite the fact that that road may be
impassable under given conditions. Is it then better to sit and wait? Or is it
still better to act in hopes of transforming those conditions and clearing the
impasse? Can one then judge someone for making the best possible choice
from amongst bad choices? Reflecting on these questions, Lesznai sug-
gests:
The ethics of politics is not either-or; everything is a question of degree.
The question of right and wrong is also determined by many co-existent
layers: the validity, the value of the goal (ideological and material) from
the point of view of human progress (towards perfection). This already
allows for a great deal of relativity. Furthermore, the level of conviction
with which we believe in the goal and its path, and how much we will do in
service of it, is entirely subjective. This is the subjective ethical layer, I
believe, according to which one can do good even on a bad path.50
With these comments, she seems to be assessing her own involvement in
the revolution ― her own ‘level of conviction’ and ‘service’. Though she
did not believe in the outcomes, she continues to grapple with the question
of whether the path, itself, was in vain.
Ritoók certainly does not share Lesznai’s acceptance of the fact
that, in the absence of ideal forms, sometimes there can be a grey ethical
area when it comes to political action. Nor can she view Lesznai’s actions
as ‘doing good on a bad path’. Instead, Ritoók wants her former peers to
be held accountable for their actions. Her novel A szellem kalandorai
culminates in a scene that betrays her bitter disappointment in the ide-
ological and political choices made by her peers, and her uncompromising
rejection of their Jewishness. At the end of the novel, the male protagonist,
Ervin Donáth (thought to be an amalgam of György Lukács and Ernst
Bloch),51 is shot and killed by his childhood friend and long-time devotee,
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Gyula Weber. Ervin’s friendship with Gyula occasions his first confront-
ation with the realities of cultural and class difference at a very young age.
It is initially on the grounds of the Weber family’s relative poverty that
Ervin rejects his friend. Later it is Gyula’s weakness and subservient
nature that Ervin finds distasteful. Throughout the novel, these traits
become irrevocably tied to Gyula’s Jewishness, creating a fundamental
difference between the two men in Ervin’s mind―the difference between
his spirit and Gyula’s mentality. When Ervin discovers that he is, in fact,
half-Jewish, the product of an illicit love affair, he must struggle to come
to terms with that difference within himself, the reality that somewhere
deep within him lay a Gyula Weber. Right before he is shot, Ervin finally
expresses his disdain for Gyula, for that part of himself:  “I have always
hated you,” he says to his childhood friend, “Your lack of courage… your
lack of talent…”52 Clearly, as Agatha Schwartz argues, Ervin’s rejection of
Gyula can be read as a self-rejection.53 But Gyula’s act also raises issues of
accountability and responsibility for the nation, and reflects Ritoók’s
conviction that her Jewish peers had betrayed the nation with their radical
action.
Ritoók’s portrayal of Ervin’s identity crisis reveals an intimate,
and often sympathetic, knowledge of the anxiety experienced by many of
her former peers as they confronted their Jewishness. Ervin faces a similar
‘flagellating duality’ as János Berkovics in Kezdetben volt a kert, or Béla
Balázs in his hatred of contemporary Jewish literature, or Lesznai with her
persistent feelings of ‘homelessness’. But unlike Lesznai, who sees her
Jewishness as the source of special insight and creativity, Ritoók casts
Ervin’s Jewish half as his weakness and ultimate downfall. Rather than a
slave rising up against its master, Gyula’s action is symbolic of the ‘mas-
ter’s own weakness and selfishness betraying him in the end. Gyula pleads
with Ervin that he should return and finish what he started, instead of
abandoning those who had followed him into the revolution and leaving
the nation in turmoil. Confronted with this choice, Ervin chooses to save
himself rather than to fight (albeit hopelessly) for the nation. Ritoók seems
to suggest that, in making this choice, he displays the same weakness that
he loathes in Gyula. Ultimately, his ‘rootlessness’ allows him to walk
away from the nation in a time of crisis, and for that he pays with his life.
Examining these writings, it becomes clear that Ritoók’s complete
rejection of Lesznai illustrates the dramatic failure of the ‘second reform
generation’ to consolidate a coherent opposition in the face of deeply
ingrained historical divisions. From her exile in Vienna, Lesznai is left to
analyze those failures and come to terms with her (now very real) aliena-
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tion from her homeland. This alienation is the source of anxiety for her,
like many of her peers, as she has to come to terms with the ‘difference’
cleaving her from her former nation, a ‘difference’ that she, herself, had
never identified with on any significant level. By 1923 Lesznai presents a
dramatically different view of her Jewish identity. Rather than the abstract
interest in mysticism as an alternative experiential realm, or an attempt to
subsume ‘difference’ to a commitment to nationhood, Lesznai expresses
an awareness of how her persistent ‘otherness’ informs and elicits
important patterns of identification and affiliation that could not be erased
by her conversion. Perhaps, the experience of exile and the complete
erosion of assimilation as a viable identity finally led her to identify with
her Jewish ‘self’:
Today, Jesus himself would go to the synagogue, not to pray with
them, but to be stoned along with them. So I have no right to sit in a
Catholic church but should be in the synagogue along with my people. My
people, to whose faith, language, traditions, culture ― probably even racial
stock―I have no binding connections, but who are, nevertheless, I know
today, my people, whom I choose above all others (but not against all
others).54
It is this final statement that most sharply distinguishes Lesznai’s
position from Ritoók’s, who chooses her Christian-Magyar peers ‘against
all others’. In choosing a community based on ethnic, or one could argue,
racial affiliation rather than intellectual/philosophical principles, Ritoók
signifies the impossibility of restructuring Hungarian national cultural and
political life based on principles of inclusion and broad solidarity. The
rejection of her former peers, however, is obviously not without its pain
and disappointment. As she expresses:
I have lived amongst only the most intelligent Jews. Sometimes
Béla Balázs and Anna Lesznai would put me to shame with their
Hungarianness — in their words, and when it came time that they had to
make a choice… believe me, with the revolution a whole world fell apart
within me when I confronted my horrifying disappointment in these
people.55
But, she feels that just as they made a deliberate choice, she must also do
the same. In doing so, she denies the possibility of broader reconciliation
based on gender, class or patriotic commitment. In final analysis, the fact
that the relationship between the two women was ultimately destroyed by
The Shifting Relationship between Anna Lesznai and Emma Ritoók 53
the privileging of ethnic affiliation above all other concerns and the return
to reactionary, xenophobic ideals of nationhood mirrors one of the greatest
tragedies in Hungarian cultural life, the effects of which are still being felt
today.
NOTES
1 Horthy was an admiral in the imperial navy and was appointed regent
on March 1, 1920, serving as head of state until October 1944. Horthy was a
prime candidate for the role, enjoying strong support from the military, as well as
the great powers, and expressing strong anti-Bolshevik, anti-revolutionary, con-
servative convictions.
2 In January 1920, elections were held to fill a 218-member assembly.
With the introduction of universal secret ballot, the Smallholders won 91 seats,
while the Christian Nationals won 59. The liberals only won 6 seats, while the
Social Democrats boycotted the elections. (Tibor Hajdú, Zsuzsa L. Nagy, “Revo-
lution, Counterrevolution, Consolidation,” in A History of Hungary, ed. Peter F.
Sugar et al. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 312.
3 For example, the murder of a young girl, Eszter Solymosi, in the small
town of Tiszaeszlár in 1882, became a national affair, as 13 Jews were accused of
a ritual killing. The accused were brought to trial based on the testimony of unreli-
able witnesses and unsubstantiated evidence, and were eventually acquitted. Yet,
the case provided the opportunity for prominent individuals to fan the flames of
growing anti-Semitic sentiments throughout the country. The intensifying climate
surrounding the Tiszaeszlár affair gave the politician Győző Istóczy, along with
the local governmental representative Géza Ónody, the opportunity to strengthen
their anti-Semitic movement. Two years earlier, Istóczy had founded the Nem-
zsidók szövetsége (Alliance of Non-Jews) and had begun the publication of his
anti-Semitic pamphlet, 12 Röpirat (12 Tracts). While the liberal government of
Kálmán Tisza attempted to contain the inflammatory rhetoric of Istóczy and
Ónody, the politicians found strong allies in the Catholic Church, and used their
power in rural areas to agitate for the repeal of Jewish emancipation. In Hungary,
equal citizenship and political rights were granted to Jews in 1867 amidst
sweeping liberal reforms and the establishment of the Dual Monarchy of Austria-
Hungary.
4 Lesznai was born Amália Moscovitz, and took her pen name from the
name of the neighbouring village of Leszna. Though she lived and worked as
Anna Lesznai for the majority of her life, she remained “Máli” to her closest
friends and family.
5 Lesznai Anna, Sorsával tetováltan önmaga: Válogatás Lesznai Anna
naplójegyzeteiből [Tattooed by her own destiny, herself: Selection from Anna
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Lesznai’s diaries]. ed. Petra Török (Budapest: Petőfi Irodalmi Múzeum, 2010);
Napló [Diary] (V.3670/43/1-20), 1912-1945, manuscript, Petőfi Irodalmi Múze-
um  Kézirattára.
6 When she presented the first draft of her roman-à-clef, A szellem
kalandorai [Spiritual adventurers] to Béla Balázs in 1916, Balázs noted his
disappointment over Ritoók’s often hostile characterization of their generation,
their goals and ideals, and her depiction of the Jew as a “foreign” entity within the
nation (Agatha Schwartz, “Emma Ritoók’s Novel ‘Spiritual Adventurers’: A
Intellectual Document of the Fin-de-Siècle,” Hungarian Studies 16/2 (2002): 298-
299).
7 Lesznai’s mother, Hermina Deutsch was a member of the powerful
Hatvany-Deutsch family, who were leading industrialists in Hungary, working in
produce, construction, banking and eventually sugar production, commanding a
large share of the Hungarian and Austrian markets throughout the late 19th/early
20th century. Due to their prominent land ownership and commercial enterprise in
the Hatvan region, the Deutsch family was ennobled in 1897 with the name Hat-
vany. On Lesznai’s father’s side, the Moscovitz family was ennobled in 1867,
owing to her grandfather Mór Moscovitz’s medical services during the cholera
epidemic of 1831and his services to the influential, aristocratic Andrássy family.
Her father, Geyza Moscovitz, practiced law and was one of the few Jews to be
elected to the National Casino. Erzsébet Vezér, Lesznai Anna élete [Anna Lesz-
nai’s life] (Budapest: Kossuth, 1979).
8 Alsókörtvélyes was a small town in the Zemplén province of North-
Eastern Hungary, in present-day Slovakia. Lesznai grew up there on the Mos-
covitz family’s sizeable estate. The garden and surroundings of the estate provided
the primary motives running through her aesthetic output.
9 Quoted in, Csilla Markója, “Három kulcsregény és három sorsába zárt
‘vasárnapos’: Lesznai Anna, Ritoók Emma és Kaffka Margit találkozása a válasz-
úton” [Three romans-à-clef and three Sunday-Circle members locked into their
destinies] Enigma 52 (2007): 90. All translations from Hungarian are my own,
unless quoted from an English text.
10 William O. McCagg, A History of the Habsburg Jews, 1670-1918
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992).
11 At the end of the 18th/beginning of the 19th century, a group of young
intellectuals sought to introduce liberal ideals into Hungarian political life, seeking
the radical transformation of the deeply ingrained feudal system that hindered
much needed social and economic reforms. Language reform occasioned a
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Nationalist Masculinity and Right-Wing
Radical Student Movements in Interwar
Hungary: The Case of the Turul
Association
Róbert Kerepeszki
Turul was the most significant Hungarian student association during the
interwar period. In the origin myth of the Magyars (the Hungarian people)
the turul was a divine messenger in the body of a great bird-of-prey that
symbolized power, strength and nobility.1 By the end of the 1930s, Turul
had more than hundred branches throughout the country, representing a
predominant majority among the youth organizations, with a membership
exceeding forty thousand. The Turul Association was established in 1919,
following the collapse of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, and it was dis-
solved after the end of the World War II.2 Consequently, Turul was able to
affect significantly the ideological development of the majority of students
in Hungary for over a quarter of a century. The role of this organization
was important not only for regular university students, but also for Hunga-
rian society at large, as many members retained their membership fol-
lowing their graduation and continued to participate in the association’s
activities. In this sense, Turul succeeded in extending the association’s ide-
ology into everyday life.
Recent historical studies have revealed a number of important
aspects, clarified significant issues in the role of this organization, and
have led to the revision of the biased views prevailing in the preceding
Marxist historiography. Although the available sources explored before
1989 reveal a wealth of information about Turul, these earlier studies have
characterized the association as mainly a “fascist”, anti-Semitic, and irre-
dentist organization.3 New aspects in the characterization of the Turul have
emerged only from the early 1990s, when the previously closed archives
became freely accessible. During this short period, the number of valuable
studies has increased, however this interest has not yet extended into the
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ranks of foreign researchers or translated into studies in foreign languages.
The available Hungarian studies have discussed the motives, organiza-
tional form, customary order, features, and motivations of anti-Semitic
actions of Turul and its sub-societies, as well as explored their wider social
role and activities reaching beyond the walls of universities. Recent explo-
ratory works have also pointed out the ideological inclusivity of fraternal
organizations similar to Turul, reflected by the fact that they had members
with left-wing and democratic orientation besides the right-wing radicals.4
Considerably less is known about the gender aspect and rate of the
membership in Turul.5 Thus, it is worthwhile to examine the association
from this point of view. Female students were a significant minority in
interwar Hungarian higher education and, as a consequence, in Turul. At
this time, women were allowed to enroll only in the faculties of arts and
medicine (both of which they had been admitted to since 1895). As well,
job opportunities in the professions were limited for women, and espe-
cially so during the years of the Great Depression.6 On the other hand, due
to its official ideology, Turul was highly conservative when it came to the
social role of women and rejected women’s emancipation. Nevertheless,
numerous sources, including archival documents, articles, and newsreel
reports, demonstrate that many women did join the Turul Association,
especially in the second half of the 1930s.7
This paper attempts to examine this paradox by approaching its
topic from two points of view. It will first present the development of
Turul and its “masculine” ideology as it is essential for understanding the
views officially represented by the Association in relation to the gender
question. Then, the paper will examine the ways in which women partici-
pated in Turul’s activities. This approach aims to reveal an interesting
aspect in the history of Hungarian right-wing radicalism and university
movements in the interwar period.
The Turul Association’s Development and Main Features
The origins and ideology of Hungarian right-wing radical youth move-
ments can be traced back to the distressed conditions that followed the
Great War (World War I). The intellectual youth and vast number of the so
called “student-soldiers” returning from the trenches witnessed the defeat
and collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the imminent loss of
territories constituting a major part of the “historical” greater Hungary. In
addition, owing to the dire social and economic conditions, the returning
The Case of the Turul Association 63
demobilized soldiers could not continue their studies at universities, nor
were they able to find employment. The Hungarian Soviet Republic
between March and August 1919 further strengthened the animosity of
right-leaning university students and intellectual youths towards leftist
movements and Communism. In 1919-1920, these political and social
circumstances crystallized the right-wing radical orientation of this genera-
tion. The massive protest against the Trianon Treaty, their view of the
“Jewish question,” and a general anti-communist position thus became a
cohesive force among these youths.8 It is necessary to mention that the
post-war strengthening of right-wing radicalism was not only a Hungarian
phenomenon. At the end of the 1910s and the beginning of the 1920s,
radical paramilitary, right-wing organizations were formed in many Euro-
pean countries, including the defeated Germany as well as a victor power,
Italy. This phenomenon was partly caused by the effect of the Great War
and the Versailles peace treaties. Their influence was felt not only among
the young intelligentsia, but in society at large. Eventually, this came to be
seen as a symptom of the crisis of liberal modernity which led to the
development of fascist movements and right-wing university organizations
across Europe. For example, the French Jeunesses Patriotes, the Spanish
Sindicato Español Universitario, the Romanian Asociaţia Studenţilor
Creştini, the Italian Gruppi Universitari Fascisti. These political parties
and associations all represented a radically conservative view on gender
hierarchy and they all refused liberal women’s emancipation and femi-
nism; their radical rejection of modernity was closely related to their “nati-
onalist masculinity.”9
After the collapse of the Hungarian Soviet Republic in August
1919, new student associations were established at universities throughout
the country. The first among them, the Turul Association (Turul Szövetség)
was brought into existence in August 1919. The rapid development of
Turul was mainly due to the vacuum that arose in the social and associ-
ational life of the youths. Leftist or liberal university organizations such as
the Galileo Circle, were banned after the revolutions, while old-style,
traditional student societies such as the University Circles (Egyetemi
Körök) were unable to represent the spirit of the emerging new era, as well
as the interests and views of radical, right-wing students.10 The growth and
expansion of Turul further accelerated after 1928, when the government of
Count István Bethlen modified the anti-Semitic Act, the so-called “numer-
us clausus.”11 Already in the next year, the association counted nearly
9,000 members among university students and 48 branches throughout the
country.12 The membership and the number of branches continued to rise
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throughout the 1930s as well. In addition to regular university students
(named daru for freshman or levente for higher level students) and the
above-mentioned graduates (dominus), many external supporters of the
organization, called patronus according to the Turul terminology, became
honorary members of the Turul. These included well-known politicians,
for example, the future Prime Minister Gyula Gömbös as well as univer-
sity professors, and their formal participation legitimized the association’s
activity to a great extent.13
Turul was officially considered to be politically neutral, but had an
important position among the youth movements (such as the Boy Scouts
and the Hungarian Levente movement) because of its ideology, the so-
called Christian-national spirit, and the many personal relationships it
shared with the establishment. The association also had close ties to some
of the infamous militant Hungarian right-wing organizations of this period,
including the Hungarian National Defense Association (Magyar Országos
Véderő Egyesület, MOVE), the Association of Awakening Hungarians
(Ébredő Magyarok Egyesülete, ÉME), the National Association of Hunga-
rian Women, (Magyar Asszonyok Nemzeti Szövetsége, MANSz), as well as
the Federation of Social Associations (Társadalmi Egyesületek Szövetsége,
TESz).14
An important feature of Turul’s membership was that first-year
students enrolling at any university were advised to apply into its ranks,
especially if they came from less wealthy families. When joining an
association or political party, a new member identifies himself or herself
with the governing ideology and social and political views of the organi-
zation. However, it is rather difficult to observe this in the case of the
Turul Association. In accordance with the rules of Turul, the association
often provided its members in need with financial aid or a loan, and the
association leadership helped them to obtain scholarships and accom-
modation in student residences. It is not surprising that many students who
did not sympathize with right-wing ideas became Turul members, and the
minutes of meetings of local branches indeed revealed political-ideological
debates and conflicts among the members.15
By the end of the 1930s Turul had more than hundred branches
throughout the country (112 in 1938, and 165 five years later).16 The local
branches were divided into ten regional chapters, with headquarters in the
largest cities of Hungary, among them Debrecen, Pécs, Szeged, Miskolc,
in addition to Budapest. Nevertheless, there were many disputes between
these regional chapters and Turul’s national headquarters in Budapest;
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these disputes concerned socio-political issues and internal affairs, such as
the election of national leaders.17
Because of the many disputes and differences of opinion, it can be
stated that the association had never been consistent in its program. This
inconsistency was also reflected in generational issues and conflicts. In the
1920s, the mentality of Turul’s membership was quite different from that
of members joining the organization in the next decade. The association’s
founders and initial members were radicalized mainly by the defeat in the
war and the shock caused by the Trianon Peace Treaty. For the following
generation of Turul members, these determining experiences were ampli-
fied or modified by increasing economic problems associated with the
Great Depression. Previous studies have demonstrated that the distress
caused by the Trianon Treaty and expressed in revisionism was artificially
generated and maintained in the collective national consciousness by the
ruling political elite.18 Consequently, the younger members were
discontented with the inefficiency and inactivity of their association, as
well as with the political system and the establishment in general. They
demanded radical changes, among others, in the Turul leadership and
demonstrated signs of orientation toward even more extremist political
movements.19 This is an important point to emphasize in our context, as
most of the female members joined the association during the 1930s.
However, before examining the role of women in the Turul Association, as
well as the association’s view of the gender question and women’s eman-
cipation, it is necessary to give an overview of the “masculine” features in
Turul’s ideology and activities.
Masculinity in Turul: “Racial Defense,” Nationalism, and
Militarism
The ideology of Turul consisted of many components. The most signifi-
cant part was the anti-Semitism and the so-called “racial preservation” or
“racial defense.” While these ideas were grounded in the popular con-
temporary notion that Jews were responsible for the Hungarian Soviet
Republic and the Trianon Treaty, they also had roots in the pre-war
period.20 In addition, an anti-royalist attitude also played an important role
in shaping Turul’s ideology. In the view of Turul’s leaders, the liberalism
of the Habsburg era was greatly responsible for encouraging the assimi-
lation of Jewry and for expanding Jewish influence into Hungarian public
life, at the expense of the “Christian” middle class.21
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Student activism and demonstrations can be considered to be
among the most significant expressions of Turul’s anti-Semitism that
materialized in similar types of incidents at nearly every Hungarian univer-
sity town: Budapest, Debrecen, Pécs, and Szeged. At the beginning of the
academic years, “Turulist” students would prevent Jewish students from
entering the university building or classrooms. They also organized de-
monstrations in the street, and held assemblies where they called for
further anti-Semitic restrictions, even a numerus nullus, a total ban of the
admission of Jewish students. By the end of the 1930s, they also demanded
the marking of their Jewish classmates with the yellow star.22 On the
occasion of such incidents, Jewish students were attacked and beaten, yet
Turul members took precautions when organizing the attacks: they were
careful to go to a faculty different from their own: for example, Turulist
law students “visited” the Faculty of Arts and they attacked the Jewish
students there, who would not know and thus be unable to identify them.
For their contemporaries, perhaps the most repulsive and shocking feature
of these attacks was that female Jewish students were occasionally
assaulted alongside their male colleagues, in acts of violence against the
female body previously unprecedented and unaccepted in any social
setting. These events show the disappearing ideals of chivalry and the
emergence of masculine violence in the self-definition of Turul. It is im-
portant to point out that in the post-war period, anti-Semitic student
demonstrations and atrocities at universities were not limited to Hungary.
The contemporary press reported widely about such atrocities almost every
month in other European countries, such as Poland and Romania.23
However, anti-Semitism was not the sole element of Turul’s ide-
ology of “racial preservation.” The association propagated the protection
of the Hungarian “race” from every alien race, especially from Jews,
Slavs, and Germans. The last is a surprising notion: while many Turul-
members were admirers of Nazi Germany or joined Hungarian National
Socialist parties, the official leadership of the organization was often pro-
nouncing against the increasing influence of the German ethnic minority
living in Hungary, which they regarded as a threat to the “Hungarian race.”
This served as an explanation for the riots Turul members staged against
ethnic German organizations, politicians, and university professors, just as
they did against Jews.24 The protection of race — an extreme version of
nationalism — can be considered as an important masculine feature,
because the protection of the homeland was traditionally the fundamental
responsibility of males.
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The other important “masculine” element of Turul ideology was
nationalism. The association’s leaders and members persistently demanded
the territorial revision of the Trianon Peace Treaty. Turul revanchism (or
“revisionism” in Hungarian) proposed the re-annexation of all lost terri-
tories, in some cases along with advancing a "Hungarian Imperial Idea.”
This expansionist ideology emerged and developed in the later decades of
the Austro-Hungarian era; its first representatives yearned for greater
power and waxed nostalgic about the return to the glory of the Árpád
dynasty or the empire of king Matthias Corvinus.25 By the 1940s, this idea
became one of the cornerstones of Turul’s ideology. According to a Turul
propaganda brochure published in 1940, one of the most important
objectives of the association was the “awakening of a Hungarian racial
consciousness”, which “prepares the realization of the Hungarian Empire
together with the upholding of Hungarian military ideals and the main-
tenance of discipline.”26
This quotation clearly reflects the most obvious masculinity
feature of the Turul ideology, namely militarism. This militaristic charac-
ter was manifested in several of Turul’s activities, and could be traced
back to the formation of the association. After the collapse of the Hunga-
rian Soviet Republic in 1919, the right-wing radical university students
formed “university battalions” whose main purpose was to maintain the
new order and “to cleanse” universities of leftist students and professors.
Armed, paramilitary groups played a significant role in the strengthening
of the counter-revolutionary, so-called “Christian-national” regime and
their representatives constituted the initial membership of Turul and its
local chapters. Later on, they provided important services for the govern-
ment, especially in October 1921, when the last Habsburg emperor and
Hungarian king, Charles IV attempted to regain the Hungarian throne for
the second time. These battalions, with a number of Turul members within
their ranks, took a prominent part in the battle of Budaörs, which ended
with the defeat of the king’s troops.27
Turul’s founders were thus “soldier-students,” and it is not sur-
prising that militarism and military attitude proved to be an important
factor both in the shaping of the association’s organizational structure and
in the development of its ideology and activities.28 Turul could also be
considered as a group of students associated for common purposes, a
fraternity, a type of organization that had otherwise no tradition in the
history of Hungarian university movements.29
In addition to Turul, there existed other student associations at
Hungarian universities. In the same year Turul was established, the stu-
Róbert Kerepeszki68
dents at the Faculty of Engineering and Technology (Műegyetem) founded
their own association, Hungaria Society (Hungária Egyesület). Shortly
after that, in 1920, the short-lived Christian-Socialist Centrum Association
(Centrum Szövetség) was called into existence. Next in line was the
Catholic and monarchist-leaning Foederatio Emericana in the next year,
and the last one was the expressly monarchist St. Stephen Fraternal
Association (Szent István Bajtársi Szövetség), formed in 1927. These
associations became the leading student organizations at Hungarian
universities, and though they shared many similar tenets in their ideolo-
gical foundation (the “Christian-national” idea, the militarist, anti-Semitic
and irredentist character), they had their own distinct main features, and
they were often hostile towards each other. Among the associations of
right-wing radical Hungarian university students, Turul enjoyed the great-
est influence and played the most significant role. Its dominance was due
to a number of factors. First of all, Turul was not restricted to a single
institution of higher education, unlike Hungária, for instance, whose mem-
bers were recruited exclusively from the engineering students of Budapest.
In addition, Turul recruited members on a non-denominational basis,
whereas Emericana was open only to Catholic students. In contrast with
certain organizations’ confessed monarchism, members of Turul were not
restricted when it came to their position on the potential return of the
Habsburgs. Besides, popular contemporary opinion held that the liberalism
of the Habsburgs was greatly responsible for the territorial losses of
Hungary after the Great War, an opinion shared by many university
students, in contrast to the Habsburg-loyalty of the St. Stephen Fraternal
Association. The significance of Turul was further increased by its great
influence on other university associations, including religious and relief
organizations, because in many cases, their leadership was in the hands of
Turul members. It follows from this that Turul was responsible for much
of the student opinion at universities and had a great influence over the life
of students at large.30
The military character of Turul was also supported by its core
ideology known as the “fraternal spirit” or “fraternal life.”31 Discipline
constituted a fundamental element of Turul mentality, and the associa-
tion’s leaders prescribed obligatory military training to the members as
early as the founding of the first local chapters of the association.32 In a
country that suffered military defeat in the war, this approach could also be
considered a manifestation of the popular will that accepted the aim of the
restoration of “Greater,” that is prewar Hungary, as a consensus demand.
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Another paramount objective of the Turul membership was the
education of Hungarian youth in military morale and spirit, leading to the
introduction of the “general mandatory national labour service”.33 The idea
of university labour camps and service was raised by Ödön Mikecz, later
Minister of Justice, in April 1921. Mikecz suggested that financial aid to
university students should be conditional on their participation in a univer-
sity labour battalion, providing assistance in rebuilding the country, parti-
cularly in agriculture, industry, forestation, and road construction.34 Turul
labour camps would be established only a decade and a half later of this
announcement. Their organizational structure was mainly modeled on the
German Voluntary Labour Services (Freiwilliger Arbeitsdienst) but traces
of English, Swiss, Austrian, Swedish, and Norwegian influence could also
be observed. During the second half of the 1930s, Turul member students
organized labour camps in underdeveloped and backward regions of the
country, providing assistance in public works.35 In addition, the partici-
pants of these summer camps received theoretical and practical military
(so-called “national defense”) education, which consisted of “modern
military knowledge,” military exercises, technical military training (for
example, anti-aircraft training), disciplinary exercises, as well as religious,
moral, and ideological training.36 The purpose of this complex “national
defense” education was the strengthening of the “racial (national) consci-
ousness” of the Hungarian student body. The importance of this Turul
initiative, labour service, cannot be overestimated and is demonstrated by
the fact that the government provided significant financial support for it in
the second half of 1930s, shortly after the Great Depression.37
Turul’s View of Women and the Participation of Women in the
Association
The above example clearly demonstrates that Turul was a typical “mascu-
line” organization; this makes an examination of the association’s perspec-
tive on women and the gender question all the more important. Turul
regarded the liberalism of the 19th century as anathema, for it allowed not
only the assimilation of Jews but also the emancipation of women, in-
cluding women’s university enrollment. This was an important feature of
Hungarian higher education during the years of the World War I, when
high numbers of “soldier-students” marched to the front, leaving the
admission numbers of universities to be filled by female students.38
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After the Great War, the right-wing radical intellectual youth
represented the widely shared opinion that women forcibly took professi-
onal job opportunities away from “Christian-national” men, and therefore,
they protested against women’s access to higher education. This anti-
emancipatory thinking had been further amplified by the economic strife
during the Great Depression.39 At that time, the most radical Turul mem-
bers strongly demanded the revision of the gender question and educati-
onal situation because — as it was explained in an article of the newspaper
Harc! Előre! (Fight! Forward!), representing the Turul press — if not for
women’s participation in the professions, “many men would find a job and
many families would get bread.”40 Of course, the author of this article did
not take into consideration that the dismissal of women would not solve
the unemployment problem, but would merely result in changes in its
gender ratio. While the article refers to working women in general, its re-
commendations also include women’s university enrollment and degrees.
In its views regarding women’s social role, the association re-
mained staunchly conservative in later years as well, which was pre-
sumably associated with the context of the Great Depression and the
broader contemporary neo-conservative approach to femininity. For
example, in 1931, the Turul chapter in Debrecen issued a statement against
the national beauty contests, and “proclaimed social boycott against the
young women who participated in these commercial competitions.” They
claimed that such beauty pageants went against the traditional ideal of the
woman, whose main roles were as the faithful and modest spouse and the
caring mother. According to the right-wing press of Debrecen, this action
“generated the wide approval of Debrecen’s Christian-national society,”
and it was followed by the active attention of the national public opinion.
This is very well demonstrated by the fact that many right-wing national
organizations, for example, the Association of Awakening Hungarians
(Ébredő Magyarok Egyesülete, ÉME), the National Association of Hun-
garian Women (Magyar Asszonyok Nemzeti Szövetsége, MANSz), and the
Federation of Social Associations (Társadalmi Egyesületek Szövetsége,
TESz) “took notice of the movement of the youth with the highest
approval,” and joined the boycott against “the improper beauty contests,”
as they intoned, “in the interest of the consolidation of national morals.”41
What underscored their enthusiasm was the fact that it was often young
Jewish girls who won the beauty queen titles, such as in the case of the
future, famous actress Zsazsa Gábor.42
Two years later, in 1933, the Szeged chapter of Turul launched a
national movement against the “liberal trend,” which “tried to put every-
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thing in the service of eroticism” and “infected society.” According to the
initiators of this movement, “fashion and the modern lifestyle endanger the
social esteem of women,” therefore they plan to “launch a fight and will
demand the ban of plays and films that serve eroticism.” Members of
Turul then decided to contact the leaders of social associations, and made
every effort to gain the approval and support of the Christian churches and
their press.43 In this light, it is not surprising that during the years of World
War II, particular actresses came to be regarded as the “enemy of the
nation” in the view of Turul, for example Katalin Karády, who often
played “the femme fatale” in contemporary Hungarian films. In 1943,
Turul members demonstrated against her, and demanded her banishment
from the Hungarian film industry.44
These events reflect the association's view according to which the
conservative female image was the only suitable female ideal for a
“Christian-national” Hungary. At the same time it is interesting to note that
the organization did not essentially reject the admission of women but,
rather, expected a suitably conservative mentality from them. The associa-
tion’s official position was that “the fraternal idea, the fraternal objective is
equally compulsory for young women,” but “on the other hand, it is also
clear that physical and psychological differences between the two genders
need to be taken into consideration in the assessment of women’s fraternal
life.”45 Admission to the organization was allowed only for those women
who represented “the religious, educated Hungarian woman [who] is being
proud of her home, fights assertively and represents a high moral
standard,” as it was articulated at the first assembly of Turul women in
1935.46
Unfortunately, there is no reliable data about the number and pro-
portion of women in the association, because most of Turul’s official
documents perished in World War II.47 However, available sources reveal
that there was a woman elected to be a member of Turul’s leadership at the
end of the 1930s. Her name was Anna Rigó, and she became one of the so-
called under-chiefs or deputy chiefs, (alvezér) of the Association, hinting
at the significant role of women in Turul’s life. In addition, there is also
evidence of well-known politicians’ wives becoming Turul’s honorary
supporter members (so-called patrona), as for example the wife of Mihály
Kolosváry-Borcsa, a leading right-wing politician.48
Regarding the actual activities of Turul women, there is a similar
dearth of sources. The very limited sources do indicate, however, that
following their first general assembly in 1935, women members organized
their own work camp in Kapuvár and an autumn congress in Budapest in
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the next year.49 Unfortunately, the minutes and other documents detailing
these events did not survive. Only the titles of some presentations (“The
role of woman in the family,” “The social tasks of young Hungarian girls,”
“The woman as a university graduate,” “The university graduate wife”)
and a brief extract of a memorandum to the Hungarian cabinet are known
from the daily reports of the Hungarian News Agency (MTI). The topics
of these fragmental sources give an indication of female Turul members’
nationalist stance and social views: in the memorandum, they demanded
the initiation and implementation of increased family protection measures,
for example, tax allowances for families with many children and a tax on
bachelors.50 These measures, if introduced, would have echoed similar
policies already in effect in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. The essence
of this mentality is even more obviously expressed by the words of Anna
Rigó, who declared at Turul’s annual general assembly in 1939 that “the
women in the Turul need not fight for emancipation but rather for the goal
of young Hungarian women to become better Hungarians and outstanding
Hungarian mothers who stand at the top of their vocation and who are
faithful helpers of their men.” [a Turul bajtársnőinek nem az emancipáció
érdekében kell dolgozniuk, hanem azon, hogy minél jobb és tökéletesebb
magyar anyák váljanak a magyar leányokból, akik hivatásuk magaslatán
állva, hűséges segítőtársai a férfiaknak.]51
Conclusion
There is no doubt that the main objectives and activities of the Turul
Association were intended to make young Hungarian intellectuals loyal to
the “Christian-national” Horthy regime and form their worldview through
militarist, revanchist, and racist ideas. Turul’s ideology was motivated and
shaped by young people who were not trained as political ideologists.
Rather, the social and political circumstances of Hungary, their military
service and experiences in World War I, the loss of two-thirds of their
homeland in the Trianon Treaty and their dissatisfaction with the political
leadership of their country made the youths bitter and keen on creating an
organization through which they could establish a new spirit for the
country. Turul was a student organization initially exclusively male, but
one that also accepted women from the mid-1930s onward. In addition, the
participation of women in the Turul movement demonstrates that the
mentality of women was affected by the contemporary right-wing radical
ideology as much as that of men. The Association’s “masculinity” deeply
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influenced the attitude of women as well. The intention of this study was
to open new avenues for research into the little-explored notions and
practices of gender, race, militarism, and youth culture on all society levels
within right-wing nationalist groups in interwar Hungary.
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Mata Hari or the Body of the Nation?
Interpretations of Katalin Karády
David S. Frey
Fame has a strange way of making individuals more opaque. Audiences
assume they know the stars whose faces they see and whose personal lives
they follow in popular media. However, the process of creating public
personas can significantly alter the individual. Stars both make themselves
and are made through media, sometimes in a symbiotic manner, other
times in an adversarial one. Such is the case with the Hungarian songstress
and actress Katalin Karády. This analysis of the characterizations of
Karády, which emerges from a myriad of disjointed descriptions and
biographic confusion about the actress, is case in point. There is much we
do not know, and thus much legend, surrounding the woman who
dominated the Hungarian box office and whose voice reigned over popular
music during the Second World War. It is precisely this contradiction —
this dominant public personality with multiple semi-private and private
personas — that make Karády a superb subject for a brief study of sym-
bolism, nation and gender in the context of a changing Hungary.
Who was this Katalin Karády? This is not an easy question to
answer. The story of Katalin Karády, née Kanczler, could have been
dreamed up in Hollywood. Karády was born in the Kőbánya section of
Budapest in early December 1910, the youngest of seven children born to
Ferenc Kanczler and Rozália Lőrinc. The household was “despotic”; her
shoemaker father prohibited reading the newspaper, visiting the theatre,
and going to the movies. As an adolescent, she received scholarships
which allowed her to study abroad, mainly in Switzerland, and briefly
escape her repressive home life.1 Drawn to the stage, she enrolled in acting
classes in 1936, when she was 25, but made little progress until the film
and theater journalist Zoltán Egyed discovered her singing in a Budapest
café in 1938. Convinced of her talent, and the need for new non-Jewish
talent due to the stultifying effects of the First Jewish Law, Egyed took
Karády’s career into his hands. At his suggestion, she worked with Ilona
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Aczél, one of Hungary’s most renowned acting coaches, whose greatest
pupil prior to Karády was Zita Perczel, the star of one of the most well-
known 1930s Hungarian films, The Dream Car [A meseautó].  Egyed also
suggested that Katalin change her name to Karády, and he helped arrange
her debut in 1939 at the Pest Theater in the Somerset Maugham play, “The
Lady and the Devil.” Her beauty and her voice, from that point on dis-
played on several of Budapest’s most prominent stages, launched her into
the world of motion pictures. Between 1939 and 1948, she starred in
twenty features and several short films, making her, according to Jenő
Király, “the greatest star in Hungarian film history, the first and last of
[Hungary’s] great divas, our film goddess.”2 Yet her activities and roles
also earned the disdain of the radical right, who blamed the actress for
spreading the “Jewish pestilence.”3 Her film career was greatly hindered
by her 1944 arrests by the Gestapo, for her pro-Allied leanings, and then
by the Arrow Cross for her supposed “defeatism” and lack of patriotism.4
When the tide of war turned and the Red Army occupied Budapest in
1945, Karády again found herself detained, this time by the Communist
secret police. Though she returned to the stage and starred in a handful of
films after the war, authorities heavily restricted her professional activities.
From the late 1940s on, Communist apparatchiks refused her roles in
Budapest’s top theaters, condemning her for having become a star during
the Horthy era and for the types of roles and politics she chose. In 1949,
they would forbid reprises of her films. Humiliated, Karády fled Hungary
with the renowned singer Oliver Lantos in February 1951, settling tempo-
rarily in Salzburg in 1951.5 Eventually, she emigrated to the US in 1968
after years as a peripatetic in Western Europe (Austria, Switzerland, Belgi-
um) and South America (Brazil).6 She rarely appeared on stage thereafter,
working in relative obscurity in a Madison Avenue hat shop. Her short but
storied career in Hungary has made her the object of great affection and
admiration, not to mention substantial gendered mythologizing.7 This
Hungarian brunette was, as András Csont asserts, “just as much emble-
matic of her times” as was Marilyn Monroe for post-war America.8
This article will consider various perspectives on Karády and in
the process discuss the symbolism of these separate narratives, the ways in
which Karády was and was not exemplary of her times. As a film giant in
a small country, a femme fatale rumoured to be a lesbian, a spy, an émigré,
a subject of historical analysis, and even one of the “Righteous among the
Nations,” Karády inscribed upon herself — and was ascribed by others —
a range of meanings. Karády’s complexities and the dilemmas she posed, I
suggest, help explain how the body of the actress became the canvas upon
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which she and other Hungarians painted various narratives of nation and
gendered behavior.
The first, and the least complicated, portrayal of Karády was as
movie star. The youngest of seven children, Karády arrived on stage and
screen at a time when the Hungarian cultural industries were in a state of
crisis. In the midst of the application of the Second Jewish Law and the
purges of creative Jewish talent this entailed, Hungarian film and theater
were desperate for new, attractive potential.9 “This type of actress, which
she is capable of becoming, is greatly needed on stage,” wrote Aladár
Schöpflin in Nyugat.10 Karády, whose husky voice drew comparisons with
Greta Garbo, quickly became a box office winner, and like the stars of her
day, a vehicle for defining gendered fashions, patterns of consumption,
and behavioral norms.11 What distinguished Karády was that she trans-
cended and subverted norms, displaying a willingness to tackle roles rarely
seen in Hungarian productions, becoming Hungary’s first full-fledged
vamp, sex symbol, and liberated woman. Her breakthrough role came in
the Lajos Zilahy-written Halálos tavasz [Deadly Spring], in which she
starred opposite Pál Jávor, the Hungarian Errol Flynn facsimile with whom
she frequently found herself paired.12 In Deadly Spring, which premiered
in December 1939, Karády played the empowered and uncontrollable
femme fatale role she would often reprise, driving her co-star Jávor to
commit suicide by refusing to commit her love to him alone. In 1940,
Karády played Queen Elizabeth, the title character in Félix Podmaniczky’s
film Erzsébet királyné [Queen Elizabeth]by the same title. In this ficti-
onalized historical film, the daughter of a Hungarian revolutionary con-
vinces Karády’s Elizabeth to learn Hungarian and to back Hungary’s
desire for autonomy from Vienna. Karády’s busiest years were 1942-43,
when she starred in 14 films. In no less than 9 roles, she played the
seductress or dangerous love interest: Deceived [Csalódás] (1942); A
Heart Stops [Egy szív megáll] (1942); Deadly Kiss [Halálos csók] (1942);
Guard-post in the Suburbs [Külvárosi őrszoba] (1942); Opium Waltz
[Ópiumkeringő] (1942); Sirius [Szíriusz] (1942); Machita (1943); Szo-
váthy Éva [Eva Szováthy] (1943); Something Adrift in the Water [Valamit
visz a víz] (1943).
In the 1943 film Machita, Karády plays a spy from an unknown
enemy country dispatched to Budapest in search of plans for a new anti-
aircraft gun.  Performing as a nightclub dancer under the name Machita,
she must use her perfect Hungarian and her other charms to seduce three
engineers. Naturally, two of the three are putty in her hands, but the third,
company director György Szávody, proves more difficult. As he resists,
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her desire for him grows, and she soon is unable to suppress the feelings
she has for him. The always competent police inform Szávody of
Machita’s real identity. Despite this, his love for her appears to trump his
love for country, and they flee to the countryside to deliver the blueprints
to Machita’s handlers.  However, in the decisive scene, the world turns
right again, both in terms of gendered and national norms.  It is Machita
who gives in to her heart, abetted by a true Hungarian who, when rubber
meets the road, would never betray his country. She refuses to turn over
the designs for the gun, is shot by the other spies, and dies in György’s
arms. Thus, the love of country triumphs through the stronger, male, sex,
whereas the foreign and female “other” is erased as a potential threat to the
national body, but only after she herself is seduced by Hungary’s intrinsic
allure.
It is, perhaps, this role that defined the myth of Karády more than
any other; perhaps because it did, to an extent, accurately reflect a portion
of her private life. As she was filming Machita, Karády was, in fact,
involved in the world of real espionage. Numerous accounts of the
activities of Colonel General István Ujszászy, the chief of the Hungarian
General Staff’s domestic counter-espionage department [Vkf-2] from 1939
to 1942 and from 1942 to 1944, the head of the larger internal security
apparatus subordinate to the Interior Minister known as the State Protec-
tion Center [Államvédelmi Központ], confirm that Karády and Ujszászy
were engaged in a public love affair that Karády assumed would lead to
marriage after the war.13 Ujszászy, who had contacts with Abwehr Chief
Admiral Wilhelm Canaris dating back to the late 1930s, with the OSS, and
with a highly secretive American intelligence unit known as “the Pond,”
was, if not an outright opponent of the Nazis, someone who believed that
the Allies would ultimately triumph.14 Ujszászy protected jailed Com-
munists and opponents of the government from execution; and despite
numerous opportunities to flee, remained in Hungary, playing a significant
role in the attempted negotiations with the Allies to extricate Hungary
from the war. Specifically, Ujszászy was the crucial contact in Operation
Sparrow, the early March 1944 airdrop of American intelligence officers
into Hungary to meet with government officials to discuss Hungary’s
potential withdrawal from the Second World War.15 This plan, devised by
the Office of Strategic Services, the precursor to the CIA, and overseen by
OSS head Allen Dulles, was the mission depicted in Péter Bacsó’s 2001
film, The Smouldering Cigarette [A hamvadó cigarettavég].16 I will
discuss this film momentarily, but first I wish to concentrate on Karády’s
role in Operation Sparrow. OSS records indicate that the meeting between
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American intelligence and Ujszászy might have occurred in Karády’s
home.17 While this report’s claim that the Nazis discovered three sup-
posedly English parachutists, executed them, and may have shot Karády as
well are patently false, certain facts are less dubious.18 Karády took an
active part in Operation Sparrow and likely had a continued role in espi-
onage through contacts with American military intelligence.19
Was there a division between the real and the screen versions of
Karády, the personas of Machita and the actress who did have a confirmed
role in the behind-the-scenes drama of the war? Imre Hecht, a Hungarian
émigré film distributor who knew Karády personally, told me that he
assumed Karády to be a spy.20 That Karády had an affair with General
Ujszászy, as I mentioned, was an open secret. In a recently declassified
narrative in the possession of the CIA, the author identified as Tibor Revay
alleges this affair was far more than one of love. Public opinion at the
time, according to the journalist András Korom and the historian Szabolcs
Szita, held that Karády “converted” Ujszászy into an anti-fascist, although
Szita dismisses this as myth. Both Korom and Szita  agree that Karády was
responsible for arranging some of Ujszászy’s liaisons with leftists,
including meetings with László Rajk and the Smallholder Party leader
István Kovács.21 Revay leaps well beyond these assertions, suggesting it
was Karády’s covert life, particularly her facilitation of contacts between
powerful men, that advanced not only her acting career, but Allied peace
efforts and even the Stalinist show trials. While these charges beggar
belief, it is worth tracing the logic of Revay’s fanciful notions.
Revay speculates that Karády’s affair with Ujszászy began before
her career took off, and it was in fact Ujszászy’s connections that pro-
pelled her to prominence, incorporating her into the right circles, finding
her appropriate promoters.22 Further, Revay suggests it was Karády who
facilitated contacts between the pro-Allied camp among the Hungarian
leadership and the United States OSS through her connections in Switzer-
land, where she had attended school before her family returned to Buda-
pest.23 She became, Revay charges, “one of the chief string-pullers of the
underground,” a woman who had connections not only with Ujszászy, but
Miklós Horthy Jr., the son of the Hungarian Regent, Noel Field, the in-
famous American double agent, and László Rajk, the renowned Hungarian
Communist who later became the victim in Hungary’s most notorious
show trial.24 She must have been a spy for the Communists, alleges Revay,
as the only way she could possibly have fled Hungary in 1951, crossing
“unharmed six kilometers of mined and guarded territory of the no man’s
land between Hungary and Austria…[with the] help of Soviet Russian
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officers.”25
Numerous errors in the Revay manuscript convince the reader that
the text is clearly fiction. The author describes Béla Kun as the Hungarian
communist dictator of 1920 (rather than 1919), charges Hungarian
Communists of “crimes” against the general population in 1924, and
quotes private conversations between Ujszászy and Karády verbatim. Yet
for all of its inventiveness, the document reveals a gendered trope, a Mata
Hari-esque mindset that is indicative of a pervasive strain of post-war
Hungarian thought. Written in late 1951 and early 1952, Revay’s work
may have been an early draft of a historical thriller in a Red Scare series
that never came to fruition. However, the work also came at a time during
which Hungarians, particularly émigrés in the United States, sought scape-
goats, people to blame for the perceived disaster of the war and the
Communist takeover. Scapegoating, as Attila Pók has shown, involves the
desire to assuage one’s own guilt, often for political reasons, and takes
typical forms.26 One form Pók does not consider is the fallen female, the
siren/seductress who betrays her nation. Like the Great War’s Mata Hari,
Revay constructs an image of a cunningly manipulative woman, a pup-
peteer of love, who uses her “feminine wiles” to tie together all of the evils
that have destroyed Hungary. From her association with film industry
Jews, the greedy exploiters who, as many Hungarian authors had argued in
the 1930s and 40s, helped to weaken Hungary; to her ties to the well-
meaning, misled patriots of the Horthy era; to her links with the party of
surrender to the Communist hordes; to her friendships with those of the
Left themselves — it is as if Karády is the focal point, the axis around
which the vortex of Hungary’s wartime collapse revolves. She is, as Slavoj
Žižek has detailed in reference to Ingrid Bergman and Roberto Rossellini,
a “woman-symptom”; woman as the cause of and the embodiment of the
fall of man.27
She wore no scarlet letter, but Karády’s sexuality, her primary
identifier in film, became her marker during her film heyday and in early
post-war narratives. Most of her roles were “grown up women” with an
overt erotic flair.  In his text about the myth and magic of Karády, Jenő
Király comments extensively on the “wonder” of Karády’s body and
screen sexuality.28 But unlike Count Michael Andrássy, who criticized
Karády in the early 1950s as a communist collaborator who was known to
be the “biggest whore in Budapest” during the Nazi period, Király does
not believe the actress to be restricted to a single so-called feminine
identity.29 Király points out that Karády frequently played the “active,
clever, successful working woman” who was not always at the mercy of a
Interpretations of Katalin Karády 95
man. Of course, audiences did not always respond positively to these
characteristics, interpreting Karády pejoratively as a lesbian man-hater.30
On this point, Király and Žižek fundamentally agree: whether Karády was
liberated from predominant heterosexual mores or the strictures of
traditional feminine identity, her liberation was a mortal threat to man.
“Carefully educated as fairies,” writes Király, “[the women Karády
played] received their top-notch diplomas, and took them straight to hell,”
men in tow.31
The comments of Andrássy and Király make it appear that, during
the wartime and immediate post-war eras, there was an even greater
congruence between the Karády of the spy narrative and Karády the film
star, than in the fictional Revay account. Combined, these sources present
an image of a woman who, whether loved or hated, wrecked havoc on the
patriarchal and national institutions of wartime Hungary, even as she
became the nation’s most desirable box office consumable. Nevertheless,
as Hungary’s image makers changed, particularly after 1989, representa-
tions of Karády and her place in the nation also transitioned.
Karády has become so much a part of the Hungarian “memory”
and nostalgia that her songs and films have experienced a revival in the
past decades, and numerous websites devoted to her have appeared, consti-
tuting what Péter Bacsó has called a “Karády renaissance.”32 Perhaps even
more indicative of her continued presence was a story and doctored picture
published in a 2000 issue of the daily Magyar Nemzet which placed the
chanteuse at the side of Winston Churchill, ostensibly as his mistress on
the shores of the Balaton during the summer of 1929.33 The picture, which
we know was fabricated (Karády would have been 18 and Churchill never
visited Hungary), is a window into the pre-existing myth of Karády as
singer, seductress, and spy.  But something new is also implicit in this
image: Karády as the social conscience of the nation, the mistress who
knew which side was in the right well before the war.34
The most significant contribution to this new image was the
popular 2001 feature about her titled The Smoldering Cigarette by Péter
Bacsó.  This film foregrounds an enormous part of Karády’s life that the
previous spy narratives had diminished, that of Karády’s work to save
Jews. While stories of Karády’s actions protecting Jews circulated even
during the war and caused her to run afoul of the radical right, one did not
publicize one’s pro-Jewish activities in late-1940s and early-1950s
Hungary. It has taken two generations and the fall of Communism for her
contributions to come to light. This film, made with significant state
support, focused on the relationship between Karády and György G.
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Dénes, her Jewish lyricist. Dénes’ character, known in the film as Miklós
Sutberger (Suti úr), is sent to do labour service on the snowy Eastern
Front, likely somewhere along the Don. The film intertwines numerous
well-connected figures, such as the editor of Magyar Nemzet and General
Ujszászy, who realize the war to be lost even before the Soviet demolition
of the Hungarian Second Army (after the Stalingrad breakout), and
contrive to act. The plot of the movie hinges on pro-Allied and pro-Jewish
themes, although the film white-washes neither Hungarian anti-Semitism
(which Ujszászy shares) nor the aloofness and isolation of Hungary’s
aristocratic elite. Ultimately, the efforts of a spoiled but well-intentioned
diva, Karády, save the life of her inspiration, the songwriter Suti, rescuing
him from the Soviet advance through Ukraine. As the plot develops, the
affair between Karády and Ujszászy takes center stage, paralleled by a
narrative line leading toward Operation Sparrow. To tie the entire film
together, director Bacsó gives the lyricist Suti a key role in the spy drama.
At Ujszászy’s behest, Suti, an idealized composite of the cosmopolitan
“culture” Jews of interwar Budapest, acts as a Hungarian patriot. Ujszászy,
knowing that the Germans are aware of Operation Sparrow, realizes that
to save the Americans and himself, he needs to devise a cover story.
Because Suti speaks both English and German, Ujszászy’s epiphany is that
Suti should act as the American Colonel who was dropped into Hungary to
negotiate with Horthy.  Despite his mistreatment by his countrymen —
having been forced to do labour service and at one point nearly killed —
Suti consents to the charade and does a great service to his country.
I view the The Smouldering Cigarette as a transition point, a
drama that coincides with the revival of interest in Jews, Judaism, and the
Jewish role in Hungarian history that characterizes the last 20 years.
Karády’s story is central to this transformation.  Once again, she is the
canvas for Hungarian national identity, in this case Hungary’s Vergangen-
heitsbewältigung, its coming to terms with the treatment of its Jews.
Through the medium of Karády, Bacsó’s feature restores the Jew both as
patriot and as central to the culture of interwar and wartime Hungary. The
film does not, however, fully detail Karády’s relationship with the Jewish
community during the years of the war. Nowhere are we shown that
Karády’s efforts depicted in the film to have her Jewish muse recalled
from labour service in 1942, resulted in her being hauled before a court
and chastised for violation of the Jewish laws.  Due to this action and other
outspoken efforts, filmmakers began to deny Karády roles. By 1944, she
eventually quit acting, in part to protest the industry’s offensive treatment
of its Jews.35
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These contemporary accounts of Karády’s actions have recently
been augmented through the initiatives of the historian Szabolcs Szita.
Based on Szita’s research, Yad Vashem posthumously honoured Karády as
one of the “Righteous among the Nations,” primarily for saving Jewish
children and sheltering them through the winter of 1945 until the liberation
of Hungary by Red Army troops. According to István Domonkos, who had
personal interactions with the actress, Karády also assisted the Jewish
actor Imre Ráday and his wife, enabling them to survive the Holocaust.36
János Gömöri, one of the several Jewish youths saved by Karády, des-
cribed a separate act of salvation in the early winter of 1944. Gömöri was
taken from his Wesselényi Street ghetto home by the Arrow Cross, and
dragged to the banks of the Danube, along with other Jewish children.
Accounts indicate that Karády, possibly accompanied by Ujszászy, pulled
up in a large black vehicle and managed to convince or bribe the Arrow
Cross militia men not to take the freezing children on a death march or toss
the children into the river, which they apparently intended to do.37 Gömöri
and a number of other Jewish children were sheltered in the basement of
villas owned by Karády, on Városmajor út and Pasaréti út, for the duration
of the war.38 All of these actions were taken at great risk to her own life
and property. The Gestapo arrested Karády on 18 April 1944. Whether the
charge was “defeatism”; “liberalism,” a code word for any purported pro-
Jewish sentiment; or treason — a charge repeated, incidentally, by the
Russians less than a year later — Karády languished in jail for somewhere
between a week and three months.39 While holding her in custody, the
Germans allegedly starved her, beat her, robbed her apartment, and ulti-
mately accused her of being a spy.40 She was interred again during the
Arrow Cross interregnum, in the fall of 1944, and eventually gained
release through the intervention of higher authorities. Struggling through
the Siege of Budapest, she survived, but like Hungary, emerged from the
war psychologically scarred.
This new evaluation of Karády, based less on her appearance or
screen personas and more on her actual acts, began in the early 1980s with
a series of interviews and texts, and took off in 1989 with the re-
publication of Karády’s biography How I became an actress [Hogyan
lettem szinésznő], and a series of obituaries published after her February
1990 death, accelerated further with her selection as “Righteous among the
Nations” in 2003.41 This current iteration of Karády makes her simulta-
neously a symbol of what was attractive about, and right with, old Hun-
gary and what present day, influential image-makers, including those of
the post-communist state, hope new Hungary would be.42 When con-
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textualized this way, Karády the deadly seductress morphs into Karády the
liberating angel, the saviour ascribed with traditionally masculine fighting
qualities as she salvages a usable, albeit flawed, past.43 Thus mytholo-
gized, and only after the fall of the communist regime she fled, she em-
bodies a cosmopolitan, inclusive, European, progressive, and economically
successful Hungary, a Hungary with agency — the ability to act positively
and thrive.
My brief attempt to situate, historicize, and provide new empirical
evidence concerning the mythology of Katalin Karády demonstrates that
as concepts of gendered practice and Hungarian identity changed, so did
interpretations of the roles, life and actions of Karády. Changing historical
contexts allow us to re-read the famous figures we thought we knew and as
a result, to ascribe to them new personas. Not only, we find, was Karády
representative of her time, but because we want her to be, she is also
reflective of the present, and even a model for the future.
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Gendered Exclusions and Inclusions in
Hungary’s Right-Radical Arrow Cross Party
(1939-1945): A Case Study of Three Female
Party Members
Andrea Pető
World War II is not exactly known as a time when many women broke
through the glass ceiling to become visible in public life.1 In interwar
Hungary political citizenship was determined by growing restrictions on
women’s suffrage. These restrictions were opposed by social democrats
and communists, but also by the increasingly powerful far right.2 In this
paper I look at four women on the far right who managed to break through
the glass ceiling. In doing so, I seek to determine how they represented the
far right’s image of women.3 How was political citizenship defined by the
far right and how did the individual women involved in politics fit this
definition? Who were the women on the extreme right and what can we
learn from their life stories? These questions are poignant if our aim is to
analyze female mobilization on the far right in terms of women’s agency.
In line with Saba Mahmood, I understand agency to mean the ability of the
social agent to question existing social norms.4 It was, in part, this factor
that mobilized the far-right women under investigation, for, in addition to
promoting the general far-right political agenda, the women were also
seeking to gain acceptance for their own goals. In my paper I firstly
examine what we know about these women and the sources available for
studying their lives. I then analyze how historical role-models were used
by the far right to define political citizenship. Finally, in an analysis of
three life stories, I show how far-right women maneuvered themselves in
the face of conflicting political pressures.
Women on the far right: sources and facts
Before addressing the facts, we should clarify the extent to which the three
stories under consideration are representative. In Hungary, gendered
Andrea Pető108
analysis of the history of the far right is still in its infancy.5 The records of
the People’s Tribunal (that were set up immediately after the war)
represent a point of departure for a systematic examination of the subject.6
This material can be used to reconstruct the types of women that were
attracted to the far right and the reasons for their attraction.
The following question should be asked: Who were the women
tried by the People`s Tribunal as war criminals? Ildikó Barna and I
undertook an analysis of the social backgrounds of women defendants at
the trials.7 In our paper, which appeared in the magazine Élet és Irodalom
[Life and Literature], we showed, based on the database of the Budapest
City Archives, that women accounted for 10 percent of all of war crime
prosecutions.8 This percentage roughly corresponds to the current female-
male ratio in Hungarian public life and politics. Prior to 1945, however,
women were rarely active in public life, and so the 10 percent figure seems
rather high.9 One should note, however, that in the aftermath of World War
II the reinvigorated Communist Party used the juridical process both to
stigmatize the Horthy regime and to suppress the “matriarchy born in
need.”10 On the other hand, we also know that in some party branch
organizations as many as 30 percent of members were women, which
suggests that the figure of 10 percent was less than women’s overall share
of party membership.
In 1939, when a number of Hungary’s right-radical movements
coalesced into the Arrow Cross Party,11 the official discourse of the Horthy
regime was hostile to women. In higher education, the rights of women to
university study (granted in 1895) were severely restricted in the
immediate aftermath of World War I.12 These restrictions seem to have
been made in reaction to the increased political presence of women,13
which threatened the positions of the pre-1918 political elite. Around this
time, the National Association of Hungarian Women [Magyar Asszonyok
Nemzeti Szövetsége, MANSZ] — founded by Cécile Tormay in 1918 —
became the umbrella women’s organization. It mobilized middle and
upper-middle class women and it also functioned to limit the spread of
left-wing and right-wing radicalism.14
During the parliamentary debate of the electoral law in 1938, it
became clear that far-right groups — who shared with the left wing a
desire to extend suffrage — were gaining ground.15 Among Hungary’s
politicians, Gyula Gömbös — who drew many of his organizational ideas
from the Italian fascist state — paid special attention to women’s political
mobilization: he even set up a separate women’s party.16 Subsequently, the
far right also gave increased attention to the mobilization of women. The
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Arrow Cross Party itself was formed from many divided and marginalized
small groups and parties under the leadership of Ferenc Szálasi. The
Arrow Cross Party first ran in the 1939 elections.
The Arrow Cross Party organization was based on a sexually
divided and hierarchical order. Its women’s organization was at the same
level as the youth section. Its function was to promote mass membership.
However, the Arrow Cross leadership recognized the political value of its
female members. Various types of membership were made available to
women: they could be members, supportive members or even secret sup-
porters. The all-male party leadership wanted female party members to be
active primarily in the social field. We know from press articles that the
party’s women members were not satisfied with this status: they too
wanted to play an active role in politics.17 However, if the Arrow Cross
Party’s female members “had taken themselves seriously” — that is, if
they had behaved as men's political equals — they would have been im-
mediately dismissed from party headquarters. In the party’s top leadership
and decision-making bodies there was no place for women. The case of
Mrs. Dücső, the leader of the women’s section of the Arrow Cross Party,
demonstrates this form of treatment. At the same time, in the official
Arrow Cross rhetoric, women were defined as strong and active. The
Arrow Cross movement was a so-called counter-movement; under the
Horthy regime it was denied official recognition and many of its members
were imprisoned as the Horthy regime tried to navigate between the
extreme left (the communists) and the extreme right (the Arrow Cross
Party and its predecessor groups). The movement may also be seen as a
socialization movement as it prepared its members for a series of events
that were to take place sometime in the future. This moment came on
October 15, 1944, when, in the aftermath of Regent Horthy’s failed
attempt to pull out of the war, the Arrow Cross came to power in Hungary,
forming a Quisling-like government.
The women associated with the Arrow Cross Party formed four
separate yet heterogeneous groups.18 The first group consisted of women
who had joined other far-right parties already in the 1920s. They were
disillusioned white-collar women (such as typists and bookkeepers). Many
of them had come to “truncated Hungary” (as the country was referred to
following the Treaty of Trianon according to which Hungary lost two
thirds of its pre-WWI territories) as ethnic Hungarian refugees from areas
ceded to the successor states of Austria-Hungary after 1919. For these
women, the newly-founded Arrow Cross Party offered a framework for
their social integration in their chosen country. Often single, these working
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women believed that their professional and social mobility had been
hindered by a conservative political regime with its emphasis on a
woman’s place in the home. For this reason, they supported radical
political solutions, in particular those offered by the far right.
The second group comprised women from lower-middle class or
working class backgrounds who had committed criminal acts during the
war. These women formed the largest group of defendants at the People’s
Tribunal. Specific (financial or personal) motives seem to have been
behind their actions. They exploited the Shoah to take revenge and to
“redistribute” social goods. Such women included the mentally ill as well
as others who clearly suffered from psychological problems.
The third group consisted of rebellious and revolutionary women
from middle-class or upper-middle class backgrounds. They were educa-
ted, wore men’s clothing, and rode horses — just like men. Although these
women had gained access to areas formerly closed to them, appeared
emancipated and rejected patriarchy as the primary markers of their
identity, they were marked by anti-modernism as their identity had been
formed against European modernity and the enlightened interpretation of
progress.
The fourth group is the best known and most visible in the public
discourse. Here, we find family members of Arrow Cross leaders. Most of
these women were from middle-class or upper-middle class backgrounds,
but unlike the third group, they had no professional aspirations. They were
the wives or relatives of men (husbands, brothers, and fathers) who had
joined the Arrow Cross Party. Such relationships explained their actions.
The public identity was that of “wife” or “supporter” to the husband or
relative. Further below, I will present live stories of women that belonged
to one of these groups; however, not all four groups will be represented.
The Arrow Cross Party had been formed in the misogynistic
political milieu of interwar Hungary, in which “women” (especially the
“new women” — i.e., working independent single women) were regarded
as a threat and as unreliable by the male economic, political and cultural
hegemony. A noticeable trend was the squeezing out of women from
public life, achieved in part by restricting women’s suffrage. In the
aftermath of World War I, attempts were also made to restrict women from
taking part in higher education.19 The reformulation of political citizenship
also meant determining which women belonged to the nation and which
did not. It was against this backdrop that the Arrow Cross Party broke onto
the scene. In spite of its anti-modernist rhetoric, the party nevertheless
provided space for the realization of female autonomy. The reconstructed
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stories present women who corresponded with (or adapted in line with
their own needs) the normative far-right image of femininity, an image
based on motherhood.
Defining role models and femininity
Before we examine — based on the life stories revealed in the courtroom
— the normative definition of gender on the far right, it is worth looking at
the manner in which the Arrow Cross Party made use of historical role
models to define normative femininity. We can do so by comparing the
Hungarian far-right movement with other major rightist movements in
Europe at the time. If we look at countries other than Nazi Germany, we
find some very interesting parallels.
Similarly to the women’s organization of the Spanish Falangists,
the women’s section of the Arrow Cross Party strove to redefine femi-
ninity at a time when an increasing number of women were in paid
employment.20 Whereas the Falangists provided women, by means of
education, with opportunities to integrate into Francoist public life
(universities in Spain would only open to women in 1940), the same was
not true for women who were employees or members of the Arrow Cross
Party.21 Just like the Arrow Cross, the Falangist women’s organization
defined the new female role with the help of historical female figures.
However, whereas the Falangists propagated the cult of Isabella I (unifier
of Spain) and the cult of St. Teresa of Avila (founder of the Discalced
Carmelites), thereby demonstrating that religious beliefs and an active
public role are not contradictory aims and aspirations, the Arrow Cross
Party considered the women’s ideal to be the charity work of St. Elizabeth
of Hungary. And whereas the Falangists respected Nobel-prize winner
Marie Curie for being an outstanding scientist, the Arrow Cross press
praised her for being both an excellent scientist and a good mother:
If a woman wishes to achieve something in the intellectual field that
is of real worth in absolute terms, she must have a rich and
unimpaired emotional life. That is to say, she must be fully a
woman. An excellent example of this is Marie Curie who was both
a caring mother and an outstanding wife. By recognizing this, one
will see the error of those who strove for women’s emancipation in
the bygone era. Women were made to compete with men in the
intellectual field. This distorted their souls and diminished their
emotions, thereby causing great harm to their intellectual abilities. It
drove them into a purposeless and fruitless struggle in which they
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were constantly made to feel the exhausting character of competi-
tion.22
The goal of the Falangists was the inclusion of women in public
life. This led women to believe that the organization would assist them if
they decided to discard the housewife’s role that belonged to old-fashioned
and conservative Spain. Now that the Spanish Civil War was over, the
Falangists were required to respond to the Republican side’s successes in
the field of women’s emancipation.23
On the issue of women’s employment, views similar to those of
the Falangists were held by women members of Sir Oswald Mosley’s
British Union of Fascists (BUF). Mosley promised equality particularly in
the field of employment, and he planned to eliminate gender-based
discrimination.24 As a consequence, a fair number of former suffragettes
joined the British Union of Fascists, and this led the party to claim that
feminism and fascism were not antagonistic.25 The Croatian pro-Nazi
Ustasha — irrespective of the movement’s nature and the combat situation
— chose historical and mythical bellicose queens as historical role models.
Still, the role models featured in their press included the first female
conductress as well as female artists and sometimes even university
students. Indeed, even the life of a warlike Amazonian was portrayed as a
potential pathway for women; in this way the Ustasha movement could set
as its ultimate goal the turning of its female members into men. This was
considered to resolve once and for all the political and rhetorical problem
arising from women’s difference.26
This type of approach to gender inequality was quite alien to the
ideology of the Hungarian Arrow Cross Party. One of the Arrow Cross
movement’s greatest internal debates (a debate nevertheless played out in
public) concerned the very issue of the role of Arrow Cross women in
politics. The official policy defined citizenship through motherhood: “The
object of the women’s movement is to make women conscious of the
maternal heart and its inherent power and to encourage them to put it to the
service of the family and thus of our nation.”27
At the same time, women political activists formulated their goals
rather differently:
In this one aspect we, Hungarist women, may seem to be feminists.
We demand for ourselves equal rights with men in the field of
honour. We are aware that this means equal obligations and duties.
May we refuse to accept a separation between male honour and
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female honour! We protest when people say that a woman’s lies can
be forgiven and are ‘endearing’, […] and we protest when the word
‘lady-speech’ is pronounced with a wave of the hand.28
In the Arrow Cross women’s educational material, we can read that
consciousness-raising groups were set up in the women’s organization, a
move related to attempts to define some kind of equality.
By contrast, the Falangists determined the spaces in which women
could abandon the so-called feminine, biologically determined roles:
military affairs (at the time of the Civil War), government, religion and
education.29 In the case of the Ustasha, the areas were medicine, writing
and education.30 These were spaces where there was a possibility of giving
recognition to women in a manner that did not compel them to abandon
their “feminine attributes.” For their part the Arrow Cross leaders
remained unaffected by the gender dilemma, and they could not resolve
the paradox. For them a woman who failed to conduct herself in
accordance with her biologically determined “feminine” attributes, had
lost her “femininity” — defined in a hegemonic and normative way. There
was only one objection: the historical roles played by women. In this
frame, they supported the cult of “ancient Hungarian mothers”31 emphasiz-
ing that “it is characteristic of our ancient culture that our women live at
the side of their men as equal partners.”32 They placed the demands of
modernization in an anti-modernist evaluation framework, claiming that
the loss of this “ancient Hungarian value” was the source of all problems.33
This definition of womanhood corresponds to Karen Offen’s definition of
relational feminism, which — unlike individualist feminism (which
emphasizes individual autonomy and human rights) — seeks to equalize
power relations between women and men yet without questioning existing
gender divisions and women’s role as part of a heterosexual couple and as
mothers.34
In the far-right press of the period, we find only a few articles
relating to female role models, which is indicative of the Arrow Cross
Party’s rhetorical difficulty to define the role of women. The Arrow Cross
struggled to cope with the fact that its mainstream gender policy was
rejected by many women who otherwise sympathized with party ideo-
logy.35 The rhetorical difficulties were, however, overcome in a report by
Ica Ruszin, who had gone to the Russian front as a volunteer nurse and SS
member. Ruszin returned from the front with a military decoration, but
having lost her legs and with a shrapnel in her belly. On the train, she gave
a soldier who was teasing her “such a healthy punch with her young war-
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trained hand […] that, in the future, the man will think twice before
making jokes about the self-sacrifices of nurses at the height of their
profession.”36 This story also served to show how a woman could use
physical force, which was later an important requirement of mobilizing
far-right women and also a means of extending militarized citizenship to
women.
The three stories
In the following three life stories, I show how three women, selected on
the basis of the aforementioned typology although not in the same order,
were mobilized into supporting the far-right movement. More broadly, I
examine how these women could enter the social space and what factors
determined their political citizenship in this period. Through the life stories
of such prominent figures as Gizella Lutz, Mrs. Dücső, Mrs. Gönczi
(Erzsébet Madarász), and Mária Kozma, we can gain insights into the
dilemmas faced by Arrow Cross women in the process of exclusion and
inclusion by which political citizenship was established.
1. The wives of Arrow Cross leaders: Gizella Lutz (wife of Ferenc
Szálasi)
An important aspect of my research is to look at the wives of Arrow Cross
leaders as well as female party members.37 In the aftermath of World War
II, historians of Nazism and fascism were quick to write down the life
stories of the wives and lovers of prominent Nazi and fascist leaders, often
portraying them as foolish puppets. In recent decades, more nuanced
analyses of these women have been published, and we now also know
more about the activities of the many women who became members or
supporters of the Nazi and fascist movements.38
In the Arrow Cross, the wives of party leaders ran an important
network, which played a significant role in the distribution of jobs.
Women in this group were the best known and visible in the public
discourse: they were family members of the Arrow Cross leaders. They
came from middle-class or upper-middle class backgrounds and lacked
professional aspirations. They were the wives or relatives of men (hus-
bands, brothers or fathers) who had joined the Arrow Cross Party. Family
relations influenced their decisions and behaviour. Their public identity
was that of “wife” or “supporter” to a husband or male relative.
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On February 7, 1946, Ferenc Szálasi, on the third day of his trial
before the People’s Tribunal, told the court about the roles he assigned to
women in his movement and to Gizella Lutz. When the prosecutor, László
Frank, asked — in a manner replete with misogyny — whether women
active in politics (and particularly in the Arrow Cross) were necessarily of
loose morals, Szálasi replied that the women had been knitting stockings
and woolens, and when a “real situation” had arisen — a sudden snowfall
— they had helped clear snow. Through this statement Szálasi sought once
more to make the female Arrow Cross activists invisible (those that had
participated in the movement, but had not been wives or lovers). Many of
the women had suffered because of their commitment to the movement.
For instance, the English teacher Mária Hunyadi had been interned in 1939
as a punishment for supporting the Arrow Cross; Szálasi had subsequently
awarded her a medal for her activities.39
In his private life Ferenc Szálasi very much followed Hitler’s
model.40 After the collapse of Austria-Hungary, he moved from Kassa
(today Košice, Slovakia) to Budapest in 1919. The man for whom military
life was a vocation and mission formed a relationship with the public
servant Gizella Lutz in 1927. From 1936 onwards, he spent much time at
her apartment, but he only married her after the couple’s flight to Austria
in 1945. They were married in Mattsee on April 29, 1945 and taken into
American captivity on May 5, 1945. Lutz, who was Szálasi’s wife for such
a short time, paid a high price for the relationship. The wives of other
Arrow Cross leaders captured by the Americans and returned to the
Hungarian authorities — the wife of Zoltán Bagossy (who prepared the
ground for the Arrow Cross takeover and was assigned by the party to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs) or the wife of Péter Hain (a police inspector
who became head of the Hungarian Gestapo) — were “merely” sent to
internment camps.
Gábor Péter, the Communists’ first secret service chief — who
was notoriously sensitive to publicity and who played a key role in
securing the return to Hungary of people suspected of war crimes — ,
arranged for the interrogation of Gizella Lutz and of Sári Fedák to be
documented.41 Fedák had returned to Hungary wearing a worn wolf-skin
coat. Lutz, a slim middle-aged woman who wore her hair in the style of the
famous film star Katalin Karády, was unable to reveal much information
about the Arrow Cross movement to her secret police interrogators, for
Szálasi had intentionally kept her away from politics. While Lutz had
regularly invited the wives of other Arrow Cross leaders to her home for
tea, the women were unlikely to have made ground-breaking policy
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decisions. When asked by the People’s Tribunal about these tea parties, the
wife of Ferenc Kassai — the minister without portfolio responsible for
national defense and propaganda in Szálasi’s government — stated: “We
women gathered at the invitation of Gizella Lutz. We discussed a variety
of problems, also addressing political topics. We spoke in particular about
the coming victory of the Arrow Cross Party.”42 This group of women —
the wives and lovers’ group — recruited many female members for the
party. One of them was Mária Januj who became the wife and accomplice
of the head of the House of Loyalty — an elite Arrow Cross body
comprising party members who had been imprisoned or interned for their
views — because she was living in the same house as László Baky’s43
mother-in-law and, as a single seamstress, hoped to gain social status and a
husband by joining the party.44 We know from documentary material
produced in the course of the People’s Tribunal trials that this social
network was used to distribute well-paid and secure jobs to people
working in the party apparatus. Amid the wartime uncertainty, finding a
“good partner” was important; even the aging Jenő Andreánszky, who
later became minister of foreign affairs in the Arrow Cross administration,
managed to attract a much younger woman as his partner.45 But against the
backdrop of a Horthy regime obsessed with social differences and
hierarchies, these groups of women were light years away from the other
female Arrow Cross members who will be analyzed below. This was not a
moral problem for Lutz, as she was playing the role of invisible back-
ground assistant. It was defeat in war that made her dream come true when
she finally married Ferenc Szálasi.
Szálasi and seven of his accomplices were sentenced to death and
executed on March 12, 1946. After her return to Hungary, Lutz received
sentences from the People’s Tribunal on two occasions: November 22,
1945 and June 19, 1946. The People’s Prosecutor interpreted various items
found in her apartment (such as her husband’s photo) as Arrow Cross
symbols, and so she was found guilty of disseminating Arrow Cross
propaganda. She was then held at an internment camp in South Buda. She
spent many years in prison, sharing a cell with Júlia Rajk for a while.46 She
was freed at the time of the 1956 revolution, thereafter living a quiet life in
her apartment on Mester Street, Budapest, until her death in 1992. There
was no place for Lutz at Szálasi’s public hearth before the war, as she did
not fit into the Arrow Cross canon; she was single and childless and, in
addition, a public servant. Accordingly, it was only after 1945 that she was
included in the far-right canon. Today, on the Internet, she is the object of
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a vibrant cult, whereby she is remembered as the wife of Szálasi rather
than as the woman who was his unmarried partner for decades.47
2. The female physician who “only wanted to heal the body of the
nation”48
The role played by intellectual women in the far-right movements should
not be underestimated, and yet the list of individuals convicted by the
People’s Tribunal does not include the Arrow Cross women who published
in such party newspapers as Egyedül vagyunk [We Are Alone] and
Magyarság ]Hungarians] from the 1930s onwards. With the approach of
the Red Army, these women fled to the West. As they were not considered
important, the Hungarian authorities never requested their extradition, and
so they have been left out of history. Apart from the head of the national
Arrow Cross women’s organization, the only other woman in this category
to be found on the list is an Arrow Cross district leader. Also absent from
the list of defendants are members of the women’s branch of the National
Association of Hungarian Physicians [Magyar Orvosnők Országos
Szövetsége], a body that played a crucial role in preparing the ground
intellectually for the far-right movement. However, the chairwoman of the
women’s branch, Dr. Erzsébet Madarász (Mrs. Gönczi), is included on the
list. In what follows, I seek to give context to her life story.
The Arrow Cross women who had graduated from university at
great individual cost had been confronted — as the first generation of
women intellectuals — with discrimination in the workplace. They, along
with single women who, in search of work, had migrated to Hungary from
areas ceded under the Treaty of Trianon and now belonging to other nation
states, were profoundly hostile to the patronage and nepotism of the Arrow
Cross Party and to the acquiescence of wives and lovers to the “patriarchal
bargain,” to use Deniz Kandyoti's term.49 These women believed in an
anti-modernist emancipation, which excluded, in a moral sense, the option
of a woman depending financially on her male partner.
Hungary as a nation state was a result of the Treaty of Trianon.
People in Hungary regarded their country as a truncated national body.
This was an opportunity for women to redefine themselves as healers. The
Horthy regime did not establish “a new canon of knowledge”50 but rather
invoked the metaphor of disease to explain events. According to its
rhetoric, while the limbs of the national body had been severed, the trunk
had remained.51 This rhetorical framework represented a particular
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opportunity for female physicians. The interwar period saw the first
generation of practicing women physicians. Despite the officially granted
educational rights prior to World War I, they had to face social prejudice
on a daily basis. Faced with such problems, some of the women turned to
new disciplines, such as psychoanalysis, or became involved in the radical
social movements. Others, however, chose a different path. The example
of Erzsébet Madarász shows that employment and a traditional definition
of femininity are incompatible in a rhetorical sense or are compatible only
at the cost of a compromise with racism.
Reinhart Koselleck has shown how “linguistic communities are
organized around specific concepts … and they also have a temporal
aspect.”52 Within this framework, the women physicians were those who
could be at the forefront of healing the national body in those exceptional
or peculiar times. The “peculiarity” was the temporal aspect, as women
physicians strove to resolve the conflict between a woman’s traditional
role and employment as a physician.53 By 1942 there were as many as 679
women physicians in Budapest, out of a total of 1,207 physicians. 54
percent of these women were married, while this was true for 61.7 percent
of male physicians.54 The female physician’s work was considered a
“noble” profession, which women practiced until they got married. To
resolve this situation, in 1927 Eszter Kokas founded the National Associ-
ation of Hungarian Women Physicians, a body organized on the Italian
fascist model but which did not exclude Jewish members.55 In their
rhetoric they made no mention of the exceptional times and the demands
of the nation. The women’s branch of the National Association of
Hungarian Physicians, on the other hand, was founded in 1929 and headed
by Erzsébet Madarász (Mrs. Gönczi, born in 1898), an experienced female
politician. Their rhetoric was very different in that Jews were excluded
from membership and support was given to the state-run eugenics
program.56 With World War II, an increasing number of women physicians
was given a professional chance but only because of the “exceptional
circumstances.” The concept of citizenship was coupled with usefulness to
the nation; moreover, it was a citizenship based on race. During her trial
by the People’s Tribunal, Madarász (Mrs. Gönczi), who was one of the
few women physicians to have adopted the name of her husband, stated:
“Because by profession I am a physician but I am also sensitive to social
questions … I was convinced that I could only realize my social ideas
through politics.”57
Sensitivity to social issues was on the rise. In 1938, for instance, a
survey conducted by the National Association of Women University
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Graduates [Diplomás Nők Országos Egyesülete] found that 60 percent of
respondents reported that they had suffered discrimination in the work-
place.58 In many cases, such statements concerning discrimination
experienced by professional women often led to membership in the Arrow
Cross Party as it, as mentioned above, opposed discrimination.
On July 28, 1945, the People’s Tribunal sentenced the best-known
Arrow Cross woman, Mrs. János Dücső, to ten years imprisonment. This
woman had been a member of various far-right groups since the 1920s and
had quite a reputation for punching people rather than arguing with them.
She suffered from cervical cancer and died as a prisoner on November 27,
1948.59 But this did not stop her from maligning Erzsébet Madarász (Mrs.
Gönczi) who had been chair of the women’s section of previous extreme
right wing formations such as the United Women’s Camp, and a member
of the Meskó political party. The prosecution did not spend much time on
compiling an indictment; it was thought that an unusually detailed
statement would suffice.60 On June 27, 1945, after a fruitless defense, Mrs.
Gönczi received a six-month prison term because “she had been persuaded
to join the party by an influential male relative.”61 Mrs. Dücső claimed that
Mrs. Gönczi “served all the far-right parties throughout the period.”62
Indeed, Mrs. Gönczi had been a member of the Awakening Hungarians
[Ébredő Magyarok], of the Race Defense Party [Fajvédők],63 and finally of
the Arrow Cross Party. It did not matter that Mrs. Dücső had stated that
Mrs. Gönczi was an “excellent and experienced voice of the people, who
with her actor’s voice and passionate performances seized the attention of
her listeners and threw them into ecstasy, whereby some of the women
were inclined to weep as she spoke.”64 Concerning her life, one should
note that she received a certificate of good conduct on July 20, 1971.
Unlike German and Austrian female war criminals, who — if they were
jailed at all — were freed in the early 1950s, it was not until the 1970s that
most of the Hungarian female war criminals were released. After her
release, Mrs. Gönczi became supervising chief physician at the Central
Child Dentistry Clinic in Budapest and qualified for a pension at the age of
seventy-three.
3. The life of Mária Kozma
The women belonging to the third group (as explained above) were often
ignored when it came to speaking about war criminals. These women were
activists in the Arrow Cross Party without, however, ever occupying
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leading roles. In a 1938 article, Ferenc Bécsi formulated what was
expected of women: “The National Socialist Hungarist social movement
respects in women the idea of motherhood. Their vocation is fulfilled
within the family and at the hearth rather than in taking away men’s bread
and butter as men are supposed to found families by becoming public
servants or workers.”65 Of course, the female ideologues and fanatics
within the Arrow Cross Party envisaged a rather different role for women,
which resulted in a conflict between the party’s male and female members.
The leading Arrow Cross women who had earlier been interned on account
of their views and who had become members of the House of Loyalty did
not take part in the exercise of power after the Arrow Cross’s takeover on
October 15, 1944. There were two reasons for this: first, the limited
perspectives of the Arrow Cross party leadership, which did not consider
women to be the intellectual or political partners of men; and second, the
approach of the Red Army and the chaos this soon generated. At the
People’s Tribunal, the fact that leading Arrow Cross women were not
included in the leadership of the Hungarian Quisling government was
portrayed, in almost all cases, as having been their own decision. This is
hardly surprising given that such a stance was likely to result in a much
lighter sentence. Given the lack of other sources, we must draw our
conclusions from the trial data.
In 1945, eight percent of the defendants facing the People’s Tribu-
nal were concierges or assistant concierges. They came from lower
middle-class or working-class backgrounds and their crime had been that
they sought to get hold of Jewish property. The authorities were relatively
well acquainted with them. Those who did not escape in good time were
the first to be reported to the authorities by the residents of their buildings.
In this way, they were rapidly included in the justice process.66 When
questioned on April 5, 1945, Mária Kozma stated that she had been taken
to court for verbal abuse and that she had been sentenced to three months’
detention for disruption of peace. She had served her sentence in the city
of Győr. Other than that, she had been punished (fined) on just one other
occasion for slander and libel. She had been released from Győr prison in
April 1941, whereupon she returned to Budapest where she found work as
a cashier at the Metropol Hotel. After her return to Budapest, she often
went to the Arrow Cross offices and visited Arrow Cross families and
attended lectures. Her main area of interest had been social work, and the
party leadership supported this “feminine” interest. Her activities in the
Party had been in this field. In 1943, she took part in a retraining course, as
this was a requirement for becoming a party official. She stated that she
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would have gladly played a leading role in the Party, as the Arrow Cross
ideas appealed to her and she wanted to serve the Party. In 1941, she had
been granted membership in the House of Loyalty, but the Horthy regime
subsequently banned this body, although its operations were  reauthorized
in January 1944. At this time, Kozma had become leader of the District IV
branch. In the summer of 1944, she submitted a request for a Jewish shop,
but instead of being awarded a bookshop, she was chosen as director of the
Arrow Cross Book and Newspaper Publishing Company [Nyilas Könyv és
Lapkiadó Rt]. In the course of her activity in the party, she spoke to Szálasi
on several occasions and she also wrote him a letter stating, according to
the minutes of the interrogation: “I, the most diligent visitor to the District
IV [Budapest A.P.] party offices.” She also met with Ödön Málnási, chief
ideologue of the Arrow Cross Party, who, after her release from prison,
asked her whether she wished to submit a compensation claim. On several
occasions she contributed to the newspaper Solidarity [Összetartás]. In her
articles she praised the Arrow Cross ideas and spread party propaganda.
She concluded her statement as follows: “I acted as a convinced Arrow
Cross supporter, I made the Arrow Cross ideas my own, and I still support
them and where possible, disseminate them.”67 It comes as no surprise that
she was convicted. She might have been treated more leniently had she
stated something similar to what another woman — one of the few district
party heads to be tried by the People’s Tribunal — stated: “I visited the
members, collected membership dues, and distributed tickets for cultural
events. I did not do anything else. … I know no more than the others
because we women were not involved [in the decision-making process].”68
Still, Kozma’s resume, attached to the trial papers for October 13,
1952, reveals something else, a typical turn of events at the time: not only
had she been involved in politics, but at the end of the war she had occu-
pied an apartment so as to “guard” it; however, she subsequently refused
to return it to the rightful tenants once they reappeared. The latter reported
her to the authorities and she was imprisoned. After her release, she of-
fered her services to the State Protection Authority [Államvédelmi Ható-
ság, ÁVH], who gladly employed her as an informer as she was a member
of the Trade Union for Concierges and of the Hungarian-Soviet Society.
Conclusions
Based on the typical life stories of these three far-right women, we can
draw some conclusions about the gender policy of the Hungarian Arrow
Cross Party and its definition of political citizenship. The first conclusion
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is about the great variety of the forms of women’s political activity; such
activity was not limited to party politics but was also manifest at informal
gatherings, such as tea parties and “alternative public spaces.”69 The arenas
in which political citizenship was exercised are also definable in terms of
class: only exceptionally did women get close to the decision-making
level. Other women were left with the “politics of motherhood” as a means
of exercising pressure or a space for the expression of political power.
The second conclusion is about the ways in which political and
economic motives merged. It is difficult to separate politics from
economic motives when discussing how women managed to get into
positions where they could contribute to definitions of citizenship. The
statements made by far-right women at the People’s Tribunal often reveal
individual needs as a motive for stealing Jewish property.
Thirdly, the women’s stories are often characterized by a political
radicalism that was a reaction to society’s rigidity and to discrimination.
These women became supporters of the far right based on their profess-
sional experiences. This political force offered them a form of political
citizenship that guaranteed their place in a political regime founded on
exclusion. And, finally, politically active women on the far right sought
forms of organization that corresponded to their own views, and it was
during the post-war decades of communist rule that they finally found such
forms of organization. The female concierges who had supported the
Arrow Cross willingly became communists. In the post-World War II
“new order” the forms of subordination remained the same as they had
been under Arrow Cross rule.
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In post-socialist Hungarian society there has been an intensified, largely
politically driven, emphasis on defining and ensuring women assume their
“proper” social roles — typically limited to maternal and nurturing duties.
These roles are often entwined with nationalist sentiments as Hungarian
women’s social roles are imbued with social responsibility and defined in
a context of what is “Hungarian”. In what follows, I first briefly discuss
the development of the emphasis on women’s maternal roles in Hungarian
society. I then focus on the Hungarian women’s website Nők Lapja Café,
unpacking the ways in which this website plays a role in shaping and
defining women’s roles and what characteristics “good mothers” should
embody. I argue that the popular women’s website serves to position
Hungarian motherhood as a means by which “Hungarianess” can be
defined and compared to other nations.1
Social Roles Prescribed for Women in Hungary from the 1990s
Beginning in the 1990s — following the fall of communism — dominant
discourses promulgated by politicians and the media claimed that “real”
Hungarian women want to have large families and make motherhood their
main objective.2 For example, Lynne Haney describes some of the posters
during the first democratic elections post-socialism, and points to the
highly pro-natal theme of pregnant women, smiling women with babies, or
women tending happily to domestic duties.3 More than just presenting
images of women happy to be mothers and homemakers, a poster by the
Magyar Demokrata Fórum (Hungarian Democratic Forum, MDF), the
leading centre-right party, featured a woman and a baby with the text, “We
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are so happy that we can finally go home.”4 Importantly, it was not just
one party concerned with women returning to the hearth, so to speak.
Haney writes of the “excessive” talk of the first democratic leaders of the
1990s, who focused on “the sanctity of the family and the need for women
to go home and guard it”.5 She explains how, on March 18, 1990 a tele-
vised discussion among party representatives featured the topic: “Future
Roles for Women”.6 Party leaders debated ways to help women “choose”
to withdraw from the workforce, providing little encouragement and
support for women who wanted to remain employed. Although Hungarian
women were obviously, not rejected from the workforce en masse and
made to stay at home in the years that followed, many of the women who
have been active in the workforce in the post-socialist period have
experienced difficulty achieving a desirable work/life balance because
women who work continue to experience a double burden — expected to
assume the primary care-giving role in addition to working outside the
home.7
The discouragement of women’s workforce participation was, and
is, importantly shaped by the country’s political and social history.
Specifically, dominant ideas of women’s roles have been strongly influ-
enced by a desire to slough off foreign influence and return to a more
“Hungarian” society. For example, Brigid Fowler explains that Hungarian
nationhood is importantly shaped and defined by an intense desire to shed
any aspects of life under socialism.8 Post-1989 then, the “emancipation” of
Hungarian women, thought to have been achieved largely by the employ-
ment of women in industrial settings under socialism, has been framed as
unnatural and “alien” to Hungarian culture and tradition.9 Public policy has
been shaped in concert with discourses encouraging motherhood and
discouraging women’s employment. For example, by July 1991 Hungarian
women no longer had job protection following their maternity leave and
many public childcare centres facilitating women’s work began to close.10
This policy was changed only in 2004 when, anxious to join the European
Union, Hungarian parliament enacted a law forbidding discrimination
based on gender, motherhood or family.11 However, in contemporary
Hungarian society, the policy is barely enforced and employers have
circumvented the law protecting women’s jobs while on maternity leave
by “restructuring” and making redundant such positions during the
woman’s maternity leave.12 As Éva Fodor explains, a study of the
literature concerning Hungarian women and policy reveals that, in general,
post-1989 policies moved “in the direction of inhibiting, rather than
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enabling, women’s participation in an otherwise tight market”.13 Éva
Fodor and Christy Glass contextualize this policy trend, explaining that
… state policies reflect and shape public opinions, which have been
identified as exceptionally “traditional” in postsocialist Hungary.
More so than in most European Union countries, Hungarian men
and women support the notion that women’s primary calling is in
the household and motherhood is women’ natural state.14
Complementing a social climate unsupportive of women’s em-
ployment and concerned with “real” Hungarian women — carried through
from the 1990s to contemporary Hungarian culture — is an emphasis on
whose procreation is important and desirable. Continuing a long-existing
stream in Hungarian political thought, there is in the 21st century an intense
concern among some Hungarians that Hungarian ethnicity may dis-
appear.15 Concurrently, in the last ten years, “there has been a sharp rise in
racism and hate crimes”.16 As a result, some Hungarian citizens — it has
been approximated that about 50% of the population of Hungary is overtly
racist17 — and even acts of legislation are antagonistic to people deemed
“un-Hungarian”. It is important to note that antiracist activists have been
working in Hungary, since the 1990s and currently, to eradicate racism and
“hate speech” from Hungarian culture.18 Roma citizens, however, are
particularly targeted; the European Commission has found, overall, that
legislation enacted to alleviate racism and discrimination in Hungary has
been ineffective and, worse, parliamentary debates have been the site of
many racist comments.19 Indeed, the Roma in Hungary face prejudice and
segregation.20 Further, the children of Roma in Hungary are often treated
as less important — and less desirable — than ethnically Hungarian
children. This is demonstrated by the low academic achievement of many
Roma children, which Anna Kende and Mária Neményi argue is a result of
the segregation of many Roma children who are placed in insufficient
institutions, originally intended for children with mental disabilities, which
contribute to their segregation and prevent or limit further education.21 As
Michelle Behr et al. explain, who is deemed “Hungarian” has become a
question of importance in Hungary,22 and the obligation to reproduce and
raise more ethnic Hungarians, while maintaining the family’s home life,
has increasingly fallen on the shoulders of women, held responsible for
maintaining the private domain.23
Tasked with forgoing employment and instead reproducing
“Hungarian” children, Hungarian women have been assigned a role in
nation building. Nationalism as a concept is hotly debated and defined
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inconclusively24 but that is not to say that there is not much to be written
about the way in which the identity of a nation is shaped and who is
expected to play a role. Fowler explains how Hungarian political elites
have, since the early 1990s, struggled to define the Hungarian nation, its
relationship to the Hungarian state, non-ethnic Hungarians within the
country’s geographical borders (although Hungary is fairly homogenous)
and also its relationship to other nations.25 In 1999, a program of national
“revival” was announced by the then — and current — Prime Minister
Viktor Orbán for the 21st century, and he remarked (in an effort to ensure
“concerned” Hungarians that joining the European Union would not dilute
Hungarian culture) that worrying about one’s culture and language was an
important — and positive — concern.26
Nira Yuval-Davis argues that much theorizing about the nation,
state and citizenship is too often limited to discussion of bureaucrats,
policy makers and the intelligentsia, and that not enough attention is paid
to the role of women. She argues that women contribute to nation building
significantly by reproducing nations both culturally and symbolically.27 In
this essay I am concerned with the expectations for the roles Hungarian
women are demanded to play in Hungarian nation-building through their
reproduction — both in their roles as reproducers, generally, and also in
the specific expectations demanded of them as mothers — and the ways of
framing Hungarian motherhood as different (and, as I shall demonstrate,
“better”) than the parenting of other countries by the website Nők Lapja
Café.
An Introduction to Nők Lapja Café
Discourses concerning who is Hungarian, what it means to be Hungarian
and what women’s roles should be in nation building are spread by many
media sources, including media with a targeted female audience. It is
important to examine these discourses because in post-socialist Hungary,
as Éva Thun explains, women’s identities are greatly shaped by popular
media.28 Further, the current Prime Minister Orbán and his government
(dominated by Fidesz) created an unsettling Media Law Package, which
came into effect July 2010 and ensured that the National Media and Info
Communications Authority and its Media Council “has oversight over all
forms of media” in Hungary, and their rule even extends to the ability to
block internet service providers.29 Given the limited freedom the media
currently experience in Hungary, it is even more important to examine the
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kinds of messages and representations that are disseminated by a website
like Nők Lapja Café, to contribute to analysis of the ways in which
messages of nation, nationhood and women’s social roles are relayed in
Hungarian society by the media (which are increasingly limited by the
government), specifically to an audience of women.
Nők Lapja [Women’s Journal] is a weekly Hungarian women’s
magazine that was launched in 1949, and originally funded by the ruling
Hungarian Workers’ Party.30 After the fall of communism, the publication
was renamed “Magyar Nők Lapja” and remained popular — it has become
the nation’s most read women’s weekly magazine.31 Currently, the maga-
zine is known simply as Nők Lapja. Gabriella Molnár, the magazine’s
editor-in-chief, explains in a blurb on the website of the magazine’s media
representative, Sanoma Media, that
The great success of this brand — and of the journalists, editors and
photographers of this magazine — is that it managed to remain credible
and authentic through several generations. It is a great challenge to transmit
constant values in a world characterized by constant change and lack of
universal values: but this is the challenge that makes Nők Lapja stay
alive.32
The magazine purports to offer Hungarian women traditional, yet stylish
and contemporary content. The target market consists of independent,
educated women, between the ages of 25 and 49, who have a high school
or university education and are also family oriented.33 In 2010, the
magazine was read by 5,851,000 readers.34 Importantly, of all of the
Hungarian weekly women’s magazines, Nők Lapja has the highest circu-
lation and most subscribers. Indeed, as Sanoma Media explains (in English
on its website), the magazine has the “strongest brand among weekly
female magazines,”35 as well as many spin-off publications: Nők Lapja
Psziché (psyche), Nők Lapja Konyha (a quarterly gastronomy magazine,
geared toward young men and women), Nők Lapja Évszakok (another
quarterly publication with similar content as Nők Lapja, but designed to be
kept, more like a book), Nők Lapja Ezotéria (astrology), and Nők Lapja
Egészség (focused on mental and physical health).
Nők Lapja Café is the website of this print magazine. Much like
the magazine, the website dominates the market and, according to Sanoma
Media, has been the largest and most popular website for women in
Hungary for the past ten years. In 2012, the website reached 1.2 million
readers per month and had more than 45,000 unique visitors per day.
Sanoma Media describes the content of the magazine as “feminine,” and
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“of high quality,” like the magazine, but explains that the website content
differs from the magazine, because the online content “is more dynamic,
creative and bolder than the weekly print magazine”. As a result, the target
audience for the website is slightly different than that of the magazine, as
the website is geared toward urban women who are between the ages of 18
and 39. However, like the print magazine, the target reader has a high
school, or higher, education and is also family oriented (defined as in a
heterosexual relationship, with a family or wishing to have one). Approxi-
mately 60 new articles are published online each day on the website, and
are categorized thematically into one of fourteen sections: “stars, gastro-
nomy, fashion, beauty care, family, health, lifestyle, relationships, home,
free time, [and] esoterism”.36 The popularity of this website and its con-
nection to such a popular print magazine suggest it to be an excellent illus-
trative example of contemporary representations and definitions of Hunga-
rian womanhood and motherhood.
Analysis of Nők Lapja Café
In the following, I will present the results of an analysis of the website Nők
Lapja Café over the course of a month.37 For the purpose of this essay, I
studied only the “family” section of the website for the month of March
2012, and examined the thematic content of the typically anonymous
articles.38 I argue that Nők Lapja Café does ideological work,39 promoting
nationalism and contributing to definitions of what it means to be Hun-
garian — as well as making clear the obligations Hungarian women have
in maintaining this national character. I argue that Nők Lapja Café ac-
complishes this ideological work by outlining parameters of “good”
mothering, favorably comparing Hungarian parenting practices to those of
other nations, promoting the advice of Hungarian nationals, and endorsing
heteronormative ideals and large families. In the following, I will attempt
to explore these narratives, discussing the significance of each.
Interestingly, the content of Nők Lapja Café is not concerned
exclusively with the experience of Hungarian families, as I had initially
assumed it to be. Instead, in the month under study, each week there were
many international articles, drawn largely from the United Kingdom, the
United States of America, and Australia, summarized in Hungarian for
Nők Lapja Café readers. The content of these articles is telling, revealing
what kinds of international news stories are deemed significant enough to
the website’s editors and authors to translate and publish on the site,
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suggesting these topics are thought to be of interest — or important to
convey — to the website’s Hungarian readers.
Among these international news stories, a distinct theme is impos-
sible to ignore: the typically favorable comparison of Hungarian policies
and parenting practices with those of other countries. Each week, there
were articles that critiqued some aspect of parenting in another country,
clearly delineating between another country’s poor parenting practices and
the supposedly better, safer, healthier practices of Hungarian parents —
although normally mothers were the focus. Importantly, this comparison
was generally supported by a Hungarian expert in the field.
For example, an article credited only to Nők Lapja Café, titled
“They Ban Crying Children from Restaurants” addresses the alleged prac-
tice of some American restaurants asking patrons with crying children to
leave the premises, even if they are mid-meal.40 The article’s anonymous
author denounces this practice as shocking and ridiculous. Although the
author concedes that there are restaurants in Hungary, as elsewhere in the
world, that do not allow children, the author is adamant that to banish only
crying children is an unheard of practice in Hungary. In fact, the author
mocks this restaurant policy, asking how a parent can possibly be expected
to reason with a three year old — to ask the child to refrain from crying
until the meal is consumed. Indeed, the author is outwardly critical of this
practice and, by comparing Hungary and the United States on this point,
implicitly suggests that Hungarian restaurants, and by extension the
nation’s cultural norms, are more sympathetic to parents and children. The
author frames the Hungarian dining experience — and by extension, the
culture and nation — as more sensible and reasonable.
In another article, titled “Babyccino — Should a Two-Year Old
Drink Coffee?” author Erika Szalma criticizes the “babyccino,” a sup-
posedly popular Australian, and now American, beverage for toddlers,
made of decaffeinated coffee, lots of sugar and frothy milk or whipped
cream.41 Szalma discusses the practice of acclimatizing young children to
such a sweetened, frothy beverage. The tone of the article is disapproving
and Szalma clearly distinguishes between the internationally trendy
babyccino and Hungarian views on appropriate children’s beverages. In
addition to simply describing, or even criticizing the practice in other
countries, Szalma compares this trend with Hungarian children’s bever-
ages. Specifically, she explains that this trendy beverage is not popular in
Hungary, where mothers avoid plying their children with heavily sweet-
ened, creamy beverages, because experts advise parents to avoid giving
toddlers sweetened beverages or whipped cream. Szalma thus suggests that
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Hungarian mothers, because they are acting on the advice of Hungarian
experts and have not succumbed to the trendiness of this practice, are more
vigilant in regards to providing their children healthy beverages. In this
way, Hungarian parenting practices are framed as superior and more
informed, and of more benefit to children’s well-being, while international
practices of the “babyccino” are presented as unhealthy, trendy and ridicu-
lous.
Importantly, the advice of Hungarian experts is often cited in the
context of analyzing international news stories. A baby yoga exercise that
involves “spinning” a baby, advocated by Russian yoga teacher Lena
Fokina, is the focus of an article titled “Yoga Teacher Spins Baby Head
over Heels”.42 Fokina is paraphrased as having argued that the technique
benefits the baby’s health — she is also supported by a Russian obstetrici-
an — but, upon consultation with a Hungarian expert, Edit Szabadi, a
massage therapist with Nők Lapja Café, the practice is denounced because
Szabadi claims it can potentially cause trauma and physical damage to the
baby. Instead, she recommends a gentler yoga exercise for babies,
contradicting the benefits and safeness Fokina promises. Regardless of
whether the yoga practice is sound or not, what is interesting is that the
author explains the technique, outlines the purported benefits but ulti-
mately seeks the advice of a Hungarian expert, whose recommendation is
deemed more sound and reason enough to denounce the practice. Once
again, Nők Lapja Café does not just report on an international story, but
compares Hungarian thoughts on parenting to an international practice,
only to affirm that the Hungarian way is much more sensible. As with the
views on babyccino, the website frames Hungarian parenting as more in
tune with maintaining a child’s health and wellbeing, while also implying
motherhood as best practiced by following the advice of Hungarian
experts.
The theme of relying on a Hungarian expert repeated itself many
times throughout the month. An anonymously written article titled
“Children on a Street Corner — Improved by Public Humiliation?” ex-
plains the story of an American father who made his son publicly wear a
sandwich board that announced his poor grades and behavior.43 The author
chastises this man, but, once again, instead of simply reporting the story,
cites a Hungarian psychologist who further denounces the parenting deci-
sion as one that is not only ineffective, but may potentially harm the
child’s psyche and cause depression or aggression. The inclusion of the
Hungarian expert’s testimony to examine an international case suggests
that this kind of parental treatment is foreign to Hungarian parents.
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In another article, titled “The Child Has the Right to Keep Silent
Up to 3 Years of Age,” the author cites an American study that outlines
what twenty-five words toddlers should understand, know and use.44 The
Nők Lapja Café author cites Éva Tóth, a Hungarian speech therapist, who
criticizes the American study and says it is a mistake to measure the
development of children in this way. Instead, she argues parents should
watch for speech development to ensure a child does not suffer from
hearing problems but, other than this concern, they should not worry too
much about ensuring that their child knows a certain number of words.
In each of the aforementioned illustrative examples, the validity of
the experts’ opinions is not in question. What is relevant is the frequent
measuring of Hungarian “truths” against those of other nations’ experts
and practices. Consistently in these articles, an international parenting
practice or study is reported, and each time it is not only discussed, but
also criticized and compared to the ways these things are and ought to be
done in Hungary. Importantly, the critique is often accompanied by a
Hungarian expert’s testimonial or advice. Each time Hungarian and
international parenting practices are unambiguously compared, the Hun-
garian practice is painted in a favorable light, and the Hungarian parenting
wisdom framed as far superior and morally correct, when compared to
those of other countries.
Because nations and nationhood are socially constructed, Yuval-
Davis argues that any sign can be interpreted and used as a boundary
signifier, used to divide groups into “us” and “them”.45 Barbara Einhorn
further argues that nations “tend to be imagined as communities of insiders
defined less in terms of their distinctive identity than in contrast to putative
“others” who do not share that identity”.46 I argue that by comparing and
contrasting parenting practices and policies, routinely measuring inter-
national stories against Hungarian ways, the authors of Nők Lapja Café
contribute to discourses that define what it means to be Hungarian and
how parenthood is deemed integral to illustrating and representing “Hun-
garianness”. Importantly, it is motherhood that is typically the focus of the
stories and in cases where photos accompany the text, it is also mother-
hood that is visually represented in the aforementioned articles on
parenting, which demonstrates how women, as mothers, are positioned as
essential to constructing understandings of what it means to be Hungarian.
Complementing and overlapping the weighting of international
experiences of parenthood against those of Hungarian parents, is the
articulation and framing of motherhood and mothering practices perceived
as superior. As Yuval-Davis argues, women often face the burden of
Tanya Watson140
representation, tasked with representing and distributing the nation’s
identity, which can be expressed through “proper” attire, behavior, etc.47
As mentioned above, the subject of most articles in the “family” section
are mothers. In the website’s articles, not only are Hungarian culture and
practices compared to other countries, mothering — examples of “good”
mothers and “bad” mothers — is also represented. Good mothers, the
reader is told, do not give their children babyccinos and certainly do not
practice certain kinds of baby yoga. With the use of these illustrative
examples, the reader is informed that good mothers heed the advice of
Hungarian experts and do not abandon Hungarian traditions or practices
for trendy, i.e. international, parenting practices.
Even when not explicitly comparing Hungarian and international
family practices, the website’s authors openly express disappointment or
disapproval of certain parenting decisions made by mothers around the
world, further defining what a good or bad mother looks like for Hunga-
rian readers. For example, Australian millionaire Gina Rinehart is criti-
cized in the article, “Richest Mom Sends Children to Work,” for con-
vincing her children to sign legal documents that prevent them from
accessing their trusts, keeping her in charge of the family money.48 She
explains she had done so to prevent them from leading a life of leisure,
spoiled with luxuries and unmotivated to work. But Nők Lapja Café
criticizes Rinehart’s mothering and decision by asking, “has she not raised
her children properly, that they cannot be trusted with their shares?”49 The
author implies that were Rinehart a good mother, she would not fear that
her children will lack motivation if provided generous trust funds — her
children’s goodness as people is framed exclusively as her responsibility
and it is assumed that any flaws in their character are due to her faults as a
mother. This attitude recalls the aforementioned contemporary discourses
of motherhood that suggest the nation’s failings are the fault of working
women.
In contrast, British mother Sophia Cahill, pregnant with her
second child, found herself in the spotlight of many media outlets because
of her decision to model nude late in her pregnancy. She was featured in a
second story on Nők Lapja Café, in March, 2012, that clarifies her
motives: she models not because she wants to show off, but because she is
a single mother with a family to support and this is how she makes her
income.50 That she models because she has children to care for is of such
central importance that this second article was written expressly to clarify
her motivations and demonstrate the devotion she has to her children,
while the first article had a much more incredulous tone. That she is
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modeling for her children, and not for her own selfish reasons, is deemed
acceptable to the Nők Lapja Café author, and she receives no criticism in
the second story. Her selflessness and devotion as a mother are praised by
the authors.
Indeed, commitment and sacrifice to children is framed as the
predominant characteristic of mothers as each story that applauds a
mother’s actions is hinged on what she has given up or done for her
children, such as the aforementioned model, Cahill, or the mothers I will
discuss later in this paper, who have set aside their own dreams and
ambitions to raise large families. However, too much devotion is dis-
couraged, as an article titled “Mother, Understand This: I’ve Grown Up,”
written by Ágnes Csízí offers adult children coping strategies for dealing
with mothers who smother their children.51 The article explicitly defines
what it means to be a good parent, with the first header of the article
reading, “What Makes a Parent a Parent?” Although the article mentions
“parents,” the title and content refer almost exclusively to mothers who are
unwilling to accept that their children have become adults. In fact, the
article explains that women more often tend to have an inability to let their
adult children move on from childhood than men, who are typically more
distant as parents.52 In this same vein, Angelina Jolie is likewise criticized
for not allowing her children to watch her appearance at the Oscars, a
show the website claims is a tame television program, not necessitating
censorship, implying she, too, is too cautious and overbearing as a
parent.53 Thus, Nők Lapja Café narrowly constricts the definition of a good
mother, providing boundaries around the concept: demanding devotion but
warning against excessive attachment. In short, the implied message con-
veyed is that women can never be perfect mothers and should never stop
trying to perfect their mothering skills.
Connected to themes of nationhood and socially constructed ideas
of “good” or appropriate mothering is the fascination with “large families”
demonstrated by Nők Lapja Café. Concerning international stories, celeb-
rity stories and articles featuring Hungarian women, the website focuses
intensely on large families, always striving to paint large families in a
positive light. Importantly, the authors of articles concerning large families
admit that having a large family can be difficult, but the reader is informed
that a large family is worth the trouble and ultimately manageable.
For example, in an article titled “She Adopted her Deceased
Friend’s Five Children,” the author chronicles the story of a British
woman, Julie Jones, who adopted her friend’s five children although, as a
single mother, she already had three children of her own.54 The woman
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must work fulltime, although she also receives some government assis-
tance, to support her large family. However, despite the difficulty in pro-
viding for such a large family on her own, the article affirms that her life
with this large family is manageable. Further, the article expresses admi-
ration for the woman’s decision to raise a large family.
Katalin Dénes Szabó, a Hungarian mother of seven children of her
own, was interviewed in a three-page story for the website, an unusually
long article for the month, titled “It is Difficult to Bring All of My
Children to the Movies at Once”.55 The author is clearly fascinated with
Szabó’s voluntarily large family and asks many personal questions.
Specifically, the mother of seven is asked if her husband willingly agreed
to such a large family, how she divides her attention between her children,
how she keeps them in line, how much groceries her family consumes in a
week, what limitations such a large family creates, how her body has fared
after so many pregnancies, and what she has sacrificed for her large
family. She admits to many sacrifices, such as not having enough time for
her husband, finding it difficult to go out and still keep an eye on her large
family and also giving up her dreams of graduating from university and
becoming an economist — although she is currently pursuing her studies
in another field. Despite the limitations, she confirms that as a mother of
seven, she is very happy and having such a large family has always been
her dream. Her story is represented in a positive light — not as something
strange or deviant — but as an interesting and laudable life choice.
Importantly, her career ambitions — only briefly mentioned — are framed
as a secondary concern to her devotion to her family, recalling the
emphasis on home life above employment for women that dominates
contemporary discourses. That Szabó had to abandon her original career
plans is barely addressed, signaling to the reader the unimportance of
employment outside of the home for women and echoing popular ideas
concerning Hungarian women’s contemporary roles in the workforce as
less important than preserving home life, addressed earlier in this essay.56
Of the celebrity families and mothers highlighted (mostly Ameri-
can film stars and famous musicians) those with larger families seem to
garner the most attention. For example, Uma Thurman’s fourth pregnancy
is reported57 and Jennifer Garner’s third pregnancy — her first boy — is
also deemed newsworthy. Angelina Jolie (with a family of seven) is a
staple of the “celebrity” family features and in an article concerning her
Oscar appearance, titled “Angelina Jolie Flashed Her Thigh―Maybe She
is Pregnant?” the author joyously speculates she might be pregnant again
because of her Oscar dress’ revealingly sexy side slit and the supposed
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tendency for women in their first trimester to feel sexier and more
confident.58 Additionally, Reese Witherspoon’s third pregnancy, but the
first one with husband Jim Toth — who is of Hungarian ancestry — is
speculated about as well.59 Rarely are celebrities with first pregnancies or
small families — with one or two children — mentioned in the family
section of Nők Lapja Café.60
I do not believe that the focus on large families is any way coinci-
dental or unintended because, when Hungarian legislation affecting
families is discussed, the Nők Lapja Café authors demonstrate a keen
understanding of the nation’s demographic and political concerns. The
nation’s decreasing population — it is reported that the birth rate de-
creased by 2.5% in 201161 — and problems with prematurely born babies62
are both discussed by the website’s authors, suggesting trepidation about
the nation’s declining population and concern over falling birth rates.
Although Nők Lapja Café authors seem, at times, curious whether a large
family is manageable, large families are a major focus of this part in the
website's family section and each story affirms, as its conclusion, the
manageability of a large family and also the central importance of children
to one’s life.  Importantly, by only featuring the families of supposedly
“ideal” — white, able bodied, working or middle class, heterosexual —
women, the website provides a visual representation of who should have a
large family, whose family is desirable and socially acceptable — pre-
cluding families who fail to meet these characteristics, such as Roma
families or same-sex couples.
Not all of the articles and stories featured photographs but those
that did featured only white, able-bodied, heterosexual women and
families. Even among international stories and discussion of the “stars,”
only one woman of colour was mentioned: Beyoncé, the American singer
and actress. Further, many stories discussed marriage, perpetuating con-
servative — but dominant — conceptions of motherhood as most suitable
for married women and framing marriage as the norm.63 Divorce was
treated as a fact of life,64 but an undesirable one. In fact, one article
deemed of interest to Nők Lapja Café authors was a Swedish study that
reported the discovery of a supposed “divorce gene” that apparently makes
some women less able to form attachments and thus less able to maintain a
relationship within a marriage or even remain committed to children.65 In
the article, aptly titled “They Discovered a Gene: Is Divorce Genetic?”
women who get divorced are presented as somehow flawed, lacking a gene
that would enable them to sustain a marriage or relationship.66 Related to
this article, Hungarian marriage statistics were of interest to Nők Lapja
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Café and it was reported that in 2011 the number of marriages increased,
albeit only by 0.5%, interpreted as an important and promising change by
Nők Lapja Café authors nonetheless.
Women who deviate from “traditional” life choices, such as the
29-year old British woman married five times, or the 100-year old bride
marrying for the fourth time, are positioned as spectacle on the website.
Marriage is a choice taken for granted, demonstrated also by an article
featuring the British actor Rob Pattinson, titled “Who Would We Most
Like to Trade our Husbands For,”67 a title that assumed that any woman
who reads the site — especially the family section — is married or values
marriage. The site is thus actively shaping appropriate roles for women,
especially mothers, dictating heterosexual marriage as the norm.
The purpose of this essay is to complicate theorizing about
nationalism, particularly the source of nationalistic sentiments. As Yuval-
Davis argues, it is unhelpful to limit theorizing about the nation to
bureaucrats and policy makers. I cannot speak to the objectives or goals of
this website but, as I have demonstrated, Nők Lapja Café is also invested
in the process: it defines what it means to be Hungarian by comparing
Hungarian and international parenting practices to clearly illustrate
Hungarianness, describes how “good” Hungarian mothers should parent,
and supports dominant, nationalistic discourses by speaking positively
about large families and de-prioritizing workforce participation in discus-
sions of Hungarian motherhood and mothering. Additionally, the website
serves to echo discourses that encourage women to have children by
pointing out the manageability of large families, made easier by the more
parent-friendly climate of Hungary, demonstrated by Hungarian resta-
urants that do not ban crying children and by an example of a Hungarian
woman who has chosen, and been able to manage, a large family.
I do not purport to understand the intentions or the ambitions of
the authors behind the articles on Nők Lapja Café, although it does seem
evident that the website’s content is in keeping with the political objectives
of reinforcing women’s social roles as mothers. However, the motivation
can hardly be gleaned given the restrictions of media in Hungary. In any
case, what is most important is to examine the results of their work: the
representations of women and motherhood in what is Hungary’s most
popular women’s website. In this essay, I aimed to examine and discuss
the social constructions of parenthood, particularly motherhood, framed by
Nők Lapja Café, and point out that certain characteristics and practices are
considered to be embodied by “good” mothers — especially an adherence
to guidelines and suggestions made by Hungarian experts — and how
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these qualities are enforced and policed by Nők Lapja Café. It was further
my goal to point out that the website does more than simply prioritize
motherhood or outline parameters for good parenting. Nők Lapja Café
consistently frames Hungarian motherhood as different, often if not always
better, than the motherhood demonstrated by women internationally. In
this way, the magazine positions motherhood as a way in which “Hungari-
anness” can be defined and compared. In addressing family oriented
women, the website, instead of providing the bold and creative content it
promises, supplies readers with discourses that support dominant post-
socialist ideals of women as [good] mothers, bolstering their nation
through their motherhood. A study of such a popular website helps to fur-
ther illuminate the current expectations of Hungarian women and suggests
the need for further study.
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Naming Rights:
Nation, Family, and Women’s Rights
in the Debates on Domestic Violence
in Contemporary Hungary
Katalin Fábián
Violence against women emerged as one of the prime topics in the inter-
national human rights discourse in the 1980s.1 In an effort to circumvent
the many culturally different interpretations of women’s rights worldwide,
activists began to focus on one common platform: the sanctity of bodily
integrity. With the fall of the communist system, this human rights frame-
work and associated policy recommendations — most notably the crimi-
nalization of domestic violence based on the “Duluth model” from Min-
nesota, USA — arrived in Central and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s.2
Transnational norms and actors exerted pressure,3 most often indirectly but
on occasion directly and personally, on this region to deal with this prob-
lem that until then had been unrecognized to the point of not even being
named.
The debates on naming domestic violence have been indicative of
the continued unease confronting this problem including an outright
rejection of its existence in many countries. Many post-communist govern-
ments eventually accepted some terminological and conceptual ambiguity
to align themselves with values viewed as important for both sizeable (or
at least vocal) local constituents and at the same time, symbolically
signaling to behave as a ‘normal state’ to international actors abroad.
Although no international or EU-specific legislation against domestic
violence exists as of early 2013, there is widespread expectation that the
problem be recognized and effectively addressed — to the extent that
taking action has almost become a sign of belonging to the “club” of
democratic nations.4 Central and Eastern European women’s groups rou-
tinely implied in their appeals to various local authorities that the degree to
which post-communist countries were willing to respond to domestic vio-
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lence could be used to measure their desire to honor their integration into
the European community of democratic nations.5
In Hungary, however, women’s and human rights NGOs’ explicit
alignment with international institutions and human rights norms for
normative support has created a distance from the predominantly nation-
alist values that the contemporary conservative-nationalist Orbán govern-
ment represents. Reflecting sharply differing value orientations regarding
the role of women, the family, and the nation, the debate on how to call
domestic violence continues unabated. Illustrative examples of the current,
official nationalist discourse conflicting with recommendations and
policies from abroad are numerous in both scholarly literature and main-
stream news items, many of them indicating that external influence is seen
as misguided and thus unwelcome in contemporary politics.6 Given the
conflicting normative orientations of women’s NGOs and the various
Hungarian governments in the past twenty years, it may not be surprising
that Hungary remains beside Estonia and Latvia one of three post-
communist EU member states that have not yet established a separate law
on domestic violence.
Why this lack of progress? Why did negotiations break down in
January 2013 between Hungarian women’s/human rights NGOs and the
government when the latter had publicly promised in October 2012, in a
response to extensive and vocal protests that it would introduce a specific
law against domestic violence?7 The analysis of the Hungarian case espe-
cially merits our attention because during the early transition period this
country was an early adopter of, rather than the exception to, signing up to
human rights norms and international treaties. Building on a considerable
social science literature analyzing why countries sign treaties, more analy-
sis of outlier cases is needed.8
Demonstrating extensive continuity with previous Hungarian
social movements mobilizing against domestic violence, references to
international norms and related recommended practices were some of the
central parts of a large protest in front of the Hungarian Parliament on 16
October 2012. Protesters gathered there the day after Parliament rejected,
with a strikingly unabashed patriarchal rationale, domestic violence being
made a separate criminal offense, despite over 100,000 signatures urging
them to do so.9 Participants also whole-heartedly rejected, in their speech-
es and posters, the nationalist and conservative perception of “women as
baby-making machines.” This protest presented a profound challenge to
politicians’ treating women’s vulnerability to intimate partner violence as
dismissible because it could all be avoided if “they gave birth to three, four
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or five children.”10 Adding further urgency to the protesters’ appeal was
Hungary’s being the only Central European EU-member country with no
specific law against domestic violence and very sparse services to help its
victims.11
Although domestic violence is still a debated issue worldwide,
there is an emerging transnational consensus that it is a widespread prob-
lem requiring consistent and sustained attention.12 One notable example of
this powerful international normative and legal trend was the 2011 Council
of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against
women and domestic violence.13 This Convention requires governments to
act against all forms of inequality between men and women that produce
violence in intimate settings and it firmly recommends establishing a
distancing ordinance (also called a restraining or protection order) that, in
case of immediate danger, removes the perpetrator from the home for a
specified period. This 2011 Council of Europe Convention is just one,
albeit a very notable example of how emerging norms, related local
awareness-raising campaigns, and international organizations have put
pressure on governments to stop violence against women, including do-
mestic violence.
How and why governments respond to pressure to eliminate do-
mestic violence varies widely. Some post-communist countries, like Slove-
nia and Croatia, responded quickly to international influences, enacting
legislation and attempting to implement laws effectively.14 Others, such as
the Czech Republic, were also relatively quick, albeit rather more reluctant
at least initially. Other East-Central European countries, such as Bulgaria
and Romania, were non-committal, producing some legislation and rele-
vant services, but resisting passing comprehensive legislation or not allo-
cating sufficient funds for proper execution of programs. Finally, there are
the three outlier countries: Hungary, Estonia, and Latvia which to date
have ignored or outright rejected efforts to pass domestic violence
legislations and create effective shelters for victims.15
Why does Hungary remain in this last category? How have social
movements attempted to change this situation and what motivates their
efforts? Since the early 1990s, Hungarian individuals, NGOs, and the
social movements they organized have been extensively interacting with
transnational partners to encourage the Hungarian government to produce
specific legislation on domestic violence and establish services for its
victims. The present article explores the three main processes that have
contributed to this ongoing process: 1) bottom-up pressures such as NGO
efforts, 2) top-down pressures such as deliberations among parties and
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state legislation, and 3) interweave, or transnational pressures that combine
with local NGOs and the government to create and enforce policies. I
investigate how and why Hungarian movements continue to struggle by
analyzing the actors, their self-described motivations, and the contempo-
rary policy outcomes in the already two-decades-long extensive engage-
ment between international and local actors regarding domestic violence. I
also highlight the most notable perspectives of both political elites and the
general public to explain how and why the new terms for and against cer-
tain policy recommendations regarding domestic violence have emerged.
Methods
For nearly two decades, Hungary has resisted both passing a specific law
against domestic violence and providing comprehensive services to its
victims, and thus is an important example of a country resisting official
recognition of domestic violence. Unfortunately, this long-standing refusal
to recognize domestic violence as an important social problem means pre-
valence data on domestic violence are missing from state statistics. The
Hungarian state does not collect data on domestic violence and the ser-
vices it provides are not transparent,16 so interviews with local NGOs, state
bureaucrats, the police, and politicians were my only reliable sources of
information about the long debates on what to call domestic violence, what
kinds of services are most needed, and who should provide those services.
I consulted various international documents and NGO websites to select
my pool of potential interviewees. I also regularly asked my interviewees
for recommendations on how to find the most important political partici-
pants in the discussion on domestic violence in Hungary. I prepared a set
of central questions for my structured interviews and, depending on my
interviewees’ willingness or ability to provide information, adjusted them
to uncover the most pertinent information and materials.
The research for this article dates back to the mid-1990s. I ob-
served and interviewed representatives of women’s groups that 1) pro-
duced news items about their events, such as conferences, petitions, and
protests; and 2) provided services on behalf of Hungarian women. The
interview sites and activists changed frequently as groups dissolved and
new ones emerged. Some activists moved to a new NGO and a few parti-
cularly dedicated individuals remained active during the entire two dec-
ades. The most typical activists can be characterized as belonging to one of
two main groups: 1) university students or recent graduates, and 2) middle-
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aged, often professional activists. Budapest tended to be the most likely
location for groups to form and coordinate activities with others both in
Hungary and also internationally.
During the fall of 1994, I interviewed numerous activists of
NANE (Nők a Nőkért Együtt az Erőszak Ellen Egyesület, Women for
Women Together Against Violence www.nane.hu). NANE, established in
January 1994, was the first Hungarian NGO to serve victims of domestic
violence. A rarity among women’s groups from the early transition period,
NANE has survived political and economic upheavals and continues to
offer its services today. Since 1994, I have added at least five new inter-
views, each with different individuals from Hungarian women’s groups, to
the original 42 transcribed and coded texts every summer.
The purpose of the interviews is to discover how and why inter-
national norms transpired in some countries and were resisted in others by
the post-interview analysis showing the actions and interactions of NGOs,
governments, and international organizations. Exclusively analyzing offi-
cial documents, such as national plans to combat domestic violence —
even if such plans were produced — would not offer the required insight.
These documents eliminate or gloss over formative debates and negoti-
ations taking place before such document appears in public and thus do not
explain why certain terms and policies were chosen and why their imple-
mentation succeeded or failed. Interviews offer activists, government
officials, and politicians the opportunity to interpret their own or their
organizations’ professed values, actions, and recommended policies. Their
interpretations then allow me to increase scholarly and policy-relevant
knowledge on the reception and adaptation to new, trans-nationally reso-
nant norms. The subjectivity of the interviews offers crucial perspectives
on why the local and international coalitions were successful in either
producing or blocking legislative and governmental action. I always ex-
plain the aim of my research to my interviewees and offer full con-
fidentiality and anonymity.
During my interviews in June and July 2012 in Hungary, I asked
NGO representatives how they reached out to supporters, established a
network of activists, and attempted to convince the government to pursue
changes in norms and laws. However, I have found that state employees’
freedom of expression was severely curtailed. Most of these interviewees
explicitly mentioned such constraints. State employees can give interviews
only with explicit permission from their boss. When I interviewed police
officers and government representatives in 2012, I encountered many
bureaucratically sanctioned obstacles despite the often explicit willingness
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of my interviewees to share information. Understandably, few people are
willing to risk their jobs for offering what could later be framed as
potentially damaging or critical information on state institutions. Some
state employees suggested I identify them by their membership in profes-
sional associations, such as lawyers or by their previous profession,
because these NGO affiliations afforded the freedom to share information
without government control.
Locating reliable police and crime statistics on how often police
units were called to domestic disputes and how they responded to cases of
intimate partner violence (I will discuss the choice of expression for
domestic violence later in this text) proved equally challenging. I could
collect such data from NGO activists and the police, but much of it is
fragmented and very difficult to compare across time. Reliable and chro-
nologically comparable data on the occurrence of and state response to
domestic violence information is essential not only for scholarly research,
but also as a basis for a meaningful public discussion and policy delibera-
tion in Hungary. Nonetheless, public deliberation has started despite the
lack of such comparative data, with NGOs asserting that the 72 women
who are killed annually in domestic disputes in Hungary account for 39
percent of all homicides.17
I also gathered extensive amounts of archival information from
newspapers, Internet sites of NGOs, and the Hungarian government. I
juxtapose the interviews with this information to identify differences of
interpretation between the various political actors. When I find overlaps
and contradictions, I ask activists, government bureaucrats, and politicians
for further information either by contacting them in writing or during the
following year’s interview because this short period allows interviewees to
more accurately recall other actors and arguments.
Background: The power of a label
Identifying obstacles to defining and establishing policies against domestic
violence has particular contemporary significance in Hungary where
political and economic problems, such as high unemployment, inflation,
emigration, much-hyped demographic decline, and near state bankruptcy
have shaken the previously unquestionable dominance of liberal norms,
especially since the 2007 global financial crisis.18 The increasingly inward-
looking and nationalist trends in Hungary further contribute to decreasing
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the chances of including international human rights and non-traditional
gender issues in policy deliberations.
The most important finding of my research to date has been the
renewed importance of naming domestic violence. Naming implies a
normative frame and connects to particular policy instruments. In the late
1990s, women’s NGOs translated “domestic violence” from English and
interpreted it as “intimate partner violence” (párkapcsolati erőszak) that
included past and present partners, married, engaged, living together,
separated, heterosexual and homosexual alike. Because language and the
construction of nation are intertwined, additions in the language reflect the
changing standards, norms, beliefs of a nation, especially if we consider
idioms. The term “violence against women” (nők elleni erőszak) was im-
mediately rejected by the public and most politicians for focusing on adult
women, and for implying victimhood and a need for feminist-inspired
policy solutions in the form of shelters and quick, easily enforceable
distancing ordinance against perpetrators. As the naming and consequent
policy debate progressed, it stripped domestic violence of any feminist
connotations, calling it “violence in the family” (családon belüli erőszak)
to include — and eventually focus on — children and to a lesser degree,
the elderly. Focus on the young generation, as the key to the future of the
nation, is the long established rhetorical focus of conservative-nationalist
forces that neither the liberal-socialist (2002–2010) nor the more explicitly
populist recent governments (in power since 2010) wished to challenge.
This comprehensive and inclusive, but entirely gender-neutral approach
aims to reduce and eliminate violence within the general family setting but
it also requires extensive services for a large and very diverse set of the
population. Both the consequent considerable expansion of welfare ser-
vices and their unfocused nature would have made such a proposal
unlikely during times of increasing austerity. More importantly,
conservative-nationalist forces, such as the Christian Democratic Party
objected to the notion that the family could be a site of violence because
they regard it as a sacred place where future generations of Hungarians are
nurtured.
The naming debate is at risk of being dismissed as superficial or
trivial, but it depicts a historical trajectory and serves as the public face of
profound normative and political differences.19 The most important line of
differentiation concerns the interpretation of individual rights and the
limits of state intervention in private life. This concern is especially
notable against a backdrop of the relatively recent historical experience of
communist-era invasive state intrusion in family life. This historical
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heritage has also been identified as limiting the appeal of women’s social
movement activism.20 Other important policy-relevant debate concerning
domestic violence is the contemporary embrace of capitalist values and the
related inviolability of private property, exemplified by the frequently
raised concern that distancing ordinance would imply the perpetrator
losing ownership of the apartment/house. A particularly controversial
aspect of naming domestic violence and finding suitable policies to
address it is homophobia, and more specifically the fear of including —
and thus legitimating — gay partners by using the term “intimate partner”
violence (párkapcsolati erőszak).21 For conservatives and nationalists,
including gay partners in the definition of partners amounts to nothing less
than an overt threat against the role of the nation and the sanctity of
procreation.
An emerging movement
The Hungarian NGOs working to raise awareness of domestic violence
have used many creative techniques rooted in their home environments,
and also borrowed ideas and arguments from international experiences.
Most local campaigns found inspiration from abroad but developed into
localized, grassroots awareness-raising efforts. For example, volunteers at
NANE, the first and thus far only NGO to have a hotline for victims of
domestic violence in Hungary, mounted a persistent campaign of placing
stickers displaying its hotline number on public transport vehicles. Initially
assisted by a regional fund from the Open Society Institute,22 NANE
launched a traveling exposition of “red dolls,” life-sized red cutout images
of “Silent Witnesses” that represented women killed by domestic violence,
as a large-scale awareness-raising and political lobbying project. The red
dolls had previously appeared in the United States and Western Europe as
part of the annual Sixteen Days Against Violence campaign and their
symbolism translated flawlessly across physical and linguistic borders.23
The initiation of a coordinated human rights campaign to crimi-
nalize domestic violence at the end of the first decade of the 21st century
marked a sea change in Hungarian women’s social movements. Earlier
waves of contemporary women’s activism in Hungary were barely — and
very rarely — connected to international networks of feminist and human
rights causes. Finding inspiration from and cooperating with transnational
social movement activists and at the same time being constrained by such
collaborations, Hungarian activism concerning domestic violence demon-
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strates this double-sided nature of transnational flows. On the one hand,
using a typical “boomerang pattern,”24 trans-national social movements
allowed women’s groups in Hungary to refer to and use the leverage of
various international norms and organizations to advance their agenda at
home. On the other hand, the predominantly Western, liberal democratic
framework of human rights and women’s activism also narrowed the
definition of domestic violence to exclude economic violence,25 contrary
to the hopes of many post-communist women’s groups.26 The Western
feminist interpretation of domestic violence as both gender specific and
part of the broad notion of violence against women also conflicted with the
Hungarian political environment which would only address this issue in a
gender-neutral manner.
NANE: An enduring force
Established in 1994 with the active involvement of Antonia Burrows, an
American feminist, NANE was the first organization in Hungary to raise
awareness of the problem by effectively using the media. Eventually,
NANE’s telephone number made its way into the general information
section of the telephone books. NANE also extensively engaged in advo-
cacy to establish laws against perpetrators.27 In an initially fruitful co-
operation between NANE and the Hungarian Policewomen’s Association,
the police started to train some of its members to recognize and deal with
domestic violence. In 2004, 240 police officers, followed by another 80 in
2005, were trained to recognize symptoms of domestic violence, but the
police found it very difficult to obtain funding for this training.28
Along with the human rights advocacy group Habeas Corpus
Munkacsoport (Habeas Corpus Working Group) and Krisztina Morvai’s
Női és Gyermekjogi Kutatási és Képzőközpont (Women’s Rights and
Children’s Rights Research and Training Center)29, NANE advocated for
the recognition of “intimate partner violence” and the provision of services
to battered women and children in the mid-1990s. The pinnacle of their
collaboration was the 2003 Budapest police directive that compelled the
police to intervene in all cases of domestic violence. Two tragic cases in
September 2002 had created an unexpected political opportunity for the
three NGOs to promote their case. One case involved Tomi Balogh, an
eight-year-old boy who was killed by his father. The other was that of
fourteen-year-old Kitti Simek, who shot her abusive stepfather. Myriad
letters and calls followed an emotional appearance on television by Krisz-
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tina Morvai, who asked Hungarians to demand that their parliamentary
representatives pass legislation to eliminate domestic violence. The three
NGOs gathered over 50,000 signatures on a petition showing Tomi’s
picture; and these signatures, as well as Hungary’s then-pending EU
admission, put extensive pressure on the broader public and politicians to
produce parliamentary legislation. When the three NGOs accepted framing
of domestic violence as child abuse, this de-gendered political message
finally convinced two members of the Hungarian Parliament to draft a
comprehensive proposal for state action to handle domestic violence. The
bill was presented to Parliament in a revised form in March 2003 under
number H/2483. During the formulation of the bill, the Hungarian Socialist
Party female representative who submitted it insisted that men were
equally victims of domestic violence and should therefore be protected,
thus showing the enduring power of dominant gender hierarchies.30
Between 5 March and 16 April 2003, the Parliament discussed and
eventually passed a nonbinding policy-oriented document, “Decision on
the Formulation of a National Strategy for Preventing and Efficiently
Responding to Violence in the Family” that obliged the legislative body to
formulate a law on domestic violence within a year. The governing
coalition of the Hungarian Socialist Party and the Alliance of Free
Democrats, totaling 203 representatives, voted in favor of the decision,
whereas the conservatives, 160 representatives, abstained. However, this
national strategy and the demand for a separate law against domestic
violence have still not been fulfilled a decade on. Although in 2006 a
distancing ordinance was established, both this and its slightly revised
2009 version were considered useless except in the most serious cases,
when the police could intervene using other means.31
NANE found a dynamic and internationally recognized partner in
Amnesty International (AI). By widely publicizing the unheard cries of
women who do not enjoy even rudimentary protection from rape and
sexual violence in the home,32 AI’s cooperation with NANE became part
of a worldwide effort to draw attention to violence against women. With
its direct involvement with NANE’s “Silent Witnesses” campaign, AI
became the first major international human rights NGO to engage, in a
direct and sustained way, with advocacy related to the criminalization of
domestic violence in Hungary.
Joining AI in exerting pressure on the Hungarian government and
many of its neighbors, The Advocates for Human Rights invited fellow
NGOs and government representatives to a February 2008 regional
workshop to enhance legal reforms against domestic violence.33 The
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notable transnational involvements of AI and The Advocates for Human
Rights signal the increasingly tangible impact of transnational forces in
social movement activism to eradicate domestic violence.
NANE persisted in finding international partners, such as the EU’s
Daphne–supported trainings and major corporations — for example, in
2011–12 it collaborated with Vodafone, a mobile phone company — to
support its cause. Vodafone was behind a successful project in Spain and
Britain whereby women who were victims of domestic violence could be
immediately connected with the local police in emergencies.34 Vodafone’s
effective technical and monetary support for NANE was a central focus
when the Hungarian government started to deliberate the definition of and
policies against domestic violence in the fall and winter of 2012.35
While NANE quickly procured moral and financial support from
abroad, its first major Hungarian state financial support arrived only in
2009 when the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour offered to fund a
two-day training session for the police and social workers with a focus on
protecting children from abuse. As the child-centric training indicates, the
conceptual debate about who is the most likely victim of domestic vio-
lence has continued unabated between Hungarian state agencies and
NANE.
The official Hungarian discourse on domestic violence has funda-
mentally erased the feminist and women-specific signifiers of domestic
violence, calling it háztartási (household) violence. A woman activist
bitterly joked about this new name, arguing that the adjective equated
violence with cookies (háztartási keksz is a type of cookie), as both share a
colloquial terminology. Such a popular association did not bother the
Christian Democratic Party, the minority party in the governing coalition,
which coined and heavily promoted the new term to avoid the negative
association of violence with the family.36 These trends were not unique to
Hungary because gender-neutral arguments have gained ground inter-
nationally, erasing gender from policy debates concerning domestic vio-
lence at least in part due to neo-liberalism offloading government responsi-
bilities and reducing public spending on welfare.37
A main reason why a small NGO such as NANE could maintain a
decade-long and extensive record of engaging with public policy and
maintain persistent contacts with the Hungarian police, the Ministry of
Family and Social Affairs38, and major corporations is that it entered into
and maintains, within the constraints of its limited resources, an extensive
transnational network. NANE managed to establish an active connection to
Western European and North American feminist women’s advocacy
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organizations that use human rights instruments, such as the UN’s
CEDAW (Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Wom-
en), to combat violence against women. It is also using its connections
with Western European organizations, such as WAVE (Women Against
Violence Europe) to find partners. Although personal face-to-face
meetings were infrequent among women activists in different countries, a
transnational communication network operated effectively, mostly via the
Internet.
Although NANE continues to be the single most persistent voice
lobbying to establish legal recognition and treatment of domestic violence
in Hungary, other national and transnational pressures have also emerged
to exert an influence. The November 2012 “16 Days Against Violence”
campaign ended with an official statement calling for the Hungarian
government to follow the Polish example and sign The Council of Europe
(CoE) binding “Council of Europe Convention on preventing and com-
bating violence against women and domestic violence.”39 Although
Hungary — along with only a few other CoE member states — has not
signed this convention, it is unlikely that it will be able to maintain its
position for long owing to a combination of external and internal pres-
sures.
A new wave of activism
Two successive signature-collection campaigns in 2010 and 2011 signaled
a newly strengthening wave of public debate on domestic violence. The
2011 signature drive gained the support of the international cosmetics
company AVON, whose network of mostly female agents mobilized
enough support to collect over 100,000 verifiable signatures. In July 2012,
I interviewed government politicians, NGO activists, and Pálma Halász,
the organizer of both signature-collection campaigns, and at that time it
was becoming obvious that the Hungarian Parliament would have to
discuss whether domestic violence merits a separate bill. These two
signature-collection drives emerged after the 2003 extensive mobilization
that also produced substantial pressure, but ultimately failed to produce
legislative action and comprehensive services for victims of domestic
violence.
However, even the 100,000 signatures collected in 2011 proved to
be insufficient evidence of a mandate for the conservative-nationalist
governing coalition and it scheduled the legally mandated debate on
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domestic violence for 3 a.m. on 12 September 2012. The most frequently
quoted intervention at this late and sparsely attended parliamentary debate
was that of representative István Varga, from the ruling FIDESZ–Magyar
Polgári Szövetség (the Federation of Young Democrats–Hungarian Civic
Union). His argument that “women should give birth to two or three,
preferably four or five children” to avoid domestic violence generated
enough outrage both in Hungary and abroad that the ruling party decided
to abruptly change course and establish a committee to review their legal
options, promising to establish a separate domestic violence bill by the end
of 2012.40 The conservative position that István Varga represented in the
parliamentary debate on domestic violence clearly demonstrated the firm
and unchanged sexual hierarchies within the present government and their
preference to give priority to nationalism in the form of promoting
demographic growth versus (women’s) individual rights and desires. To
the supporters of Varga, deliberations on domestic violence appear as a
challenge to the nation, to (the exclusively heterosexual interpretation of)
the family and, within it, women’s (assumed) subservience.
Comparative analysis on domestic violence has identified two
main clusters of factors that most influence attitudes regarding violence
against women at the individual, organizational, community, and societal
levels: culture and gender.41 These two meta-factors shape attitudes on
multiple levels that then contribute to a fundamental and causal relati-
onship to the perpetration of violence against women. For example, men
with more traditional, rigid, and misogynistic gender-role attitudes are
more likely to resort to marital violence. With nationalist-conservative
values and a right-wing leaning centrist government enjoying broad popu-
lar support in Hungary, legislation against domestic violence will continue
to encounter obstacles, even if its two-decades long history shows per-
sistent signs of increasing appeal.
Two theoretical challenges and their relevance
Two main theoretical venues directly contribute to explaining why the
process to produce a separate domestic violence bill and establish services
to its victims has been so long and difficult in Hungary: a) postmodern
feminist theory on intersectionality, and b) recent reformulations of social
movement theory, including transnational movements. The intersection of
these two perspectives provides the most useful explanations of how and
why women’s and human rights NGOs have added domestic violence to
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their agendas and pursued related policy changes in the past twenty years
in Hungary.
It may be tempting to assert that Hungary’s increased transnational
engagement has initiated and contributed to the changes in activism related
to domestic violence. However, such a monocausal explanation would
grossly underestimate both the effects of national political forces and the
diversity of the women who participated in this social movement. Thus,
the postmodern interpretation of the diversity of women’s interests and the
corresponding diversity of women activists is the first theoretical per-
spective to be discussed here.
Intersectionality: A postmodern perspective
Post-modern feminist theory highlights the diversity among women and
within women’s movements. Data emerging from the research on Hun-
garian women’s movements underscores the arguments of contemporary
feminist theorizing on the multiple characteristics of women, also labeled
as “intersectionality.”42 This postmodern line of thought rejects an
essentialist notion of femininity and instead recognizes that the entity we
call “woman” is a fluid construct of various facets, such as ethnicity,
sexual orientation, economic class, and religion, etc. Consequently, the
Hungarian movement against domestic violence combines many of these
facets in changing ways.
Recognizing diversity, however, does not negate that the social
and political category of “women” can account for both the impressive
political solidarity of women and their explicit differences.43 While some
men participated in the protests to call for a separate law on domestic
violence and in the signature collection campaigns both as activists and
supporters, the overwhelming majority of activists were women. My own
observations and interviews have revealed that only women acted as the
main spokespersons for the movement against domestic violence. Thus,
while I keep the diversity of women in mind, I highlight when and how a
sizeable group or combination thereof mobilized in support of what they
considered an important shared interest concerning domestic violence in
Hungary.
Ethnicity is one of the important perspectives of intersectionality
in Hungarian women’s movements. The country’s largest ethnic minority
— the approximately 10 percent of Gypsy/Roma ethnicity — has created
and maintained women’s groups separate from the other women’s groups.
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With a few exceptions, the pursuits of Roma women’s groups have
remained disconnected from the Hungarian movement’s waves of actions,
including domestic violence. Roma women’s groups’ focus has been
mainly on job creation and anti-discrimination, both of which have en-
countered continuous and strong obstacles,44 and both they and individual
Roma women have been largely absent from mobilizations against domes-
tic violence in Hungary. Their general absence may be explained by a
strong anti-Roma sentiment that explicitly emerged in the form of the 17
percent electoral support for Jobbik — The Movement for a Better Hun-
gary, an ultra-right and explicitly racist party, which entered Hungarian
Parliament in the 2010 elections.45
Jobbik has a special relevance for Hungarian women’s move-
ments, because Krisztina Morvai became one of its best-known representa-
tives and its presidential candidate in 2010. An internationally known
feminist lawyer who served as a UN CEDAW Committee member bet-
ween 2002 and 2006, Morvai, as described earlier, was one of the most
notable activists fighting for legal changes regarding domestic violence in
Hungary. However, her swift turn to the extreme Right, including her
broadly publicized, vitriolic anti-Semitic comments caused a rift that
halted women’s and human rights groups’ organizing against domestic
violence.46 Morvai’s anti-Roma rhetoric entered national and international
politics when she became a representative of the European Parliament.47
Despite her long-established record of supporting a separate law on do-
mestic violence, she remained silent in September 2012 when
conservative-nationalist politicians questioned the credibility and mandate
of the petition signed by over 100,000 people calling for such a bill.
My interviews were testament to the deep ethnic divide among
Hungarian women activists, rooted in discrimination against both Roma
and Jewish compatriots. The ethnic divide usually manifests not as
outright hostility, but as organizational segregation. I have not encountered
Roma women members in other women’s groups, although I have seen a
few ethnic Hungarians attend high-profile meetings of a few Roma
women’s gatherings. This ethnic segregation continues despite a much-
publicized integration effort, called “Roma Decade 2005–15,” which is
supported by many European governments, the EU’s various institutions,
the Open Society Institute, and other notable international funders, and
which has its secretariat in Budapest.48 In part because most Jewish
women activists refrain from publicly identifying as belonging to this
long-discriminated-against minority in Hungary, anti-Semitic sentiments
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have appeared latently or as comments in my interviews, but I have not yet
observed them in the public actions of women’s groups.
Reformulations of social movement theory
Reacting against the new global neoliberal order and the related imposition
of austerity measures, social movements in post-communist Europe seized
on emerging transnational networks. The post-communist trans-national
experience does not negate the global and international inquiries, but adds
to them Foucauldian considerations of disciplining power structures and
normative regulations of individuals and their groups.49 When viewing
globalization as a disciplining regime, a Foucauldian analysis reveals a
form of govern-mentality built both with economic-political structures and
deeply incorporated meta-norms, such as individuality and competition,
and based on these, certain rights. Nationalist and traditionalist interpreta-
tions of community, such as family and nation, attempt to counter these
influences.
Although often described as weak, illiberal, and ineffective in
post-communist Europe,50 social movements in Hungary have explicitly
broadened the scope of political contestations. For example, especially
during 2011 in Hungary, conservative-nationalist voices stated their own
critique of neo-liberalism alongside what is usually seen as a “red-green”
(social-democratic and environmentalist) protest. Domestic violence has
fallen in between these two dominant and culturally resonant framings.
From the globally dominant neoliberal perspective, domestic
violence is cast as an individual rights violation. At the same time, the
neoliberal perspective also creates strong incentives for objectifying
women and using their bodies to sell in the — purportedly free — market-
place. In Hungary and in post-communist Europe in general, naked or
scantily clad women’s bodies are pervasively used for economic gain both
legally as advertisements and illegally, as prostitutes. These two normative
constraints, simultaneously emerging from the neoliberal framework, leave
Hungarian women’s groups with precious few options for framing domes-
tic violence in a way that could appear as an important problem their com-
munities need to address both for international and national audiences.51
Thus far, Hungarian women’s mobilizations chose to hybridize the
arguments of individual human rights with national considerations to raise
attention to domestic violence. The results have been strong signs of
gender neutrality and a child-centered focus in national deliberations. The
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combination of these arguments produced tensions both within and
between women’s groups, but in this regard they appear similar to other
contexts, including Canada where activists against domestic violence
recently adopted gender-neutral frames that de-emphasize feminist argu-
ments.52 This phenomenon highlights the difficult task of discursive
framing inside a social movement. Benford and Snow argue that it is cru-
cial to include social movement framing alongside political opportunity
structures and resource mobilizations to understand the emergence and
assess the effectiveness of movements.53
The major benefit of using the transnational framework is that its
epistemology encourages the incorporation of various kinds of otherness.
This flexibility allows for multiple opportunities that neo-liberalism
enlivens. The transnational frame also invokes the necessity to include the
long-neglected “Second World” experience to re-enter the already well-
established North-South dialogue.54 In order to accomplish this newly
interpreted recognition and renewed incorporation of the contributions of
the communist/post-communist period regarding women’s movements,
post-communist women’s movements must overcome two major obstacles.
First, Central and Eastern European women must reject being labeled
persistently as “backwards, apolitical and full of apathy,” which inflicts
false consciousness.55 Second, the whole region must overcome having
been erased as an entity: “Eastern Europe itself (in its Cold War borders)
has in any case probably ceased to exist.”56
Unearthing, validating, and analyzing contemporary Hungarian
women’s movements reveals many shades of the seemingly two-fold
process of women’s empowerment and disempowerment. On the one
hand, free association, increased travel opportunities, and new media
offered by the Internet are emancipatory and afford self-expression. On the
other hand, the example of Hungarian women’s activism in the past twenty
years demonstrates the rise of new forms of unequal power relations and
conflicts between international and local interpretations of the “appro-
priate” gender-specificity in social movements and their claims about
public policies. Due to the intermingling of these two contradictory effects
of transnational forces, women’s mobilizations had to — or chose to —
creatively hybridize external and local expectations so that their claims
could reach an audience. The process of hybridizing is ongoing and it is
moderately successful in navigating the sensitivities of an increasingly
anti-democratic national environment and a powerful neoliberal global
regime.
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Conclusion: Domestic violence and contemporary Hungarian women’s
movements
This paper has described and explored successive waves of Hungarian
women’s activism while defining and interpreting domestic violence as
they interact with one another, national politics, the transnational environ-
ment, and the broader social issues of gender and nation. The terms
defining domestic violence has changed from the initial “intimate partner
violence” through various iterations to arrive at the same term, only
slightly modified after nearly two decades of activism and awareness
raising.57 In an environment of economic crisis in Hungary, the focus of
women’s movements has shifted to a selection of gender-specific topics
that already carried a seal of transnational resonance, such as domestic
violence. The transnational socio-economic and cultural forces affecting
Hungary produced not only more openness and diversity of voices in the
public arena but also various limitations on women’s activism. Although
social movements tend to benefit from the increased opportunities for
transnational networking, women’s movements have also been constrained
by the underlying norms and implementation of neo-liberalism.
The contemporary Hungarian case presents a challenge to a mono-
lithic understanding of women’s mobilizations by showing that when
domestic violence emerges as a topic of public debate, successive waves of
movements have tended to downplay the potentially women-specific
arguments in favour of a more gender-neutral framework in hopes of
attracting broader popular support. As Alena Heitlinger and Steven Saxon-
berg point out for the Czech case, despite the obstacles feminists face, it
might be possible to mobilize more people around women’s issues if social
movements frame their arguments in a manner that takes into account the
specific cultural sensitivities of the region.58 The more successful Slovene,
Croat, and Czech cases of recognizing and defining domestic violence and
creating and implementing policies against it serve as evidence that such
harmony between transnational, national, and local contexts is entirely
possible in a post-communist context. In contrast, the current Hungarian
discursive frames tend to portray the sexes as complementary, with women
acting as the more docile figure, in part because of contemporary national-
ist and conservative attitudes, and in part because of the historical legacy
of communism and the contemporary economic crisis, which emphasize
the need for solidarity within the private sphere.
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There are at least three main points of significance in the notable
shift from welfare to narrower, often gender-neutral but trans-nationally
more resonant issues in Hungarian women’s activism.
First, transnational support is becoming a requirement for sus-
tained mobilization, and increasingly so even for partial policy success. At
the same time, resource-dependence, co-optation by Western donors, and
“NGO-ization” (i.e., professionalization) can be to the detriment of
women’s social movements focusing on local concerns.59 It is important to
note that even this otherwise seemingly simple hierarchical relationship
has produced an ongoing and substantial exchange about interpretations of
gender roles and differently lived realities — that is, the expression of
intersectionality and difference between women and their various move-
ments. For example, women’s NGOs from the former communist bloc
have emphasized the inclusion of economic violence, which women’s
NGOs promoted as a fundamental part of defining domestic violence,
much to the chagrin of US-based activists.
Second, the much celebrated and seemingly open neoliberal
system has brought a new set of structural constraints to social movement
activism. These increasingly normalized (and thus, most often invisible),
but powerful constraints cannot be explained by exclusively relying on the
routine argument that Central and Eastern European movements are weak
because the fear inherited from the communist past blocks activism or
women’s continued solidarity with men against the oppressive state.60 The
movements that Hungarian women have produced in the past twenty years
are real-life examples of using the meager benefits of structural changes
while creatively fighting against a political environment that does not want
to take any notice of them. The mobilization against the government’s
position in the form of large, vocal protest in front of the Parliament the
day after István Varga’s now infamous speech shows how effectively
women’s and human rights NGOs can use this admittedly narrow struc-
tural opening.
Third, the activities of women’s groups not only create political
agency but also assist in creating heightened awareness of gender roles, the
extent of gender inequalities, and conflicts with both national and inter-
national norms.61 The price of continued engagement in national political
affairs has been the toning down or complete elimination of gender-
specific and feminist claims in public policies. The usefulness of trans-
national lens is evident in this respect because these women’s movements
would otherwise be barely visible from the traditional standpoint that
focuses on governments and political parties.
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By transferring norms, symbols, terms, best policy and mobiliza-
tion practices that were useful in one setting to another context, trans-
national activism can bring up and help solve public policy problems.62
Either on a temporary basis (as in the case of the 2011 campaign collecting
over 100,000 signatures with the help of a one-time dedicated AVON
network) or longer-term transnational coalitions (such as the network of
NANE, AI, and WAVE), the women’s and human rights NGOs have
reached out to numerous potential partners to gain support for their
definition of problems and then together lobby the public and authorities to
implement favourable policies. To gain more visibility and resonance,
Hungarian women’s movements have frequently applied trans-nationally
interpretable symbolic devices (such as the “red dolls” of domestic
violence victims in the Silent Witnesses campaigns), regularly referred to
the internationally used terms for domestic violence, and used the argu-
ments and data collected abroad to challenge the existing order at home.
As this set of evidence shows, a large selection of women’s groups in
Hungary have moved beyond their national confines, entered trans-
national networks, and applied the framework of human rights norms and
international policy recommendations when lobbying to criminalize
domestic violence. The increasing transnational engagement on their part
during the past twenty years was in part due to necessity, given the per-
sistently conservative interpretation of gender and the popular support for
nationalism. Further exchanges between the local and transnational
contexts may help eventually decrease the gap between interpretations of
gender and nation in post-communist Hungary and lead to an effective
legislation against domestic violence while meaningfully supporting its
many victims.
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